How Will AI Shape the Future of Law? by Koulu, Riikka et al.
How Will AI Shape the Future of  
Law?
EDITED BY RIIKKA KOULU & LAURA KONTIAINEN
2019
Acknowledgements
The editors and the University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab would like to 
thank the authors and interviewees for the time and effort they put 
into their papers.
We would also like to thank the Faculty of Law at University of 
Helsinki and particularly the continuous kind support of Professor 
Kimmo Nuotio, the former dean of the faculty and the Lab’s unofficial 
godfather, for facilitating the Lab’s development and for helping us 
make the second Legal Tech Conference happen.
In addition, we would like to express our gratitude to the conference 
sponsors, Finnish Bar Association, the Association of Finnish Lawyers, 
Edita Publishing, Attorneys at Law Fondia and Attorneys at Law Roschier 
as well as the Legal Design Summit community for their support.
It takes a village to raise a conference. Therefore, we would like to thank 
everyone whose time and commitment has turned the conference and 
this publication from an idea into reality. Thank you to the attendees, 
speakers, volunteers and Legal Tech Lab crew members.
RIIKKA KOULU & LAURA KONTIAINEN
Legal Tech Lab, University of Helsinki
2019
University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab publications
© Authors and Legal Tech Lab
ISBN 978-951-51-5476-7 (print)
ISBN 978-951-51-5477-4 (PDF)
Print Veiters
Helsinki 2019
Contents
Foreword                    009
KIMMO NUOTIO
I Digital Transformation of  the Society?
Legal Tech Con 2018 – How Will AI Shape the Future of Law          017
LAURA KONTIAINEN
Picturing Technological Futures – an Interview with Adam        
Greenfield                        037
JENNI HAKKARAINEN AND KALLE MARKKANEN
II Will Digitalisation Lead to Robojudges?
AI in the Judiciary – an Interview with Dory Reiling                   049
DORY REILING AND LAURA KONTIAINEN
Artificial Intelligence Improving the Delivery of Justice and How   
Courts Operate                                      063
SANNA LUOMA
III Law at Intersections of  Information, Innovation and 
Technology
Smart Legal Information Services                      105
SARI KORHONEN AND ALTTI MIEHO
Exploring News Automation – Notes on Transparency and 
Copyright                         115
ANETTE ALÉN-SAVIKKO
Black Box AI – The Problem with Sufficient Disclosure                    119
ATTE KUISMIN
IV Towards New Horizons of  Law Research
Modelling Justice by Emergence? Rights and Values in AI 
Development                         155
RIIKKA KOULU AND TIMO HONKELA
Towards AI-Driven Society. A Legal Perspective                    195
BEATA MÄIHÄNIEMI, HANNE HIRVONEN, TUOMAS PÖYSTI, 
BURKHARD SCHAFER, DORY REILING, LEO LEPPÄNEN, ANURADHA 
NAYAK AND LAURA LASSILA


009
Foreword
Artificial intelligence is a catch word, very obviously. Policymakers 
just love it. If you have it in your research proposal, you might double 
your chances of getting funding. Even we lawyers have learned to 
use if (even if we would not always be able to say how it differs from 
automation, machine learning and other similar tech catch words). 
Including myself.
Why this is so? We are sure that the artificial intelligence is about to 
come and that it will change many ways we deal with law. We just do 
not yet really know how. 
As such, the topic is not new. If you go through the lists of academic 
articles on artificial intelligence and law, you will find a continuation 
of articles from the 1980’s onwards. And you will also find that the 
articles deal with the topic from a variety of angles.
As could maybe be expected, the articles cover almost anything the 
legal studies cover more generally. You can read about legal reasoning, 
privacy, copyright. You can read about envisioned changes of practices 
in the law firms and the courts. You can read about automatization and 
liability issues. You can read even about applications of AI in the field 
of criminal law. 
010 In my early years as an academic scholar I had some interest in the 
theory of the so-called risk society. One question that was involved 
in the discussions was precisely the one whether technology is a 
blessing or a curse. Is technological development one of the causes of 
trouble as concerns the development of our societies, or could we use 
technological tools for the benefit of the governance of the society – 
and the control of the risks.
One observation in that discussion was that the technological 
development often happens outside of the political process. 
Innovations are just simply adopted without any legal policy debate, 
and the legislature tends to regulate the things after the facts.
In the 1980’s and 1990’s this was an issue when personal computers 
were introduced. This changed the work of the legal profession 
very much as well. There were talks about possible further waves of 
automatization and that routine activities or even more demanding 
decision-making could be automated and handled by machines. Not 
much happened at that front. AI continued to be rather science fiction. 
I did a simple test. I searched the Finnish legal databases in order to 
find traces of any regulations or disputes as regards AI. Not a single hit. 
If you search ‘automation’, you will already find something.
In the aviation law you will find regulation on unmanned aircraft.
And Finland got its first ever Space Act just this year. 
Always when we see that new technologies are about to come, we 
find it difficult to judge how much it will really change. 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have shown that much of 
human reasoning is in fact rather intuitive, and only seldom are we 
able to really reach high standards of rationality in our reasoning. 
The qualities of factual legal reasoning are something that we should 
be looking at more closely. We should not be afraid of getting help, 
011if we can have that. But it seems that we still want out real cases to 
be handled by human beings. Just like we wish to see a barber, not a 
robot.
In any case, maybe the biggest issue is that concerning how we 
adopt the new technologies to serve us. It is extremely important that 
we lawyers are involved in these processes.  It is quite natural that legal 
regulations could slow down this development, and in order to move 
forward, many new legal rules have to be elaborated. Liability issues 
concern accidents in traffic in which automated vehicles take part is a 
clear example. I believe we should be open-minded and curious and let 
the developers show what they can.  
Some other areas are more sensitive. We should be mindful of legal 
cultures and legal traditions; we should adapt AI in law to recognize 
this, just as it does in linguistics. We should use technological tools to 
improve access to justice. We need legal design, bringing law closer to 
people. 
The European union is today planning to introduce a European 
approach to the adoption of AI technologies. The Commission of 
the European Union outlined recently some basics of the European 
approach.  It really makes sense to develop a European approach. This 
we have already seen in other fields as well; data protection being the 
most recent example. In the Communication the Commission states 
that: “This is how EU can make a difference – and be the champion of 
an approach to AI that benefits people and society as a world.” – These 
are big words, and these should be taken very seriously.  Law seems to 
be rather important in this framework.    
As with any transformative technology, artificial intelligence 
may raise new ethical and legal questions, related to liability or 
potentially biased decision-making. New technologies should not 
012 mean new values. The Commission will present ethical guidelines 
on AI development by the end of 2018, based on the EU’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, taking into account principles such as data 
protection and transparency, and building on the work of the European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies. To help develop 
these guidelines, the Commission will bring together all relevant 
stakeholders in a European AI Alliance. By mid-2019 the Commission 
will also issue guidance on the interpretation of the Product Liability 
Directive in the light of technological developments, to ensure legal 
clarity for consumers and producers in case of defective products.”1
Finland could take an active role in contributing to this development 
since due to the upcoming Finnish presidency in the Fall of 2019 
Finland gets to have access to the relevant tables where these things 
are being discussed. The European Union could and should a leader in 
combining high ethical standards with strong development of the tech 
tools. We have rather interesting times ahead of us, since so much is 
still in the making. We should contribute to all this. I think we are.       
I have been happy to see that our Faculty has built for itself a 
profile in legal tech. This we have done in a close collaboration with 
the key players in Finland. Maybe we were a bit latecomers, that is 
what the legal tech freaks would probably say. But law faculties tend 
to be conservative, and things start to happen first when a signal gets 
stronger. 
Some two years ago this started to happen. All this grew out of a 
relatively well-functioning collaboration with legal experts outside of 
the university frames. If I now look back, I believe that some activists 
1 European Commission, Artificial intelligence: Commission outlines a European 
approach to boost investment and set ethical guidelines. Press release, Brussels, 25 
April 2018.
013within the  IT law association of Finland have actually been rather 
important drivers of this development. In 2016 the first Legal Design 
Summit was organized in Helsinki, the Legal Tech Lab was launched, and 
now we have already had the second legal tech conference. Not only 
has the faculty been active, but the university itself has introduced new 
openings. Digital humanities is a new profile for the central campus, 
and our Legal Tech adds an interesting dimension to it. 
When you try something and you see that the students are 
interested in it, then you can be sure that you have done something 
right. Legal tech lab with its various activities, such as the hackathons, 
is also a new way of learning by doing, and transferring knowledge to 
our makers of the future. Maybe even we oldies can have a minor role 
in this. In any case it is great fun to see all this happening.  
Artificial intelligence used to be called science fiction. Now even 
the European commission says its already here. I’m glad we can jointly 
discuss the significance of AI for law. 
KIMMO NUOTIO
Professor, Former Dean of the Faculty of Law
University of Helsinki
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Legal Tech Con 2018 – How Will AI 
Shape the Future of  Law?
LAURA KONTIAINEN1
1 WHAT IS THE LEGAL TECH LAB?
In November 2016, the University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab was 
established as a research hub focused on research of changes of 
digitalisation and law. The idea behind the Lab was that we need more 
information, from both academics and practitioners, to answer the 
challenges that the new technological developments as well as societal 
changes has brought with it to the legal field. 
Our research strategy has loosely defined itself around five different 
areas – (1) foundations of legal digitalisation, (2) algorithmic fairness 
and justice by design, (3) legal approaches to information, (4) societal 
change in institutions and profession, and (5) digital access to justice 
and governance. As digitalisation is a massive theme that cuts through 
the whole field of law, we are approaching the themes from many 
specialties and points of view.
The questions of what digitalisation means in the legal field and 
what kind of changes to law, or interpretation of it, as well as to the 
1 The writer is an LL.M student at University of Helsinki and research assistant at 
the Legal Tech Lab. She wants to thank assistant professor Riikka Koulu for her great 
support in writing this article.
018 legal professions it will bring were key part of the first Legal Tech Lab 
conference in 2017. Last year, in 2018, we held our second Legal Tech 
Con on AI and law, and this  publication is a collection of articles based 
on that conference. In addition to belonging to the Faculty of Law, 
the Lab is also a part of the institutional settings provided by Helsinki 
Centre for Digital Humanities (HELDIG) at the University of Helsinki. 
While a major part of the Lab’s focus is on research, we also take 
part in developing academic structures and collaboration. The Lab 
actively promotes interdisciplinary collaboration within and beyond 
academia and is actively engaged in the creation of working practices 
and methods to this end. We also strive towards broader knowledge 
mobilisation and societal debate on digitalisation of law. Everything 
we do centers around the idea that law is a changing thing, and we 
want to know everything there is to know about how that change is 
happening  –  or should happen.
This conference publication continues to dive deeper into the 
themes of the last Legal Tech Con. It starts with introducing how AI could 
affect the society and law. On the second part judiciary is examined as 
window to what AI use in legal field could look like in practice. The third 
part deals with topics of legal information and intellectual property. 
Finally, the fourth section includes articles on what directions the legal 
research on AI could continue towards. The articles are published as 
they were written, with only small edits to the language.
In addition to the two Legal Tech Cons, The Lab has also 
experimented on cross-discipline pedagogical experiments as a way 
to mobilize knowledge and engage students, with the idea that it is 
not only professions that are changing  –  education of law students 
also can change. One such experiment was a seminar Fairness Aware 
AI with the Department of Computer Science of the University of 
019Helsinki, where law students worked together with data science 
students to define fairness in algorithmic decision-making – a task 
that proved hard, but rewarding as even the question of ‘what is fair?’ 
started a long discussion. Last two years we have also held the Hack 
the Law! hackathon event, which in 2017 when it was first held was a 
new format in legal studies. During the event law students joined with 
students from other fields, such as data science and design to develop 
and create prototypes of products to help professional lawyers in their 
work, or improve the access of disabled citizens to legal services over 
the course of a single weekend, with the help of professionals and 
experts who agreed to mentor them during the event. 
The Lab has also continued with its student volunteer program, 
engaging participants in understanding different questions in 
technology and law and how they themselves want to approach the 
subjects in their future careers. As future law professionals, student 
volunteers for example were interested in researching the current use 
of technology in the work of lawyers and what opinions law school 
alumni had on how their education had prepared them for the new 
technologies. This was done by creating together with the Finnish 
Lawyer Association and the Finnish Bar Association a question-aire 
that was spread widely among Finnish lawyers, and then collaborated 
with the Lab’s postdoctoral researcher Beata Mäihäniemi to write a 
joint article on the changes to work and how that should be reflected 
in the education of law students. The collaboration also had value as 
a pedagogical learning method, and allowed the students to take a 
deeper ownership in the project than traditional coursework.2 
2 Beata Mäihäniemi – Aapo Asp – Anna Band, Työelämätaitojen opettaminen ja 
oppiminen juristikoulutuksessa vastauksena digitalisaatioon. Lakimies 7–8/2018, p. 
1024–1046.
020 As part of the community and dialogue-building aspects of the Lab’s 
mission to foster discussion, we have also strengthened our affiliated 
researcher network and held researcher meetings with affiliated 
researchers, who work on intersections of law, technology, and society. 
These meetings are a way to offer feedback and exchange ideas in a 
non-formal setting, and therefore support the research process of 
participants from a mere idea to full-fledged research.
1.1 BRINGING CLARITY TO DIGITALISATION
In the research of the Lab we approach digitalisation and law 
thematically from a variety of perspectives, but with the united goal of 
understanding the changes happening and bringing clarity to the issues 
involved. The researchers of the Lab have for example done research 
on conflict management, and how it works with new technologies such 
as blockchains3, which in addition to AI has been a much hyped concept 
lately. Another interesting new technological context for law has been 
platform economy, and we have done research on how access to justice 
works within that setting4. From a more interdisciplinary perspective, 
professor Riikka Koulu has also collaborated, among other things, on 
research on the way the expectations of the role of judges in the justice 
system are changing with the digitalisation.5 
3 Riikka Koulu – Kalle Markkanen, Conflict Management for Regulation-Averse 
Blockchains? March 1, 2019. Forthcoming in R.M. Ballardini – O. Pitkänen – P. 
Kuoppamäki, Regulating Industrial Internet through IPR, Data Protection and 
Competition Law. Kluwer Law Int. 2019. 
4 Riikka Koulu – Jenni Hakkarainen, Konfliktinhallinta alustataloudessa. In J. Päläs, & K. 
Määttä (eds.), Jakamistalousjuridiikan käsikirja. Alma Talent 2019. In press.
5 Riikka Koulu – Risto Koulu  – Sanna Koulu, Tuomarin roolit tuomioistuimissa. Alma 
Talent 2019.
021Bringing the theory of algorithmic fairness closer to practice during 
the past year has also been the Lab’s project “Algorithms as Decision 
Makers? The potential and limitations of AI use in public administration”, 
funded by the Finnish Prime Minister’s Office6. The project focused on 
the conditions that need to be fulfilled for the public authorities to 
use of robotics and artificial intelligence in their decision making. The 
research project sought to clarify how current laws and regulations 
work apply to it, and how the regulatory framework for the use of AI 
needs to change for it to be a usable solution in public context. 
The main suggestions made in the final report were to create a unified 
strategy for the use of algorithmic systems by public authorities, as well 
as regulate the use by a general law instead of multiple specialty ones 
so the unified strategy could be made. The base for the suggestions 
was, that it would also make it easier for the public authorities to fulfill 
the requirement that their actions, including automating decision 
making, are based on law.  A third practical suggestion was to limit 
the automation to models using traditional decision-trees. While that 
would limit the complexity of the cases where automation could be 
used, it would help find a balance between legal protections of the 
subject of the decision and the benefits of automation in practice.
While regulatory framework is something that different 
stakeholders adopting AI technologies are interested in, the last 
few years there has also been an increasing effort to think about AI 
ethics. Ethical guidelines for both developers of AI, and parties using 
them have been published by multiple sources such as EU, scholars 
and tech companies themselves. As a result, the question of ethics 
6 Riikka Koulu – Beata Mäihäniemi – Vesa Kyyrönen – Jenni Hakkarainen – Kalle 
Markkanen, Algoritmi päätöksentekijänä? Tekoälyn hyödyntämisen mahdollisuudet 
ja haasteet kansallisessa sääntely-ympäristössä, Valtioneuvoston selvitys- ja 
tutkimustoiminnan julkaisusarja 2019:44. Valtioneuvoston kanslia 25.6.2019. 
022 washing has also come up – are we turning to guidelines as soft law 
instead of regulation?7 Assistant professor Riikka Koulu is also taking 
part in the ACT (Autonomy through cyberjustice technologies) project 
at the Cyberjustice Laboratory at Université de Montréal and McGill 
University8. ACT has the goal of moving forward, and developing a 
governance framework to complement the variety of AI guidelines in 
ensuring fair use of AI for justice9.
As the latest, just starting large scale project, the Lab concentrates 
on algorithmic transparency. It is an often proposed solution, including 
by the EU and the European Commission as well as many of the self-
regulatory industry guidelines10. The idea behind transparency as a 
solution is that it allows for people to understand the way an algorithm 
works – or possibly auditors, or any outside party whose job it would 
be to ensure that the algorithm works in a fair manner. Some problems 
with transparency as a solution are that the differing interests and 
clarification of just what is meant by transparency – what should be 
7 See for example Thilo Hagendorf, The Ethics of AI ethics: an Evaluation of Guidelines. 
arXiv preprint 2019. Available at https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1903/1903.03425.
pdf. See also Ben Wagner, Ethics as an Escape From Regulation: From “Ethics-Washing” 
to Ethics-Shopping? Pages 84–89  in Emre Bayamlioğlu – Irina Baraliuc – Liisa Janssens 
– Mireille Hildebrandt (eds.), Being Profiled: Cogitas Ergo Sum: 10 Years of Profiling the 
European Citizen. Amsterdam University Press 2018. 
8 Project website: https://www.cyberjustice.ca/en/, accessed 6.8.2019.
9 See e.g. Neil Gunningham - Joseph Rees, Industry self-regulation: An institutional 
perspective. (United Kingdom)(Special Issue on Self-Regulation). Law & Policy, 19(4) 
1997, pp. 363-414, p. 366, 370; Bert-Jaap Koops, Should Self-Regulation be the Starting 
Point? P. 109-149 in Bert-Jaap Koops - Corien Prins - Maurice Schellekens - Miriam Lips 
(eds.), Starting Points for ICT Regulation : Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-liners. 
T.M.C. Asser Press 2006. Especially p. 124-126. 
10 See, e.g. AI HLEG (High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence), Ethics 
Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. European Commission 2019; Microsoft, Our Approach 
to AI, available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ai/our-approach-to-ai; IBM, 
Everyday Ethics for Artificial Intelligence, available at ibm.biz/everydayethics, websites 
accessed 6.8.2019.
023open, and to whom – is not as easy as just using the term, and that it 
requires vigilance to spot the possible problems with the algorithms 
as they appear, instead of ex ante control. The new research project 
ALGOT (Potential and Boundaries of Algorithmic Transparency), which 
the Lab is part of, is focused on creating a  socio-legal analysis of 
algorithmic transparency and its use in algorithmic governance.
2 BUSTING THE MYTHS OF AI
A little over a year ago, when thinking about this conference, the Lab 
reflected on how fast the technology – and the talk about technology – 
is changing. Today’s buzzwords become old news fast, and the changing 
terminology does not make it easy to stay on top of the discussion. For 
the conference of 2018 we wanted to encourage more discussion and 
research between all stakeholders and everyone interested by bringing 
some clarity to the table, as well as try to separate hype from realistic 
paths of development for the future. We also wanted to question what 
we talk about when we talk about AI – what is AI, and what questions 
should we be asking and focusing on instead of assuming – in good 
or in bad – things that are not actually that relevant. For law, with its 
normative function, it is especially important that it is based on true 
understanding and correct assumptions of what is regulated. Our idea 
was to demystify AI (as well as law), and move the discussion towards 
practicalities from sci-fi where it had for decades been in popular 
discourse. 
As the Lab wants to not only do research, but also popularize it, 
as well as mobilise knowledge, we didn’t want the conference to 
remain only interesting for academics. We chose AI as our theme, as 
024 it is talked about a lot, but still remains somewhat elusive in common 
understanding — especially when it comes to practical applications in 
the field of law. We wanted the conference to bring together people 
from multiple fields, to share their expertise and expectations on how 
the developing AI technologies will affect society and legal professions, 
as well as what is purely hype and what is reality in technological 
development. The AI as a very contemporary theme also reflects 
our larger research interest of change, in being a good showcase for 
questions of how is law changing in answer to the changes of society 
and technological development.
Our goal during the conference was to find answers to the question 
of “how should AI be used?”, and our speakers rose to the challenge of 
answering the question from many perspectives during the conference. 
This question is shared by people across fields of study, and as a part 
of holding the conference, we hoped to inspire an exchange of ideas 
between people from different areas of law, as well as outside law. 
The question on how we can beneficially AI in the society touches 
everyone, and we wanted to popularize the research done in the 
subject – by having short science pitches from researchers, as well by 
inviting student panelists to talk about their subjects of interests in the 
field.
2.1 WHAT’S THE PROBLEM WITH AI (AND IS IT REALLY AN AI 
PROBLEM)?
The last few years have seen artificial intelligence (AI) become a major 
buzzword in the discussion about digitalisation and law. For its small 
share, the Lab has taken part in this dialogue in the hope of offering 
Nordic and European perspectives to the discussions on AI ethics and 
025technology regulation. As professor Kimmo Nuotio from the faculty 
of law of University of Helsinki stated in his opening remarks during 
the 2018 conference, the ethical and legal perspective is the implicit 
strength that legal scholars have and should bring to debates on 
digitalisation of the society. 
More and more decision-making in different situations is being 
outsourced to algorithms, or at least uses algorithms to supplement 
the decisions made by a human. As data based decision-making 
technologies are developed, their accuracy increases, but the amount of 
data used – or the logic of the decision-making itself – becomes harder 
for humans to understand and handle. Nowadays the automation of 
decision-making happens also in situations which have a profound 
impact on our lives – our job, social security benefits and health, for 
example. That makes it critical that we can be sure of the decisions 
made on, for example, how to distribute healthcare resources, can be 
considered fair and acceptable – whatever we consider the criteria 
for fairness or acceptable results. The algorithms therefore cannot be 
hidden in Frank Pasquale’s famous Black Box11, where no one can later 
verify how they worked.
Already at the time of the conference the discussion about 
regulating new technologies had increasingly started to concentrate on 
data centric technologies, increasing pressure for practical measures. 
An example of this was the GDPR, which in the area of European Union 
made changes to the regulation concerning the  use of personal data  – 
including in automated decision-making. As automation has increased 
and become more widely used, the problems of profiling or predictive 
11 Pasquale defined Black Box in this context as “ a system whose workings are 
mysterious; we can observe its inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one 
becomes the other.” See Frank Pasquale, the Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms 
that Control Money and Information. Harvard University Press 2015. p. 3.
026 algorithms, such as re-enforcing historical bias, have become more 
obvious and a part of the public discussion. As talk of ethics of AI has 
become more common, many private and public sector stakeholders 
have created ethical guidelines and principles for developing and 
utilizing new technologies in a fair manner12, as self-regulatory 
measures. The focus on ethical guidelines has also been criticised and 
called ethics washing, for example by Ben Wagner who has written that 
technology policy makers focused on ethical guidelines are “Unable 
or unwilling to properly provide regulatory solutions, ethics is seen as 
the ‘easy’ or ‘soft’ option which can help structure and give meaning 
to existing self-regulatory initiatives”.13There remains a need for more 
concrete governance which can complement the softer guidelines of 
ethics, but allow for stronger protections when needed. While often 
the question of regulation is on whether and in which manner allow 
for the use of new technologies, the technology could also change the 
fundamental understanding we have of law and legal systems.
The field of data centric technologies is vast, and not very clear – and 
partly as a result we do not have consensus on what are the problems 
we are trying to solve. During the conference our first keynote speaker, 
renowned writer and urbanist Adam Greenfield gave one perspective 
on that when he talked about what the changes to the society and 
law  could look like. He talked about the development of algorithms 
and what a world made on the terms of terms of technology instead 
of humans could look like. He pictured a possible future of algorithmic 
jurisprudence, which as a concept brings algorithms even to the most 
12 See for example Google AI, available at: https://ai.google/responsibilities/
responsible-ai-practices/; High Level Expert Group on AI (set up by European 
Commission), Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, 8.4.2019. Available at https://
ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation. Both accessed 6.8.2019.
13 Wagner 2018, p. 84.
027sacred area of judicial system, and brings up questions of optimizing 
legislation for specific goals, instead of principles. His view was not that 
of a traditional legal scholar, who would probably start with principles 
that legal traditions have formed throughout the history, but showed 
well that as the technology becomes part of all spheres of society, 
including the justice system, we need to be prepared to justify why 
these principles matter and need to be the base for the system even 
in the future. 
One reason why the discussion on new technologies is unclear is 
that we don’t necessarily have an answer to a question: “what we talk 
about, when we talk about AI?”. In addition to tackling the challenge 
of interdisciplinary interaction between sciences, we don’t have clear 
enough terminology for exact discussion on AI and new technology as 
a whole, either from the perspective of ethics or law. We talk about AI, 
automation of decision making, algorithms, and sometimes also about 
the larger scale of digitalisation or datafication of the society. All of 
the terms carry their own nuances – AI bringing into mind possible 
personality and citizenship of humanlike robots, algorithms on the 
other hand mostly numbers and letters running on the screen. While 
the nuances can be clear to someone who knows the topic well, it can 
make the discussion harder to follow to those who do not. 
In the discussion of technology, digitalisation or datafication, no 
matter what terms we choose, the central question is that of data, 
which adds even more directions for the discussion – such as the 
problematics of privacy, or the subjectiveness of data, which is always 
socially constructed – that need to be taken into account when actually 
moving from theoretical talk towards practical solutions in society and 
on regulatory level.
028 As a short summary, using algorithms in decision-making can be 
understood as an umbrella term for multiple different types of uses of 
developing technology in the decision-making process. The algorithms 
can be used to aid decision-makers in their task, by, for example, 
profiling clients, or the decisions can be made by the algorithms with 
no final input from a human. Algorithms can, for example, use big data, 
gathered from multiple sources and combined in a manner that was 
never expected by the person leaving breadcrumbs of information 
around the internet. Or the algorithm could only have access to a single 
information sheet that a person submits to an insurance company 
for the explicit purpose of being used to make a decision of granting 
insurance. When it comes to regulating use algorithms or AI in decision 
making, this definition creates a challenge.
2.2 JUSTICE IS ELUSIVE - WHAT DO WE MEAN BY FAIRNESS?
If the terminology of technology can be unclear, similar challenge 
comes from trying to define another key term in the discussion of law 
and technology, fairness itself. It is a good example of a concept that 
is deceptively simple. It is also something that people have a strong 
intuitive feeling about – even small children can recognize if something 
feels unfair. In larger, society wide scale, it becomes far harder to create 
principles of fairness that everyone could agree on – and legal scholars 
have spent probably the whole history of legal scholarship trying. 
Part of the fairness discussion in AI context has been the question of 
algorithmic fairness, especially from the perspective of discrimination.
Algorithmic fairness means that the algorithm produces fair results 
– for a given value of “fair”. For the coders of the algorithm it relates 
to choices they make – what weight to give to different data points, 
029what data to discard from the decision-making completely and how 
to recognize bias in historical data used for machine learning. When 
it comes to defining what kinds of results we consider fair, however, 
it also becomes a question for policy makers and sociologist – do we 
want the algorithm to try and balance out historical imbalances and 
discrimination, by, for example, positive discrimination of minorities?
From the perspective of legal scholars to whom the long history 
of the concept of fairness is familiar, the question is often not about 
individual cases, but of finding out if there are justifications for different 
treatment of people. In cases of discrimination, this also ties together 
strongly with the assumption of discrimination and switched burden 
of proof as procedural principles, which place to onus of showing that 
their actions were justified on the party accused of discrimination. The 
different perspectives that experts in multiple views have on fairness, 
mean that to even understand where everyone is coming from, we 
need to start by defining the perspectives and key terms that we are 
using. 
As the questions of algorithmic fairness, and how to use new 
technologies do not sit only within one field of research, it is clear 
that interdisciplinary work on the subject is necessary to get a 
comprehensive picture of the topic. To avoid reducing the knowledge 
and rich research tradition of different disciplines, from which the 
ambiguity of terminology stems from, to their bare-bones versions, 
experts from multiple disciplines are needed.
During the conference, Indrė Žliobaitė, our second speaker, who 
talked about AI and deep learning from data science perspective, and 
also gave an example on the limits of a single field of science working 
on it’s own. Her speech highlighted the challenges that the writers of 
algorithms are facing, such as biased data and algorithmic fairness. 
030 These lead to the need to also understand the social background of 
the historical data, as well as the results that the algorithm should get. 
For this kind of comprehensive picture, translating the expertise of one 
discipline to the language of others is necessary.
Part of the problem in interdisciplinary work – especially as far 
apart as social sciences, law and data sciences can be – has often been 
the lack of understanding between researchers. Different sciences 
understand social realities differently, and do not always share similar 
knowledge interests that could be used as a base for shared research 
or other work. In this publication, these challenges are talked about  by 
Riikka Koulu and Timo Honkela in a joint article on algorithmic ethics, 
where they frame approach the topic from the perspectives of their 
different fields of research, and attempt to reach an understanding 
that could form a base for further interdisciplinary research.
2.3 FINDING A MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN HYPE AND FEAR?
Automating decision-making is a tempting option to human made 
decisions in many situations where the number of clients is large, and 
the amount of usable data gives an opportunity for more accurate 
predictions, as the algorithms can make meaningful correlations 
that are not obvious to human decision-makers and their accuracy 
increases with the larger scale of data available for learning. Other 
benefits for automation are that it allows for faster decision-making 
processes – which, especially when it comes to public authorities, can 
be a part of good governance as well a matter of access to justice. 
Optimistically algorithms have often been considered more value-
neutral and unpolitical, avoiding thus the biases of humans as well as 
discrimination, but more and more the questions of both privacy and 
031individual’s control over their data, as well as AI ethics and algorithmic 
fairness have risen.
We have visions of both utopias and dystopias – from decades old 
sci-fi stories where people do not need to work as everything happens 
automatically to films where prediction algorithms cause innocents 
be judged for future crimes they might commit. Keeping the dialogue 
realistic, somewhere in between of the fears or too careless optimism 
is not easy, with these kinds of strong emotional images in our minds. 
While it is now increasingly clear that the most optimistic views on 
adaptation of data centric technologies are not the full picture, neither 
is the opposite view – and to dispel both the positive and negative 
hype in a constructive manner, we need clarity on the subject of the 
discussion, as well as realistic ways to adopt data centric technologies 
with positive impact.
3 DIGITALISATION OF LEGAL PRACTICES 
As the development of AI and digitalisation on larger scale affects law 
and our understanding of it, it also has an effect on professions and 
institutions, changing the role of legal professionals.
The questions of how to practically benefit from digitalisation have 
become more mainstream in the legal field, on a smaller scale with the 
development of tools for lawyers and citizens which can streamline 
processes and remove barriers to access to justice. On a larger scale, 
many governments researching the possibilities of automatisation of 
public services. 
For professionals and law students this means getting used to 
working with digital tools, such as AI – in many predictions, the future 
of lawyers involves a stronger focus on tasks that require higher 
032 expertise, whereas simpler research and contract writing could be 
automated. Sari Korhonen and Altti Mieho from Edita Publishing 
talk about how these changes reflect on legal information in their 
article on smart legal information services. The development of new 
kinds of tools is also something that needs to be taken into account 
while training future lawyers and other professionals, and it poses a 
challenge for a field where the students often get their first experience 
of work by helping with the routine cases as interns. 
To gain a better understanding on what digitalisation looks like 
through the eyes of people working with law, we invited lawyers, 
researchers, as well as our final keynote speaker Dory Reiling who has 
decades of experience on the subject, to share their ideas and thoughts 
on digitalisation and law.
As the idea behind the conference was not to make it fully an 
academic endeavor, but also include the visions of the future from 
the field, the conference included a professional panel of current 
legal specialists where they addressed the the future of lawyers as a 
profession. 
From the side of future professionals, the panel discussion was 
followed by three student writers, who were invited to present their 
current work on the topic of AI, and gain feedback from people who 
had more practical experience in the topics. The speeches included 
topics of patentability of black box AI and whether they, the positive 
effect AI could have on access to justice in the courts, as well as data 
breaches and hacker ethics. In their articles in this publication, the 
student presentors delve deeper into these topics.
0333.1 GIVING NEW MEANINGS TO THE LEGAL CONCEPTS IN THE 
COURTS
The concluding keynote speech that summarized all the discussion was 
given by dr. Dory Reiling, an independent IT and judicial reform expert 
as well as a retired senior judge of Amsterdam District Court, who lent 
her considerable experience on how to translate technological hype 
into justice reforms – a task she had experience of throughout her 
career. According to her, the changes to the work of lawyers, or judges 
are inevitable. Majority of the cases that courts deal with day to day 
basis are relatively simple, and do not require much consideration on 
the part of the judge. She however stated that the courts with human 
judges are more of a changeforce for the future than a thing of the 
past, as the courts with human judges  excel at as the giving of new 
meanings to concepts in different contexts, in order to get to a just 
result. 
This reflected the talk of professors Riikka Koulu and  Timo Honkela, 
who is an expert of artificial intelligence. They also discussed meaning 
negotiations and how focusing on developing algorithms capable of 
that could resolve conflicts based on misunderstandings between 
people. While a need for more explicit meaning negotiation happens 
all over human interactions, and creating algorithms capable of it in 
general could be an intense effort, smaller scale meaning negotiation 
of terms in a court room – of giving definition to legal concepts, is 
something that could remain the manual task of the courts.
Part of the idea for the conference was also to bring forth new 
directions of research – what kinds of AI related questions are of 
interest right now and in the future in different fields of law. The 
pre-conference workshop chaired by Beata Mäihäniemi and Hanne 
034 Hirvonen from the Legal Tech Lab, the science pitches during the 
conference as well as the student presentors gave an opportunity for 
both established researchers and students to throw into air ideas that 
they were working on and thinking about last year. 
As the actual conference was built around the idea of popularizing 
the complex issues of AI and law, the Lab also organized a pre-conference 
workshop for researchers. The questions raised in the pre-conference 
workshop were centered around the theme of how to best use AI to 
serve the society. The workshop participants brought forth multiple 
different views on the matter, representing in their specialties various 
legal specialties, such as criminal and contract law. These perspectives 
are represented in the article rising from the workshop discussions 
and experiences as well as the abstracts from the participants, where 
Beata Mäihäniemi and Hanne Hirvonen write about the current and 
possible directions the regulation of AI can take.
During the conference the research perspective was shown in 
the science pitches The idea of the science pitches is familiar from 
multiple tv shows. Everyone was given a short time in which everyone 
participating could explain what they were working on – to pitch their 
research projects in just seven minutes. The format allowed for a 
variety of different topics to be raised, and demonstrated well how AI 
can have an effect all over the society – and law as a reflection of it. 
Some changes the researchers saw happening were to IP law – and 
the concept of authorship, reflecting also the first keynote speaker 
Adam Greenfield’s speech where he asked if it even matters anymore if 
a human or a machine made a song or a painting the audience enjoys, to 
the changes to insurances when marine vessels become autonomous, 
to the Estonian E-residency experiment and meaning of borders. These 
also reflected the previous talk from Burkhard Schafer, where he used 
035traffic – and the changes to social relations and communication since 
the invention of cars – as an example of new technology that can lead 
to changes in the legal environment.
4 OUTCOMES
When it comes to AI, the problems are complex, rising from multiple 
different sources. Currently much of the discussion is centered on 
individual rights, and fairness from the perspective of an individual. 
The questions touch topics such as fundamental and human rights, 
especially right to be protected from discrimination, and, as a specialty 
of governmental operators, include requirements for good governance. 
The centrality of rights of the individual, and limitations to the use of 
governmental power provide a framework for decision-making that 
does not consider whether the decision was made by traditional 
human means, or by an algorithm – whereas such consideration needs 
to be taken in the discussion of liabilities when the system does not 
work as expected.
The discussion of how new technology will affect law and society is 
not new, as professor Kimmo Nuotio said in his opening speech of the 
Legal Tech Con 2018, but the lawyers strength in it is bringing to the 
table knowledge of law and ethics. Changes to the law and world can 
happen, and Adam Greenfield gave one vision of changes happening 
on a fundamental level of both in his keynote speech. A perspective 
on how new technological advances have both now and historically 
created societal changes which then lead to legal environment 
changing was shown by Burkhard Schafer during his keynote speech. 
Dr. Dory Reiling also had the view that we can be certain that change 
036 is happening – but we can work with the changes instead of battling 
them. 
To work with these changes, or direct them the way we want, 
interdisciplinary dialogue is needed, as highlighted by assistant 
professors Indrė Žliobaitė and Riikka Koulu and professor Timo Honkela. 
The science pitches showed that the change is happening all over, from 
IP law to insurance field, to concepts of nationality and borders, and 
the student perspectives brought forth questions of applicability of 
current legal instruments such as patents to algorithms, possibilities 
of technology to access to justice, and how so called “ethical hackers” 
challenge what needs to be criminalized in modern society.
The discussion of how will AI change the future – and how we 
should use AI draws from the fundamental basis of our legal and 
societal system, and continues the dialogue that has been going on 
on technological advancement since forever. As the topic is fluid, and 
the questions complex, no definitive answers can be given that would 
answer the questions the Legal Tech Con 2018 was based on. Still, the 
conference fulfilled it’s purpose of fostering dialogue and bringing 
clarity to the issues surrounding it.
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Picturing Technological Futures – 
an Interview with Adam Greenfield
JENNI HAKKARAINEN & KALLE MARKKANEN1
Adam Greenfield, an American writer and author of Radical Technologies, 
gave the opening keynote speech at a Legal Tech Conference “How 
will AI change the future of law?”, held at the University of Helsinki 
on June 2018.  Technological development has narrowed the gap 
between artificial intelligence and human generated intelligence. As 
Mr. Greenfield described, AI can already mimic human expression in 
arts and has been used in e.g. automating tasks previously done by 
humans. As pointed out by Mr. Greenfield, jurisprudence may well 
be a domain where algorithmic automation is utilized in the future. 
However, one of the key messages from Mr. Greenfield was that the 
development is not and should not be inevitable, even though this 
deterministic line of development is overemphasized in the current 
discourse. 
Mr. Greenfield ended his keynote with a question addressed to 
the audience. “How can we enact the conditions of justice in a world 
that is rapidly absconding from our understanding?” This provoking 
question resulted to a lively conversation among the conference 
participants about e.g. the future of lawyers and the meaning of conflict 
1 Doctoral student Jenni Hakkarainen and LL.M student Kalle Markkanen from the 
University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab.
038 management This article is a short interview of Mr. Adam Greenfield 
by Jenni Hakkarainen and Kalle Markkanen, made shortly after Mr. 
Greenfield’s keynote. The interviewers both work at the University of 
Helsinki Legal Tech Lab.
In your book, you are talking about technologies that mediate 
modern radicalism. At the presentation, you were talking about how 
the world is slowly reduced into a set of rules. Usually radicalism 
results into opposing the rules. How do you see radicalism today?
Let’s first be clear that when I talk about “radicalism” in this context, I 
by no means mean radical politics.
I personally consider myself as somebody of the left. I’m committed 
to that tradition, I’m committed to what we might think of as an 
emancipatory or a liberatory politics. I don’t by any stretch of the 
imagination think these technologies necessarily are radical in that 
sense. So when I say “radical technologies,” I mean technologies 
that act at the root of our conception of ourselves as individuals and 
collectivities. The technologies that we discuss in the book almost all 
pass that test. These are things that present real challenges to our very 
framings of the world, and who we are in the world.
You said that the change is not inevitable. If it happens, can we adapt 
to it?
We are an extraordinarily flexible species. We can adapt to anything 
right up to the point of extinction-level events. In anything short of 
physical extinction, there will be some human beings who will find a 
way to come to terms with it.
039There will always be people in the world until the moment there 
are not, and those people will have a society. They will have a way 
of understanding themselves and who they are that will shape itself 
around whatever the physical, material facts of that moment in time 
are. If this particular set of potentials [around AI] we’ve been discussing 
comes to fruition, our societies will mold themselves around it, and 
then begin to act on that sets of potentials in line with their own 
desires and articulated needs.
Human society as a whole absolutely can flow like water around 
whatever obstacles are in its path, sure. As it happens, though, I was 
born in a particular place at a particular time, and I personally might 
not be able to adapt to that changed set of circumstances. Individual 
people can be pushed to the point of breaking relatively easily. Which, 
in turn, is an ethical concern. That is something you do not want on 
your conscience if you are a designer or a developer of technology. You 
do not want to push people to the breaking limit.
Who do you place you trust in if individual human beings cannot do 
much. What is the role of society as a whole or the community or 
nation states, who should we trust?
I do not think we should necessarily trust any given party. I think we 
should trust politics. We should trust our ability to contest and to enact 
new realities based on our dissenting view of the world. Right now, we 
are not doing that.
040 Who is the active party in this. Is it us as individuals, or do we have 
any structures that would somehow support the move towards this 
posthuman politics you are talking of?
Yes, I think there have to be structures that mediate between the 
individual and the world. Inasmuch as I am an individual myself and I 
insist on my individual prerogatives to a very great degree, I also think 
politics based on individualism has been almost fatal for the cohesion 
of any kind of ongoing purposive collective endeavor that is aimed at 
enacting reasonable human values.
Since 1979 or 1980 or so, [public discourse] has been all too much 
about the individual, and less and less about collective articulations. 
We need to rediscover how is that we can come together in one 
another’s presence — open, vulnerable to one another, but collectively 
articulating some sense of a shared understanding of the world. And 
there have to be structures that mediate between these two things.
Do they look a lot like nation states or political parties?
You know, I don’t think they do. I think they take on forms that the 
moment gives us. I do not know necessarily know what that looks 
like, but I can tell you I don’t think it probably looks a whole lot like a 
traditional political party.
What is the role of law in all this? In this world of advanced capitalism, 
law is usually criticized for being an instrument for capitalism. Do you 
see any other roles law might have or does it have to take any other 
roles?
041I am sympathetic to the Critical Law Studies perspective, but I don’t 
think it’s the whole truth. In my lifetime, I have understood lawyers as 
specialists in the resolution of human conflict. And that’s deeper than 
merely enacting one or another set of power interests in any given 
moment of time. I think there is a world out there that is not simply 
cynically about power.
It is of course critical how we think about power in a deeper sense, 
about how we negotiate the allocation of power in the world. But I 
do not necessarily think that the practice of law is always corrupt or 
always rotten at its root. I think there’s a vocabulary there and a set of 
traditions, particularly rights discourses, that I find to be very powerful 
in giving people a sense of their own agency. I wouldn’t want to throw 
that away for the sake of being impeccably critical.
You said you trust in politics. Is there a role for tech developers or the 
way we make new technologies?
Yes, but only if they develop a whole lot more reflexivity. I think tech 
developers as a class have tended to be blind to the fact that they are 
a class. The developers of technology have been almost entirely mute 
as to the ways in which the things they develop do articulate their own 
class interests. The extraordinary homogeneity of the technological 
development community leads it far astray in terms of developing 
things that are of maximal utility precisely to a household of 25-year-
olds with relatively few commitments, who are sharing a house in the 
Mission District in San Francisco, who have undocumented immigrants 
doing their laundry through an app and so on.
In the book, I said “a time of radical technologies demands a 
generation of radical technologists,” and I really believe that. However, 
042 right now you don’t see very many radical technologists, and I think 
it’s largely because privilege and comfort tend to blind people to the 
implications of their acts.
Do you see individuals could also take part in the development of 
technologies, or are we even forced to take part?
Nothing distresses me more than the claim that the only way to 
participate is to learn to code, or that everybody should learn to code, 
or that STEM education is somehow more important than anything 
else in life.
That’s why I say I believe in politics. I believe there are all kinds of ways 
to contribute to the shaping of our collective existence. Technological 
inventions are a powerful one, particularly at the moment. There 
are also other processes that function as brakes or constraints on 
technological development. There are all kinds of human learning 
styles, all kinds of human expression styles and it seems highly unlikely 
that the only way that you can make a difference as an individual is 
to learn how to design technological systems, products and services. I 
find this improbable.
So every lawyer is not required to learn how to program?
No — god, no. That is, again, what small, cross-functional affinity 
groups are about. There should be local collectives [dedicated to 
activism around technosocial issues] where somebody brings to the 
table their technological expertise, somebody else brings to the table 
their policy expertise and somebody else again brings to the table their 
comfort and familiarity of the law. Working together they not merely 
043raise the competence of each individual, but they also form something 
that is more than the sum of its parts, something that has a throw 
weight and an ability to enact change in the world.
This is why I have always believed in interdisciplinary — or probably 
a better way of putting it is undisciplinary — education, where silos 
and boundaries between modes of knowledge are effaced. It’s true 
that there is a lot of good in learning from other people in your own 
technical specialty, but I think the grandeur lies in the confrontation 
with someone who does not share that vocabulary. There’s no way 
of learning more efficient than being compelled to explain something 
complicated to somebody who doesn’t know anything about it. You’ve 
never truly mastered your own field until you can communicate its 
essence to people who do not share that perspective. That is where I 
think all the power lies.
Do you have a vision how to get there, since the networks we are 
surrounded by are more likely to support the silos we are in.
This is where I think concerted long-term effort on the part of individuals 
consciously operating in networks is the only thing that can work at all.
That puts a lot of pressure and responsibility to the individuals.
Yes, that burden falls upon our shoulders. I think that is the moment 
we find ourselves in. I don’t see any other way around that. There are 
certainly no magical solutions to this. I don’t think even the collective 
power of state regulation can necessarily do much to stop [AI] systems 
in their tracks.
044 You know, “overdetermined” is a word I keep coming back to. I 
would never say anything is inevitable, but the array of forces with 
great power that are invested in a certain set of outcomes around AI 
is so great that there is an extraordinary need for us as individuals to 
become aware of what the implications are for us and how we can 
push back against what we’re being offered. We need to develop new 
skills, new affinities, new connections, and the will to make things 
different than they are right now. 
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Will Digitalisation Lead 
to Robojudges?
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AI in the Judiciary – an Interview with 
Dory Reiling
DORY REILING & LAURA KONTIAINEN1
Dr. Dory Reiling is a renowned IT and judicial reform expert, who 
has previously, among other things, worked as a senior judge in 
Amsterdam district court. She has published widely on judicial reform 
as well as on IT and courts. During the Legal Tech Con 2018 she held 
a keynote speech on the topic of ’How to translate hype into actual 
justice reforms’. In this interview she talks about the same topic, her 
experiences in how to utilize AI in judiciary as well as what challenges 
that poses.
To begin with, what does using AI in the judiciary mean? How can AI 
be used in court? 
Artificial intelligence can fulfill different roles for different case types/
disposition processes in the courts. Some of them have already proved 
to be useful.
Firstly, structuring information. In complex cases, pattern 
recognition can be useful in test documents and case files. An example 
from the US is eDiscovery, automated document examination for 
1 This interview was conducted through email, answers were written by dr. Dory 
Reiling and edited by Laura Kontiainen.
050 disclosure. eDiscovery uses learning artificial intelligence, which learns 
through training what the best algorithm is to extract the relevant 
sections from a large quantity of information. The parties in the case 
agree on the search terms and coding to be used. The judge decides on 
the agreement. This methodology for document research is recognized 
by courts in the US and the UK. It is faster and more accurate than 
examination done by humans. 
Secondly: advising. AI that can advise can be useful for people who 
need a solution for their problem, but also for legal professionals. In 
this case, AI not only collects relevant information, but it also answers 
a question. The user is free to decide whether he or she will follow 
the advice. This function can help people help themselves more, and 
thereby prevent disputes. If that is unsuccessful, support in finding a 
solution is an option. Support for working out a solution, or at least 
parts of it, can help make the judicial examination more of a routine 
exercise. A proven example is the Solution Explorer at the Civil 
Resolution Tribunal in British Columbia in Canada, which uses simple 
AI. 
Thirdly: Predicting. There is a high level of interest in AI that says 
it can predict outcomes of judicial proceedings. An unpredictable 
outcome of a court case is a risk. With more complex cases, this risk 
increases. Hence, these is a lot of interest in AI that claims to limit that 
risk. In the US, AI tools are on offer commercially. This means that the 
workings, as trade secrets, are not transparent. Nevertheless, some 
tools provide some insight in how they work. A group of American 
scholars has developed an application which says it can predict the 
outcome of a case before the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The application uses information about the case, but also about the 
political preferences and the voting record of the individual judges. 
051The application claims 70% accuracy. The application that describes 
its workings in most detail is one that claims to predict outcomes of 
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights. This tool predicts 
whether in a given situation the Court will decide whether a certain 
clause of the Convention was breached. The tool works with earlier 
judgments. This means that the material the AI works with is already 
the result of a lot of complexity reduction. The tool claims 79% accuracy. 
The creators think the tool can be a useful help for judges because 
of its pattern recognition in a text document. Another example from 
the US is predicting recidivism in criminal cases. US judges use this 
tool in their daily practice. Meanwhile, the tool has been proven to 
overestimate recidivism in African-American defendants because it 
uses data from the past. 
Finally, a last example: profiling. At least one legal tech firm in the 
US offers judge profiles for a fee. Their workings are not public, I have 
no information about their accuracy.
What are the benefits for increasing digitalization or using AI in the 
judiciary? 
 
Court cases are governed by the right to a fair procedure, in Europe laid 
down in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Digital procedures can bring considerable improvements to the way a 
court procedure complies with article 6 ECHR. Compliance with the 
right to a fair procedure in Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights increased:
•	 Easier court access through digital case filing. 
052 •	 Equal access to information and increased transparency 
since parties’ lawyers all have access to the digital case file. 
•	 Less delay with instant messaging and automated case 
management. In one of our pilot courts, one full adversarial 
procedure, including a hearing, was completed in seven 
weeks. 
Other improvements can be, for instance, increased Information 
security: digital documents are kept in a persistent format with 
metadata on their status. And moreover, process information is now 
public.
Are there some kinds of cases that are unsuitable for digital processes? 
What kinds of cases on the other hand are best candidates to move 
completely to the digital realm? Are the majority of the cases that 
come to court closer to which end?
Court IT can be many different things. It helps to understand what 
it is that courts do. Courts decide disputes, they also have a shadow 
function when their decisions are a guideline for behavior by 
others than parties to a case. Deciding disputes involves processing 
information. How courts process information is relevant for the kind of 
IT that is useful for courts.  Parties, be they the prosecution, someone 
appealing an administrative decision, a couple requesting a divorce 
or a party to a civil case, bring information to court. In most cases, 
another party is involved: the defendant, an administrative body, a 
party contesting a civil claim. The court processes the information, and 
at the end of the process produces a result, an outcome. This outcome 
is new information. Courts transform information, and turn it into new 
information that can be of use for the parties involved. However, Hazel 
053Genns Paths to Justice research has shown that court decisions do not 
always solve the underlying problem.2
How courts process information is largely determined by two 
factors: (1) how unpredictable is the outcome, and (2) what is the 
relation between the parties? On this basis, cases can be divided into 
four groups. Below is first a description of the concept.
Group one: A package of information comes into the court 
(someone files a case), that information can be sufficient to decide 
the outcome of the case in question. For example, a money claim that 
remains undefended, or a one-sided request that does not involve a 
second party. The court, after doing the necessary checks, only needs 
to provide a title for execution, for instance a payment order or a 
default decision. The outcome is highly predictable, and parties do not 
need to exchange or provide more information.3 
In my second group, parties bring a proposal to court, not because 
they have a dispute, but because the law requires the court to examine 
the proposal for legality. Here, before bringing the case to courts, the 
parties do exchange and share information, and work together to put 
together their proposal. Most family cases come into this group, as do 
certain labor cases. The cases in this group have in common that they 
largely deal with long term relationships and regulation is light. In this 
group, the court has a primarily notarial role, in verifying that all legal 
requirements have been met.4 
So far, the outcome of the case was largely predictable. In more 
unpredictable cases, more activities are needed to transform the 
information to produce an outcome. Such activities can be requests for 
2 See Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What people do and think about going to law. Hart 
Publishing 1999.
3 This is the equivalent of the concept of a zero-sum game in game theory.  
4 Here, the configuration is similar to a win-win game.
054 further information, another reaction from the other party, a hearing, 
a witness hearing or a visit to examine a location. 
Sometimes, while the procedure is in progress, parties still reach an 
agreement between themselves to settle their dispute. This is group 3. 
In this group, parties work together, that is, they exchange and share 
information, for a settlement, a win-win outcome. 
If parties do not reach an agreement, a judgment is needed to end 
the case. This is group 4. In this group, whether the parties exchange 
information between them is not relevant for the outcome. 
This give us a first impression of the way courts process information. 
Figure 1 Courts process information
Next, it is helpful to find out how the total case load breaks up into 
the groups identified. In my research, I have found that for 1st instance 
civil cases in the Netherlands, group 1 is about 41% of the total case 
055load.5 Group 2 is about 36%, so the predictable cases are a large 
majority. Group 3 is about 12%, and group 4 11%. This means that the 
group we see as the essence of court work, is actually the smallest one. 
So how about IT for these groups? Group 1 lends itself to automation 
– with digital case filing, court staff no longer need to input data into the 
court systems. Because the outcome is largely predictable, automating 
the process, or at least parts of it, is an obvious use of IT for this group. 
Most courts already do some of this. They will extract data to compose 
the court decision, and some also use templates for the text. There 
may be some use for artificial intelligence, for instance to sort cases 
into streams, in this group. 
For group 2, the IT of choice for the courts is the same. Some form 
of internet support may help parties put together a proposal that will 
comply with the criteria the court uses to examine it. 
For group 3, an added benefit can come from negotiation software.
Group 4 is what we think of as the main activity of courts and judges. 
In terms of case load, it is just a little over 10%, but it is the majority of 
the judges’ work load. Cases here can be somewhat to very complex. 
The amount of information in the case file can be considerable, legal 
research needs to be undertaken to bring the case to a close. This is 
where digital case files, knowledge systems and search engines come 
in. Artificial intelligence may be helpful for structuring large case files 
and for research purposes. 
5 Reiling, Dory, Technology for Justice, how information technology can support 
judicial reform. Amsterdam University Press 2009. Online at www.dory.reiling.com. 
On p. 120-122, there is a full description of the methodology used. The percentages in 
the book represent the total case load including bankruptcy cases. A later insight made 
me exclude bankruptcies from the case load for the purpose of this breakdown, since 
their process is, in the Netherlands, not comparable to case disposition. In this article, 
I used the new figures.
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Figure 2 Information Technology for each group
You have written that to make AI useful for courts and judges, it needs 
to have legal information it can understand (through structure etc.), 
and be able to explain how it came to the end result. Do you think we 
are moving towards that being possible, and will it eventually lead to 
all cases being suitable for full automation? 
My answer to the last question is negative. Court cases where there 
is a dispute, my group 3 and 4 cases, are actually a conversation 
between the parties, and of the parties with the judge. During the 
conversation, new insights can arise, and points of view may change. 
The parties and the judge need to come to some conclusion in order 
for the case to end. I do not see how that conversation can be fully 
automated. Besides, I do not see justice systems ready to produce 
legal information AI can understand any time soon. Article 6 of the 
057ECHR requires a fair procedure from courts and judges. It requires a 
transparent procedure, equality of arms for the parties, and also a 
reasoned judicial decision. Judgments, in their complexity reduction, 
must be reasoned, transparent, and offer equal opportunities for the 
parties. AI operates with legal information. In order to let AI work with 
legal information, the information needs to be operable for machines. 
This involves, among other things, the following. 
Obviously, bad data reduce the quality of the AI-result. Correlations 
and statistical relations do not suffice as a foundation for a judgment. 
If AI needs to process and understand legal information, it needs to 
be structured and legally significant. Right now, text documents need 
to be supplemented with structure and significance retroactively. 
AI will be much more useful if legal information like judgments can 
be enriched for machine reading before publication with textual 
readability, document structures, identification codes and metadata. 
If legal meaning is added in the shape of structured terminology and 
meaningful relations, AI’s potential increases even more. All that 
is still in the future. The general opinion is that AI, when applied in 
courts, must be able to explain how it reached its result. This can be 
an explanation of the process, but also with regard to the content of 
the end result. Research shows that generally speaking, AI is capable 
of this kind of explanation we now require from humans, but that in 
practice humans can explain some aspects much more easily than the 
AI.
058 How willing are different stakeholders to use AI or digital processes? 
Is there a difference between professionals, such as judges or court 
officials, and the people involved in the dispute? Are there certain 
tasks that people are more or less reluctant to automate?
Our experience in the Netherlands has been that people who are at 
ease with IT use welcome it. Those who are not so familiar with IT 
will, obviously, find it more difficult and probably be more skeptical. 
Bailiffs and lawyers are generally well aware of the economic benefits 
of automation. Replacing a paper procedure with a fully digital one, 
including changes in the procedural legislation, is a tremendous 
change for the courts. It takes judges and court staff way out of their 
comfort zone. So, it takes a lot of effort and patience to make this 
change happen. Some court systems now record hearings, either in 
audio or video. The Dutch appeal courts objected to having to use 
those recordings because they were afraid it would take too much 
time. So, the decision was to leave that till later. Another choice was 
to keep face to face hearings for most cases. The changes were big 
enough as they were. 
In Netherlands, the digital procedure has been piloted in two courts. 
What kind of practical experience has that been? How have the users 
felt about it?
Some of that experience is already in my replies above. Our main 
learning point is about implementation. Replacing paper procedures 
with digital ones is a big change. Looking back, I think replacing a 
procedure in one operation should be done only for simple, short 
term procedures where the digitalization does not change the work 
059process much. For a full civil procedure, I recommend making the 
changes gradually, even if that means not taking full advantage of the 
digitalization at first. Our users had mixed feelings. Some were very 
happy, but others found the experience difficult. Let’s not forget that 
court staff, who knew they were going to be replaced by the new 
system, cannot be expected to welcome the changes. In fact, they 
were very critical of what we were building, and that was extremely 
helpful in fine tuning the system. From earlier experience, I know it 
takes quite some time for users to be at ease with new functionality. 
Now, three years after the pilots started, and over 3000 cases in the 
system, everyone is quite OK with it. Unfortunately, the Minister of 
Justice has stopped funding for the project, so there is no funding to 
implement the system in the other nine first instance courts. 
What types of difficulties are there when adopting new digital 
systems in courts? 
The difficulties are everywhere. Don’t forget, three quarters of all IT 
projects fail for some reason. Overall, we always underestimate the 
complexity of what we are trying to do. We are simply unable to foresee 
all the eventualities that will come our way in the process. And even if 
we are aware of that, it is still hard to manage the complexity. Building 
a procedure involves many different technologies all working together, 
so there is technical complexity. Once they do, there is the usability. 
So a lot of user testing is necessary, with a constant feedback loop 
between the development team and the users. Some users will want 
more automation than the team can provide, given the constraints of 
time and money. That brings us to the governance. Who decides about 
time and money, and about changes to the court work processes? 
060 Government IT projects always have to deal with complex governance: 
budgets come from Parliament, which has high ambition but usually 
little knowledge. Professional organizations lobby for their wishes, civil 
servants in charge of the projects like to have big budgets instead of 
controlling cost. 
As a follow up on that, how do the high regulation of the judiciary and 
the procedural rules affect the adoption of new digital processes? 
Are there any special challenges coming from that side? 
Absolutely. Let me start with independence, which should underpin 
the impartiality of judicial decisions. This independence has taken 
very different shapes in different countries. In all cases, it is a delicate, 
complex balance between the judiciary and the Minister of Justice, who 
holds the budget. If changes in procedural legislation are needed, the 
legislative process may take quite some time. If the changes are big, this 
complicates implementation of the system. And now that technology 
has reached a point where procedures can be entirely digital, this 
poses new problems. As long as IT was a tool for specific activities like 
document production, the paper process is still dominant. With a fully 
digital procedure, IT has become an environment. This environment 
needs to be governed by the judges themselves, in accordance with 
the ECHR. So we need to figure out who can decide about the digital 
work process in that light. I see many judiciaries struggling with just 
this problem, in many cases without realizing that this is what theyr 
problem is. Next, I hear a lot of complaints about the legal profession, 
including the courts, being conservative. We must keep in mind that 
the courts and the judges are the guardians of the existing legal order. 
When big changes are made to the procedures and the way people 
061work, that takes those who are happy with the existing situation way 
out of their comfort zone. So it takes lots of training, caring, and also 
lots of patience.
How does developing IT systems for the judiciary differ from 
developing for other kinds of users, such as other officials, or private 
organizations? Are there special features that are required for the 
system to be suitable for the judiciary? 
Private organizations, unlike government organizations and judiciaries, 
do not have to live in the limelight. Publicly funded organizations need 
to be transparent and accountable. In private organizations, IT projects 
can be complete failures without the rest of the world knowing about 
it. People expect systems for a judiciary to be completely secure, and 
rightly so. But do they have to be more secure than a banking system or 
the national tax system? What makes judiciaries and courts different, 
is that they deal with adversary procedures, in which there is access to 
the personal information of the other party, or of a defendant. This is 
most certainly an extra requirement for security.  
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Artificial Intelligence Improving the 
Delivery of  Justice and How Courts 
Operate
SANNA LUOMA1
1 INTRODUCTION
What are the first associations come to your mind when you think 
about the court system in U.S.? If it is lengthy delays, high cost and 
occasional injustice, then you’re not alone. Wouldn’t it be wonderful 
if your first thoughts were instead efficiency and fairness?2 – Max 
Tegmark.
Court congestion is a problem affecting access to justice in several 
jurisdictions all over the world. Delays exist in the U.S. state and federal 
courts and are causing congestion as well as backlog.3 Court congestion 
and undue delay means also delay to access to justice, a fundamental 
principle of rule of law. 
1 LL.M. student Sanna Luoma also took part in the student panel during the Legal Tech 
Con 2018.
2 Max Tegmark, Life 3.0 – Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (2017), 
107–109.
3 National Center for State Courts, ‘Civil Justice Reform Initiative: Advancing Civil 
Justice Reform’ NCSC Library eCollection https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/
collection/ctcomm/id/86/rec/6 accessed 29 September 2018.
064 Technology is changing the court systems, and in many countries, 
there are plans to provide more efficient means to solve disputes 
to provide more access to justice as well as clear congestion and 
backlogs through technology. There are also many hopes for artificial 
intelligence (AI) to solve problems pertaining to access to justice and 
legal complexity.4 AI systems are already used for help courts to assess 
various aspects related to bail and parole decisions for example. If we 
develop these tools to be more sophisticated, they might be a potential 
solution to the massive congestion courts are facing.5 
What is artificial intelligence? AI can be defined in many ways and 
there is no unambiguous definition for AI. One way of defining AI is 
to compare its abilities to human intelligence. AI enables machines to 
perform intelligent and cognitive tasks.6 To give a definition to AI, I am 
borrowing a definition from Kris Hammond: “[AI’s] goal is to enable 
the development of computers that are able to do things normally 
done by people -- in particular, things associated with people acting 
intelligently.”7 In addition, as important as defining AI, is defining what 
is intelligence. Referencing Max Tegmark’s definition, intelligence 
is ability to accomplish complex goals.8 Judges are facing complex 
4 Eric Allen Engle, ‘An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning: Using 
xTalk to Model the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act’ (2004) 11 
Rich. J.L. & Tech. 2 accessed 29 September 2018.
5 Caleb Watney, ‘It’s Time for Our Justice System to Embrace Artificial Intelligence’ 
(2017) Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/07/20/its-time-
for-our-justice-system-to-embrace-artificial-intelligence/ accessed at 29 September 
2018.
6 Oliver Theobald, Machine Learning for Absolute Beginners: A Plain English 
Introduction (2017), 14.
7 Kris Hammond, ‘What is Artificial Intelligence’ (2015) Computerworld https://
www.computerworld.com/article/2906336/emerging-technology/what-is-artificial-
intelligence.html accessed at 29 September 2018. 
8 Tegmark (n 1) 64–65.
065decision on a daily basis which requires legal knowledge, years of 
experience, 
and intelligence to solve the case efficiently. Could machine be capable 
to perform same tasks faster? 
Technologists have introduced an idea of a robojudge that would 
replace human judges as it would be more impartial, efficient, and it 
would not have human needs such as hunger and fatigue. However, 
predictions and speculation about robojudges seem a bit too 
optimistic at least according to today’s legal writings and scholars 
in general – AI or robots will not take over the role of a judge. One 
reason for this is that it is not morally desirable to allow a computer to 
make judgements regarding people’s freedom or even life.9 Laws also 
require interpretation which is not always based on straightforward 
regularities and unambiguous rules as one would assume.10 While we 
might not go as far as robojudges, AI could bring essential value to the 
court system and judicial decision-making process as a supplemental 
tool, supporting the judge’s reasoning especially in easier cases such as 
routine civil matters. 
This research paper will focus on how AI could be utilized in courts 
and judges’ decision-making process and whether AI could bring more 
efficiency to the court system and thus, more access to justice in U.S 
court system. Furthermore, I will assess whether AI could be capable 
of taking the role of a judge in the future. This article will focus on 
the court system and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes 
in U.S. to provide access to justice to individual citizens in their 
9 Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, ‘Developing an Online Dispute Resolution 
Environment: Dialogue Tools and Negotiation Support Systems in a Three-Step 
Model’ (2005) 10 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 287, 291. Available at: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1008802.
10 Ibid. 
066 everyday legal problems: separations, accidents, employment issues, 
neighbor problems, and land issues for example. I focus mainly on civil 
justice, but I will bring aspects concerning criminal justice as well. The 
structure of the paper goes as follows. First, I will address the issue of 
court congestion in the light of access to justice. Then, I will introduce 
qualities of AI and machine learning, and how these algorithms could 
be utilized in courts – and further, whether robots could be judges and 
why that might be beneficial to access to justice. Moreover, I discuss 
the benefits as well as challenges and downsides of using AI algorithms 
in courts and judicial decision-making. Last part focuses on the future: 
what kind of tools would be useful for judges and courts focusing on 
reducing court congestion and promoting access to justice. In this part, 
I analyze how combining online dispute resolution (ODR) and AI could 
empower judges’ daily work providing more access to justice.
2 AI IMPROVING THE DELIVERY OF JUSTICE IN 
THE COURT SYSTEM
2.1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Access to justice is a basic principle of the rule of law meaning that 
individuals can exercise their rights, challenge discrimination and have 
their voice heard i.e. bring their case in front of the judge including 
access to legal assistance and representation.11 Today, access to justice 
in U.S. state courts is mainly access to physical courthouses and the in-
person, real-time availability of justice system decisionmakers i.e. law 
11 U.N. website, ‘Access to Justice, United Nations and the Rule of Law’ https://
www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-to-justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/
access-to-justice/ accessed at 13 April 2018.
067enforcement, prosecutors, and judges.12 However, millions of people 
in the U.S. do not have proper access to justice mostly due to lack of 
resources in federally funded civil legal aid. Likewise, public defenders, 
whose caseloads already exceed the recommended limit, are not 
capable to help everyone in need.13 People might also have difficulties 
to commute to court and take the day-off from work to attend court 
proceedings. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Justice established the 
Office for Access to Justice (ATJ) in March 2010 to focus on this “access-
to-justice crisis” in the criminal and civil justice system by promoting 
accessibility, fairness, and increasing efficiency in court system.14 ATJ 
works to inter alia promote less lawyer-intensive and court-intensive 
solutions to legal problems as well as research which provides solutions 
to closing the gap between the need for and the availability of quality 
legal assistance.15
The World Justice Project (WJP) is an independent organization 
working to evaluate rule of law worldwide.16 WPJ highlights that access 
to civil justice requires court system to be accessible, affordable, 
effective, and impartial. They measure e.g. civil justice by index which 
consists of the following key factors: accessibility and affordability; civil 
justice that is free of discrimination, corruption, improper government 
12 J.J. Prescott, ‘Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform 
Technology’ (2017) 70 No. 6 Vand. L. Rev., 1993, 1995. Available at: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3080615.
13 The United States Department of Justice, Office for Access to justice, ‘About the 
Office’ (2017) https://www.justice.gov/atj/about-office accessed at 13 April 2018.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 World Justice Project, ‘About us’ https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us accessed 
at 29 September 2018. “[WPJ was] founded by William H. Neukom in 2006 as a 
presidential initiative of the American Bar Association (ABA), and with the initial 
support of 21 other strategic partners, the World Justice Project transitioned into 
an independent 501(c)(3) non-profit organization in 2009. Its offices are located in 
Washington, DC, and Seattle, WA, USA.”
068 influence; civil justice being effectively enforced; and alternative dispute 
resolutions are accessible, impartial, and effective. Furthermore, the 
delivery of effective civil justice also obliges that court proceedings 
are not subject to unreasonable delays.17 AI has a lot of potential to 
improve many of these aspects.
The WJP collects data on how rule of law requirements are fulfilled 
in several countries and gives scores to these countries by evaluating 
justice with different defined factors such as civil justice factors 
discussed above.18 According to their data, U.S. overall score was 0.73 
while 1.0 is the best possible score, and U.S. was ranked as 19th from 
113 countries.19 In civil justice, U.S. scored only 0.42 in accessibility 
and affordability and 0.61 in having proceedings that are not subject 
to unreasonable delays. Even though these results are quite alarming, 
on the other hand, India scored only 0.16 and Italy 0.36 in the factor 
“no unreasonable delay” in civil justice. Thus, congestion and delays 
are a real problem concerning court systems and it is affecting access 
17 World Justice Project, ‘Civil Justice (Factor 7), Factors of Rule of Law’ https://
worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-
2017%E2%80%932018/factors-rule-law/civil-justice-factor-7 accessed at 29 
September 2018.
18 The World Justice Project, ‘WJP Rule of Law Index 2017-2018’ (2018) 2–4, 156–
163 http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/ accessed at 13 April 2018. “The Index’s 
methodology and comprehensive definition of the rule of law are the products of 
intensive consultation and vetting with academics, practitioners, and community 
leaders from more than 100 countries and 17 professional disciplines.” For example, 
“[t]he country scores and rankings for the WJP Rule of Law Index 2017–2018 are derived 
from more than 110,000 household surveys and 3,000 expert surveys in 113 countries 
and jurisdictions.” WPJ data is collected through a general population poll representing 
sample of 1,000 respondents in the three largest cities of each country (in e.g. U.S. New 
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago) and qualified respondents’ questionnaires consisting 
of closed-ended questions completed by in-country practitioners and academics with 
expertise in civil and commercial law, criminal justice, labor law, and public health.
19 Ibid 3, 25. Interestingly, compared to last year, the United States ranking changed 
down one position from 18th to 19th. U.S. was ranked as 19th out of 35 countries 
categorized under “high income” countries which is a relatively unsatisfactory position.
069to justice. Also countries, such as Finland, who did well in the ranking, 
got lower scores (0.63) from accessibility and affordability as well as 
providing proceedings without unreasonable delay.20 It is alarming that 
U.S. rank is lower than most of the western countries.
Right to fair and public hearing without unreasonable delay is a 
recognized fundamental right in several jurisdictions. For example, 
European Convention on Human Rights21 Article 6(1) states that “in 
the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.” In the case practice of European Court of Human 
Rights, the court has passed several sanctions related to delays in 
court proceedings subject to the article 6(1).22 Accordingly, the U.S. 
Constitution recognizes a right to a speedy trial in the sixth amendment 
regarding criminal proceedings. Also, other U.S. provisions are 
enhancing the right to a speedy trial by securing the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.23 
Regardless of these provisions, courts are struggling from backlogs 
and congestion in reality. Thus, individuals lack proper access to justice 
if they cannot get their case heard in a reasonable time. This is not 
a novel problem to the court system – in last decades, courts have 
adopted alternative choices for parties to solve disputes in order to 
20 The World Justice Project, ‘Country profile: Finland, WJP Rule of Law Index 2017-
2018’  http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/FIN accessed at 29 September 
2018.
21 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 
4. XI. 1950.
22 See eg Kukkonen v. Finland App no 47628/06 (Commission Decision, 13 January 
2009). Not to mention the multiple cases brought against Italy regarding unreasonable 
delay and article 6(1).
23 See eg Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 1 and 18 U.S. Code § 3161.
070 clear the backlog and reduce the amount of cases that are going to 
trial. Below, I am discussing further what is causing delays in courts and 
what measures have been taken to mitigate those delays. 
2.2 CONGESTION AND DELAY AS A PROBLEM OF ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE
It is said that justice delayed is justice denied. Long duration of court 
proceeding can be identified as a fundamental failure of access to 
justice.24 The primary and inevitable outcome of court congestion is 
delay and a lot of these delays are institutional i.e. caused by congestion 
and backlogs in courts.25 Alternatively, congestion occurs when judges 
have a backlog of older cases or cases which have higher priority. Thus, 
small civil claims with lower priority are sometimes unduly delayed.
Budget cuts and under-staffing are one of the reasons why courts 
are facing congestion and backlogs. For example, in California, 
budget cuts since 2008 have closed 52 courthouses, reduced services 
statewide, and decreased access to justice.26 Many Californians must 
travel longer distances, miss time at work, and wait long to have their 
day in court due to these budget cuts.27 While the California judicial 
branch has regained some of the funding it lost during the recession, 
24 HiiL Trend Report IV, ‘ODR and the Courts: The Promise of 100% Access to Justice’, 
(2016) 27 https://issuu.com/hiilrechtwijzertechnology/docs/hiil_online_dispute_
resolution_tren_d5f3bbbcedea3d accessed at 29 September 2018.
25 See eg, Francis D. Doucette, ‘Court Congestion and the Right to Speedy Trial in 
Massachusetts’ (1995) 24 New Eng. L. Rev. 1095.
26 California Judicial Branch, ‘In Focus: Judicial Branch Budget Crisis’ http://www.
courts.ca.gov/partners/1494.htm accessed at 13 April 2018.
27 Ibid. 
071the judicial branch is still “unsustainably underfunded” and California 
trial courts will see no new funding in 2018 either.28 
Problems of court congestion do not only appear in U.S. In some 
jurisdictions, such as India and Italy, the congestion in the courts is 
very extreme. For example, Italian civil proceedings can be inefficient 
in terms of the time it takes to litigate each case. The Italian civil 
proceedings before first instance courts can last up to three years 
because the hearings required to resolve the lawsuit are scheduled so 
far apart. This creates gaps in evidence and explanations which leads 
to unfair and uncertain proceedings since the judge will be less familiar 
with the case.29 Thus, these delays could be reduced through better 
case management. On the other hand, in India, the amount of incoming 
cases is just so massive, that courts do not have the capacity to clear 
already existing backlogs. It is estimated that if the Supreme Court of 
India takes no fresh cases and there is no increase in judge strength, a 
dedicated period of nine months of fulltime judicial attention would be 
needed to clear the backlog.30 Hence, often the main reason for court 
congestion is lack of resources or structural failures. For example, the 
backlog in caseload on Indian legal system is resulting from among 
other factors overly elaborate, unenforced procedures, automatic 
28 Maria Dinzeo, ‘Modest Gains for Judicial Branch in New California Budget’ (2017) 
Courthouse News https://www.courthousenews.com/modest-gains-judicial-branch-
new-california-budget/ accessed at 29 September 2018. 
29 Simona Grossi, ‘A Comparative Analysis Between Italian Civil Proceedings and 
American Civil Proceedings Before Federal Courts’ (2010) 20 No. 2 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev., 213, 271. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2145497.
30 Nathan Rehn et. al., ‘Justice Without Delay: Recommendations for Legal and 
Institutional Reforms in the Indian Courts’ (2011) 4 Jindal Global Legal Research Paper, 
8–9. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1679350 
072 appeals, and systemic vacancies from the bench, and critically 
misaligned incentive structures, among other factors.31
One option to deal with court congestion would be increasing the 
court staff handling the cases. However, by increasing the number of 
judges and personnel to deal with cases, it is possible there would 
simply be more cases filed and the delays in the proceedings would be 
the same.32 The same thing applies to technology – while technology 
can make court proceedings cheaper and faster, so called rebound 
effect might appear meaning that when something is cheaper and 
faster, people will simply use it more.33 Interestingly, the problem lies 
also in attorneys and legal services. That is, judges are overloaded 
with information in individual cases where attorneys paid by the hour 
have every incentive to add more information to the cases. Nowadays, 
due to technology, it is easier to discover information that may be 
relevant such as e-mail archives, videos, and transcripts of telephone 
conversations. Adding these to individual cases increases the difficulty 
of and workload required for fact-finding, and adds to the costs 
in terms on money and time of going through all this information. 
Also, legal information, such as case law, is increasing continuously, 
meaning that judges will have to manage more complex information. 
More information also requires better procedures for organizing it.34 
Therefore, we should promote more ways to solve civil disputes that 
31 Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, ‘Technology, Ethics and Access to 
Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?’ (2014) 35 Mich. J. Int’l L. Available 
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2309052.
32 Grossi (n 28) 271.
33 Josh Becker, CEO, Lex Machina & Scott Reents, Lead Attorney, Data Analytics & 
E-Discovery, Litigation Cravath, Panel Discussion at ‘The Future of Law – the Case for 
Analytics webinar’ (Mar. 29, 2018 at 10:00-12:00am). 
34 HiiL Trend Report (n 23) 30. 
073are less lawyer-intensive and provide more tools to solve dispute on a 
lower level.
Courts have been able to reduce the problem by providing ADR 
processes for civil disputes that require less time and effort from 
courts. ADR consists mainly of arbitration, mediation, and negotiation 
in which a neutral person helps parties to reach a settlement without 
proceeding to trial.35 This neutral person can either be a judge or outside 
counsel or other professional. Thus, mediation can be maintained by 
courts and held in front of a judge although the process as such is 
informal and separate from a trial.36 A judge can initiate a mediation, 
but parties may also take the initiative. 
As mentioned above, many problems related to access to justice 
also result from difficulties to physically access a courthouse. Hence, 
one way to increase access to justice is to take courts to online. 
Online dispute resolution (ODR) environment is ”a virtual space in 
which disputants have a variety of dispute resolution tools at their 
disposal.”37 ODR can be used, when properly implemented, both fully 
in court proceedings and pre-trial phase ADR such as online mediation 
or negotiations. ODR system either used in court or ADR is foreseen as 
a solution that would be an effective mechanism to reduce barriers to 
accessing justice.38 ODR means different concepts and it can be partly 
or entirely online. These concepts are inter alia an ODR conducted 
35 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 8) 296. 
36 See eg Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara website (2018) http://
www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/adr/civil_adr.shtml accessed at 30 September 
2018.
37 Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute 
Resolution’, in Online Dispute Resolution: Theory And Practice, A Treatise On 
Technology And Dispute Resolution (2012) 92. Available at  https://research.vu.nl/ws/
files/3097325/Lodder%20and%20Zeleznikow%20(2).pdf
38 Raymond & Shackelford (n 30) 486–87. 
074 exclusively online or ODR utilizing electronic media, such as video 
conferencing and e-mail in the proceedings or mediation.39 Benefits of 
ODR are especially in the fact that it is online – in U.S., attending the 
court hearing physically is a deal breaker to many citizens for several 
reasons whether it is transportation or time to take off from work 
in order to attend the court. Taking court and disputes online could 
increase the accessibility substantially which is one of the reasons why 
courts in U.S. and other jurisdictions are adapting these platforms to 
court services.
Many of the existing and most progressive ODR tools have been 
developed primarily to facilitate negotiations and resolve e-commerce 
disputes or other issues related to the Internet.40 For example, 
e-commerce companies such as eBay are already using ODR in their 
consumer disputes which are private by their nature and thus, not 
solved in courts.41 Even though ADR and public ODR already exist in 
several countries,42 implementation of these has been rather slow 
paced. However, courts are investing to technology to improve access 
to justice – e.g. in England and Wales, courts are planning to invest £700 
39 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 8) 301.
40 Ibid. 298. “The major reasons for the popularity of handling e-commerce or 
Internet-related disputes online are that 1) access to the Internet is not a problem 
because the parties concerned already had online contact before the dispute arose, 
and 2) the information crucial to their dispute will usually be available electronically.”
41 Maximilian Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, ‘Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing 
Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency’ (2016) 21 Mich. J. Race & L., 205, 208. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777059.
42 See generally, Joint Technology Committee, ‘Case Studies in ODR for Courts: A View 
from the Front Lines’ (2017) http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/About%20Us/
Committees/JTC/JTC%20Resource%20Bulletins/2017-12-18%20ODR%20case%20
studies%20final.ashx accessed at 30 September 2018. For example, Civil Resolution 
Tribunal in small claims in British Columbia, however, has been quite successful and 
there are plans to expand the use of this ODR from 5,000$ claims up to 25,000$ claims.
075million in bringing their procedures online.43 Also other court systems 
are shifting towards e-filing and online case management systems 
meaning that all people working on a case will have access to the same 
files and documents which will have great impact in work efficiency 
in courts.44 Thus, the use of ODR in the court system and negotiations 
will most probably increase in the future.45 Filing online through an 
ODR platform facilitates the possibilities of using AI in courts – an ODR 
platform brings a lot of potential to combine machine learning and 
data processing to court systems. There are already theories regarding 
use of AI – machine learning and neural networks – in combination of 
ODR which I will address more deeply in chapter 4.1. of this paper.
To conclude, ODR or other similar platform technology would bring 
courts closer to the individual and make it easier to access to court.46 
However, if legal services become cheaper and more accessible 
through technology, and courts do not get more resources, it might 
result in even more congested courts. Attempts to increase access to 
the courts may also lead to unintended regressive consequences such 
as increasing the workload in courts which causes even more delay. 
That is why we need to think of solutions that also makes judges’ 
work more efficient and thus, reduce their workload. As it is well put 
in this article regarding massive court congestion in India that some 
might argue that “increasing access is a paradoxical goal for a system 
already loaded with cases”.47 Nevertheless, we should not think that 
43 HiiL Trend Report (n 23) 11.
44 Ibid.
45 Richard Susskind and Daniel Susskind, The Future of the Professions (2015) 67-68. 
Richard and Daniel Susskind discuss about that there are already some online dispute 
resolution (ODR) platforms used in courts in England and Wales, which is “definitely an 
exciting milestone in the history of court system”.
46 Prescott (n 11) 2050. 
47 Rehn et. al. (n 29) iv. 
076 the problem is that there are too many cases going into the courts, but 
there are too few coming out. Courts should provide justice and not try 
to restrict it.48 To this problem, AI can bring an essential value through 
automatization of judges’ daily work. Further, I discuss the use of AI in 
courts.
3 AI AND COURTS 
What use can AI be for courts and what does it take? There are already 
various AI systems used in legal services such as case prediction, 
contract management, and due diligence tools e.g. Lex Machina, KIRA 
Systems, and Gavelytics.49 Furthermore, AI-driven risk assessment tools 
for bail and parole decisions are already used in the field of criminal 
justice some states. In this section, I am addressing the possibilities 
of AI for the court system. The question is, could machine learning 
and AI possibly help improve judges’ decision-making process and 
48 Ibid. that “[t]he challenge of court congestion is not one of efficient waste disposal, 
but of delivering timely and meaningful justice through functioning courts. Increasing 
access includes tackling the continuing delays (demand and supply-side), as well as 
reducing the backlog that weighs down the system. Enhancing accountability includes 
examining rules as well as informal norms of judicial procedure, augmenting the 
positive feature of the same, and improving the efficiency of the judicial system by 
eliminating practices leading to unjustified delay. In the context of a growing population 
and economy, to serve the rule of law, and to ameliorate basic social problems, these 
remain the most pressing matters being pursued under the general heading of ‘judicial 
reform.’”
49 Gavelytics’ AI-powered analysis algorithm which parses vast amounts of litigation 
data to generate actionable insight such as judges’ tendencies how they rule, 
possible outcomes, and help lawyers to write a “winning” motion regarding the 
jugde’s ruling history. Gavelytics, https://www.gavelytics.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). See also Zach Warren, ‘Gavelytics Localizes Judicial Analytics for California 
Litigators’ (2017) LegalTechNews https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/sites/
legaltechnews/2017/09/26/gavelytics-localizes-judicial-analytics-for-california-
litigators/ accessed at 30 September 2018.    
077case management by making it faster, more efficient, and maybe even 
more impartial? In this chapter, I will assess to what extent AI could be 
used in judicial decision making besides or instead of human brain and 
judgment.
3.1 CAN ROBOTS BE JUDGES?
Researchers have agreed for years that AI will have a great impact 
to legal profession.50 In their article, Dana Remus and Frank S. Levy 
discuss whether robots can be lawyers. An essential part of lawyer’s 
work could be subject to automation by AI. For instance, lawyers in 
tier one firms use approximately 30% of their time in total for routine 
work such as case administration and management, document review, 
due diligence, and fact investigation.51 If we think about document 
review for example, it often means going through similar documents 
that have recognizable patterns. Thus, AI will specifically have strong 
impact on document review.52 A lot of the aforementioned is, at least 
indirectly, applicable to judges. Therefore, my question is, could robots 
be judges? I still hold on to the view of most legal researchers – robots 
will not replace judges. However, in this chapter I will consider the 
question of to what extent use of AI in courts could bring efficiency 
and mitigate human failures.
When modeling a judgement, a judge’s decision-making is based on 
consideration that ensures the same result for all cases which can be 
identified as structured or routine process. While judges’ work seems 
50 Susskind & Susskind (n 45).
51 Dana Remus & Frank S. Levy, ‘Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and 
the Practice of Law’ (2016) 8 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2701092 accessed at 30 
September 2018.
52 Ibid. 18.
078 very complicated, machine learning model can predict future judicial 
decisions through “a mathematical combination of characteristics 
taken from the case”.53 Through these “combinations of characteristics” 
AI is capable to predict court cases outcomes with high accuracy. 
Furthermore, natural language processing (NLP) has been proven to be 
good tool for case predictions.54 Court judgements in U.S. and common 
law countries tend to have a distinctive structure, which makes them 
particularly suitable for a text-based analysis. Court cases are usually 
written in a similar way and procedure, the facts, the circumstances 
of the case, relevant law, legal arguments, parties submissions, and 
outcome of the case can be easily recognized from cases due to 
these similarities.55 By training AI with textual features extracted from 
given cases, an actual decision made by the judges was reached as 
the output.56 Thus, AI have already reached the level of solving cases 
corresponding the actual outcome by a judge. In cases where the 
facts are undisputed, the law is clear, and well-established precedents 
exist, AI software can analyze the circumstances and produce a draft 
53 Ibid. 12–13.
54 Nikolas Aletras et. al., ‘Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights: a Natural Language Processing Perspective’ (2016) https://peerj.com/articles/
cs-93/ accessed at 30 September 2018. See also, Daniel Katz et. al., ‘A General Approach 
for Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States’ (2017). Authors 
received 70.2% accuracy at the case outcome level and 71.9% at the justice vote level 
over nearly two centuries (1816-2015). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2463244 accessed 
at 30 September 2018.
55 Ibid. Nikolas Aletras et. al. (2016)
56 Ibid. considering that “[authors] presented the first systematic study on predicting 
judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights using only the textual 
information extracted from relevant sections of ECtHR judgments. [Authors] framed 
this task as a binary classification problem, where the training data consists of textual 
features extracted from given cases and the output is the actual decision made by the 
judges.”
079judgment for the judge to review. These tools already exist57 so there 
is a potential to adapt this technology to judges’ work as well. Thus, 
especially in routine cases, judges could rely on the algorithmic draft 
decisions instead of routinely going through a lot of documents and 
communications with litigants.
3.2 THE USE OF AI IN COURTS – RISK ASSEMENT TOOLS  
Across the U.S., judges, probation and parole officers are increasingly 
using “risk assessment” algorithms to assess a criminal defendant’s 
likelihood of becoming a re-offender. How does these AI-driven risk 
assessment tools work? The basic idea of the tool to give judges the most 
objective information available to make fair decisions about prisoners. 
However, these algorithms are dependent on the information they use 
which might cause problems in case the data itself is biased. 
There are three main risk assessment systems that are most widely 
used in courts in U.S.: Correctional Offender Management Profiling 
for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), Public Safety Assessment (PSA) 
and Level of Service Inventory Revised (LSI-R). COMPAS, assesses 
variables under five areas: criminal involvement, relationships/
lifestyles, personality/attitudes, family, and social exclusion. COMPAS 
scores each defendant ranged from one to ten, ten being the highest 
risk. Algorithm provides the score which is based on a set of questions 
defendants answer.58 COMPAS is used e.g. in state of Florida and 
Wisconsin to help judges decision-making in assessing the risk of the 
57 See e.g., CARA, Casetext, https://casetext.com/ accessed at 30 September 2018. 
This tool is developed by Pablo Arrendondo.
58 Jeff Larson et. al., ‘How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm’ (2016) 
ProPublica https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-
recidivism-algorithm accessed at 30 September 2018.
080 defendant’s tendency to commit further crimes.59  Also, the LSI-R uses 
information from a wide set of factors, concerning criminal history and 
personality patterns. The PSA, on the other hand, uses a narrower set 
of variables, and only considers factors related to a defendant’s age 
and criminal history.60 Interestingly, these algorithms are not subject 
to state or federal open government laws since they are proprietary.61 
A question is how much courts should rely on these algorithms? Since 
these algorithms are already used widely in courts, it might be hard for 
a judge not to rely on them. After all, U.S. criminal justice systems have 
used math to guide decision-making for approximately a century.62 In 
general, these tools save judge’s valuable time and provides answers 
regarding defendants’ bail decisions in less time assuring a speedy 
process.
Accuracy of algorithmic bail decision could at least in theory reduce 
the crime rate since judges do have tendency to some amount of 
mispredictions. According to a recent study conducted by National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), AI algorithms are more accurate 
– and more fair even – than human judges. Thus, use of them in 
the court system “could be able to reduce the crime rate by 24.7%. 
Alternatively, we could hold the crime rate constant and reduce the jail 
59 Ellora T. Israni, ‘When an Algorithm Helps Send You to Prison’ (2017) N.Y. Times 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/opinion/algorithm-compas-sentencing-bias.
html accessed at 30 September 2018.
60 Electronic Privacy Information Center, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System’ 
https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/.  
61 Ibid.
62 Jason Tashea, ‘Risk-assessment Algorithms Challenged in Bail Sentencing and 
Parole Decisions’ (2017) ABA Journal http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
algorithm_bail_sentencing_parole accessed at 30 September 2018.
081[population awaiting a trial] from 26.4% to 15.4%, a decline of 42.0%”.63 
Repeating the experiment on data from 40 large urban counties across 
the U.S. yielded similar results. Interestingly, the research found that 
use of those algorithms was shifting the jail population to include a 
smaller proportion of African-Americans and Hispanics – NBER study 
demonstrates how a judge-advising algorithm could reduce crime as 
well as the rate at which blacks and Hispanics are jailed.64 
Hence, AI seems like a perfect tool for decision-making in courts. 
However, do we know that the machine is getting correct results?65 
Further question is, can we think of ourselves living a world where a 
machine can decide over individual’s freedom? These are some of the 
challenges of using AI in courts. AI and machine learning are based on 
the inputted data and recognizing patterns and learning through that 
data. Data processing always includes the problem of possible biased 
data that is affecting to the outcome of the processing. To what extent 
can we rely on these algorithms? Are we able to reach algorithmic 
fairness in a way that we could utilize AI to mitigate human failures? AI 
is yet not perfect and has its benefits and challenges.
63 Jon Kleinberg et. al., ‘Human Decisions and Machine Predictions’ (2017) National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper Series, 16 https://www.cs.cornell.
edu/home/kleinber/w23180.pdf accessed at 30 September 2018.
64 Ibid. See also Tom Simonite, ‘How to Upgrade Judges with Machine Learning’ 
(2017), MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603763/how-
to-upgrade-judges-with-machine-learning/ accessed at 30 September 2018.
65 Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Law As Computation in the Era of Artificial Legal Intelligence. 
Speaking Law to the Power of Statistics’ (2017)  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2983045 
accessed at 30 September 2018. See also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, 
‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’ (2014) 89 Wash. L. Rev., 
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082 3.3 BENEFIT AND CHALLENGES OF AI – MORE OBJECTIVE 
DECISIONS OR FALSE JUDGEMENTS
Humans are not perfect. Surprising things can affect to outcome of 
the judges’ decision-making process such as their energy-levels and 
mood in general as well as other human failings that machines do 
not encounter.66 Furthermore, human ideologies and values may 
have influence on the judgement which is undesirable in an impartial 
court system.67 In light of NBER statistics presented above, AI could 
mitigate these errors especially regarding fairness. In addition, AI is 
more efficient than judge. AI has ability to act autonomously which 
means that “AI program can search through many more possibilities 
than a human in a given amount of time, thus permitting AI systems 
to analyze potential solutions that humans may not have considered, 
much less attempted to implement.”68 
However, AI and machine learning algorithms are not only 
recognizing patterns but also developing themselves – which makes 
66 Alex Kozinski, ‘What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision 
Making’ (1993) 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 993.
67 Watney (n 4). 
68 Matthew U. Scherer, ‘Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies’ (2016) 29 No. 2 Harv. J.L. & Tech., 353, 363–364.Scherer 
is talking about regulating AI and how legal system is falling behind of technological 
development.
083it problematic to understand the produced outcome.69 Can a court 
rely on that outcome of AI’s decision? If the algorithm is hidden, how 
can the result be checked or re-evaluated?70 How can we ensure the 
interpretability, transparency, and predictability in court’s decision-
making process and that a judge is understanding the algorithm and 
able to validate its outcome and build a fair reasoning to the parties? 
In judicial decision-making, human supervision is always needed and 
furthermore, it is seen morally undesirable to allow computers make 
judgements.71 Understanding of the algorithm and reasoning of a 
case’s outcome must be given great importance. Although, humans 
can forget facts and make mistakes, human intelligence is still superior 
69 Hildebrandt (n 65) 9. “This brings us to the sub-discipline of machine learning (ML), 
that is the use of computing systems to detect patterns in data that allow a system to 
update its own program. The idea is simple: to reach its goals the system must reduce 
uncertainty about the effects of its own behavior. To reduce such uncertainty it probes 
its environment and processes the feedback, reconfiguring its processing algorithms 
until its goal is reached. Here we return to mathematics, though not to encryption. 
ML seeks to infer correct mathematical functions to describe patterns in a data set, or 
between given input data (for instance data on speed or brake behavior), and given 
output data, for instance machine readable ‘safe driving behavior’ for an autonomous 
car. The result is a set of – potentially reconfigured - instructions that produces desired 
behavior of the system.”
70 Jason Tashea, ‘Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now’ 
(2017) Wired https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-
must-stop-now/ accessed at 30 September 2018.
71 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 8). 
084 to machine intelligence in complex legal system due to its creativity to 
“go beyond existing formal rules”.72  
Although AI is a useful tool for judges, developing algorithms for 
courts has not been so straightforward, and interpretability of the 
algorithm may cause concerns. In the case Wisconsin v. Loomis73 
COMPAS algorithm defined defendant Eric Loomis as a “high risk to 
the community” while he was charged with driving a stolen vehicle 
and fleeing from police. Loomis claimed that the use of algorithm 
was violating his right to due process since it was using gender as a 
factor and he was not allowed to assess the algorithm. However, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the use of the COMPAS risk assessment 
at sentencing did not violate defendant’s right to due process and 
reasoned that knowledge of the algorithm’s output was a sufficient 
level of transparency – reasoning of the Supreme Court does not give 
rules governing how AI risk assessment tools should be examined 
during trial:
“This is a worrisome precedent as risk assessments evolve from 
algorithms that are possible to assess, like COMPAS, to opaque 
neural networks. Neural networks, a deep learning algorithm 
72 Engle (n 3) “While formalization does implicitly reveal the theoretical shortcomings 
of contemporary legal theory, one cannot predict what new theory or theories would 
emerge. This is because the formalization underlying the computer program itself 
reflects meta-theoretical assumptions. In this regard, human intelligence is, at present, 
clearly superior to machine intelligence. Although humans, unlike computers, often 
forget facts or make mistakes, they are capable of synthesizing theories that creatively 
go beyond existing formal rules of production to generate new ones. They are able 
to apply abductive, intuitive, and aleatory operations that are not part of the basic 
instruction set of a CPU.”
73 Loomis v. Wisconsin 137 S. Ct. 1240 (2017).
085meant to act like the human brain, cannot be transparent because 
of their very nature.”74
Also, ProPublica found that algorithms which courts in U.S. are using 
for criminal sentencing gave biased outcomes and resulted racial 
disparities.75 Although, these algorithms do not explicitly use race as an 
input, blacks were more likely to be labeled as risky and on the other 
hand whites got a low risk rate. However, those results do not prove 
the algorithm itself is biased. Classifications are based on recognized 
risk factors such as a documented history of violence which are giving 
biased outcomes. Thus, it is misleading to blame the algorithm while it 
is only uncovering real statistical patterns that need to be fixed in the 
society.76 However, more research is needed into how to ensure that 
criminal justice algorithms do not lead to unfair outcomes.
Another aspect of using machine learning or AI in courts relates to 
the nature of common law and Anthony D’Amato argues that one of 
the costs of using AI in courts will be a freezing of the precedents. The 
common law will not develop under a computer regime; rather, all new 
cases will be decided according to exactly the previous case history, 
and the new decisions will not add to the body of case law because 
they will simply reflect the previous cases.77 Furthermore, challenge 
of AI relates to the fact that the use of these algorithms is not yet 
74 Tashea (n 70). 
75 Julia Angwin et. al., ‘Machine Bias’ (2016) ProPublica,= https://www.propublica.
org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing accessed at 30 
September 2018.
76 Sam Corbett-Davies et. al., ‘Even Imperfect Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal 
Justice System’ (2017) N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/
algorithms-bail-criminal-justice-system.html accessed at 30 September 2018.
77 Anthony D’Amato, ‘Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?’ (1977) Faculty 
Working Papers, Paper 129, 15 http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/
facultyworkingpapers/129 accessed at 30 September 2018.
086 regulated. Currently, there’s no federal or state law for implementing 
risk-assessment or any other AI tools nor standards for testing their 
validity.78 Regulation will be needed to make sure that judges know 
what the AI program is doing – in order that they can provide well-
reasoned outcomes. Although, AI is yet unstable, AI has a lot of 
potential and failures of AI cannot be a too big barrier for the use of AI 
in courts.79 
In conclusion, could AI be suitable solution to the access to justice 
crisis? Access to justice does not only mean speedy trials but also 
fair proceedings. Congestion is a problem to access to justice, but 
fairness cannot be compromised as a price of efficient proceedings and 
decision-making through AI. Thus, these studies are vital in the process 
of adopting AI algorithms and decision-making to courts. However, 
public policymakers have found these algorithms improving public 
safety. There are also studies showing that optimizing public safety 
leads to some amount of racial disparities and on the other hand, 
satisfying fairness means also releasing more high-risk defendants.80 
On the other hand, a judge can rule more strictly than the algorithm 
as aforementioned NBER study concluded. Consequently, use of these 
algorithms can after all promote fairness.81 So, how can we promote 
78 Watney (n 4).
79 Dave Orr, Senior Project Manager at Google, speech ‘A.I. and The Future of Online 
Dispute Resolution’, at Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. Symposium, Legal 
Bootstrapping – The A.I. Tools Lawyers Need, Computer History Museum, (4 April 
2018). As Dave Orr said well in the symposium: if AI is not getting it right for the first 
time it does not mean we will have to give up, but we need to train the data more and 
better.
80 Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel, and Aziz Huq, Algorithmic 
Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness. In Proceedings of KDD ’17 (2017) Halifax, 
NS, Canada. DOI: 10.1145/3097983.3098095. Article available at: https://5harad.com/
papers/fairness.pdf accessed at 30 September 2018.
81 Jon Kleinberg et. al. (n 63) 5.
087both fairness and public safety in through AI algorithms? Wisconsin v. 
Loomis highlights the pain point – judges must be able to understand 
and explain the outcome of AI. Further, defendants should be entitled 
to contest the fairness. 
4 THE FUTURE OF AI IN THE COURT SYSTEM
Above I have discussed the qualities of AI and how it could help judges’ 
in their decision-making process. In this section, I will focus on concrete 
AI-driven tools and opportunities for court systems and ADR that could 
reduce the congestion and backlogs in courts. I am presenting some 
AI-driven tools for judges that would make justice more accessible 
to the public while reducing court congestion by making judges work 
more efficient: AI-driven ODR, and case assessment and management 
tool. As discussed above, cheaper and more accessible means to enter 
court may end up causing even more backlogs and congestion if we 
do not provide technology tools for judges as well. Therefore, possible 
ODR systems that are adopted to courts could also include case 
management and AI-driven negotiation support tools for the parties 
to make judges work faster and maybe even easier.
What is the way forward? Adopting AI and ODR to the court system 
is a long process which takes time and resources to plan and execute.82 
As discussed above, currently used risk assessment tools would need 
more evaluation, testing, and regulation around them to ensure fairness 
of the outcomes of these tools.  Regarding ODR platform, courts need 
to choose whether they want to build it in house or buy it as a cloud 
service. The problem is that courts tend to build tailor made systems 
for themselves that fits their needs which at the same time slows down 
82 Tashea (n 70).
088 the development. Also, if courts want to build a sophisticated AI-driven 
ODR they face considerable costs, adding costly updates. However, 
technology is getting cheaper, and according to HiiL report on ODR and 
the courts, cost of well-designed ODR would be 500,000 EUR or even 
less.83 According to the same report, the average annual spending on IT 
for courts e.g. in EU member states is just 3% of court budgets, totaling 
33 billion EUR. Thus, required economical investments are attainable. 
According to the report, this 1 billion IT budget would only need to be 
increased some amount to make adopting ODR systems possible.84
4.1 COMBINING AI AND ODR – PROVIDING MORE ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE
An effective ODR system will serve litigants to efficiently connect 
courts. Judge’s role would not be diminished, but judges would retain 
in-person, face-to-face judicial consideration, and would receive the 
information they need to decide an issue accurately. Thus, judges 
would have more time to focus on the hard part of judging that cannot 
be automatized. Furthermore, judges can improve the quality of the 
outcomes when they are less congested and have less time pressure.85 
As mentioned, ODR can be used both in ADR and in courts. ADR 
processes are less regulated and more informal which is why there is 
a lot of potential to adopt AI-driven ODR to mediation. However, also 
courts would benefit from this technology in routine civil matters that 
does not require judges’ experience and hard work. 
83 HiiL Trend Report (n 23) 68–69.
84 Ibid. 12. 
85 Bulinski & Prescott (n 40) 244.
089How does AI-driven ODR work and what does it mean? One option 
for ODR is to create an AI-driven ODR system with a three-step model 
which is designed to be used in pre-trial ADR such as negotiation and 
mediation.86 As a suggestion, Lodder and Zelenikov have introduced 
a theory of three-step negotiation method that, through utilizing 
AI, first, provides feedback on the possible outcomes of the dispute 
if the negotiation were to fail – task is to find the “best alternative 
to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA). Secondly, the tool should try 
to resolve any existing conflicts using argumentation or dialogue 
techniques. Third, the tool should employ decision analysis techniques 
to facilitate resolution of the dispute if those issues are not resolved in 
step two.87 System promotes parties to resolve their dispute on their 
own which reducing the role of the judges in a particular dispute.  
Lodder and Zelenikow also introduce an idea of intelligent decision 
support which is based on machine learning.88 In general, decision 
support tools help decision-makers, i.e. judges for example, improve 
their performance.89 AI’s strength in decision support is especially in 
machine learning, neural networks and data mining: a problem-solving 
methodology that finds of patterns and regularities in the set of data 
e.g. how judges have ruled in similar cases before.90 Due to AI’s qualities 
of recognizing patterns and natural language processing opportunities, 
AI could go through the existing precedents and evidence in a certain 
civil dispute. As an outcome, AI would suggest a BATNA for the parties 
and options to choose whether to settle for that outcome or proceed to 
86 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 8).
87 Ibid.
88 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 36) at 86.
89 Ibid. 86–87.
90 Ibid. 88.
090 court.91 This could bring essential value since judges could focus more 
on the hard cases instead of routine civil disputes: finding a BATNA 
facilitates the parties decision whether to proceed or settle.92 
How does AI help to find BATNA? I am using Lodder and Zelenikow’s 
discussion about family law disputes as an example: they introduce 
the Split-Up system concerning distribution of property in case of 
divorce under Australian law. System identifies almost fifty variables 
as relevant factors for a determination in consultation with experts. 
These variables were extracted from previously decided cases 
regarding family law – a neural network could learn to mimic the way 
in which judges had combined these variables i.e. came to certain 
conclusion. These variables along with arguments provided by parties 
are fed to the machine learning program such as neural networks so 
that machine learns how to weight these different factors such like 
a judge would do. As an outcome, the Split-Up system shows first to 
parties what they would be expected to be awarded and moreover, 
the litigants are able to have discussion on possible solutions through 
Split-Up.93 This technology can be implemented to other disputes as 
well, including criminal justice. Inputting certain facts or arguments 
regarding the case while defining variables related to a specific field 
of law, specific disputes, and related case law, a neural network can be 
trained in a way that it establishes BATNA to the parties. This kind of 
a negotiation support tool or AI-driven ODR would be very beneficial 
to ADR and would promote settlement between the parties and thus, 
reduce the amount of cases that goes into trial.
91 Ibid. 147–148. “Calculating one’s BATNA is an important step in the decision as to 
whether go to court or to mediate – in family law, commercial disputes and even in 
criminal law.” 
92 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 8) 326. 
93 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 36) 111–115.
091Similar AI-driven ODR system could also be adopted to court trials. 
Most of the civil cases in courts are mainly routine matters that AI 
could easily solve. For example, most of the cases in U.S. State Courts 
are traffic violations cases.94 These are usually quite straight-forward 
but they take a lot of judges’ time. Furthermore, for example in traffic 
violence cases, with access to data assembled by government or 
industry as well as information collected from the platform itself, an 
ODR system can provide insights about litigant behavior. Predictive 
algorithms may give judges and decision-makers information regarding 
correlations between litigant characteristics and legally relevant 
outcomes through patterns in data. Judges could choose whether they 
use these relationships to inform their thinking and decision-making.95 
AI-driven ODR could also make court proceedings more objective 
and increase judicial accuracy because the system would eliminate 
distorting, irrelevant information from the process through better 
organized information.96 Thus, e.g. by removing from view factors 
such as race, gender, weight, age, or socioeconomic status when they 
are irrelevant to the legal issues before the court, ODR would make it 
easier to judges to focus on the judicial facts and information without 
unconscious prejudices humans tend to make. However, the value 
of human interaction shall not be underrated and the risks, such as 
possible failures of algorithms discussed in the section 3.3., must be 
considered. There are still many challenges regarding the use of AI in 
courts. The solutions to make courts more efficient should not lead to 
injustice and false decisions. 
94 National Center for State Courts, ‘Court Statistic Project’ (2016) http://www.
courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/National-Overview-2016/EWSC-
2016-Overview-Page-5-Table.ashx accessed at 30 September 2018.
95 Bulinski & Prescott (n 40) 246. 
96 Ibid. 211.
092 Adapting new technology such as AI to courts is not an easy 
path – implementing technology to government systems is always 
complicated. However, proper planning of new systems is vital, 
especially in regard to court systems. Referring to Dave Orr speech in 
AI symposium one of the most important steps is training the datasets 
repeatedly until it is reaching the desirable and accurate outcome with 
the input data. After training the data, it is important to start very 
narrowly i.e. with smaller cases such as civil disputes or small claims. 
Next step is to ensure the interpretability meaning that judges have the 
knowledge of how these algorithms are working. Lastly, explainability 
of the outcome plays important role in judge’s reasoning and thus, the 
parties understand judge’s ruling and are convinced that it is fair.97 
As said, ODR could reduce some barriers when accessing courts 
that can be as simple as resolving the issue of not having a proper 
transportation i.e. physical opportunities and access to the court 
house as a place.98 AI-powered ODR system is most probably not 
going to replace lawyers, legal services, or legal aid, but however it 
would especially empower the court – i.e. judge – to communicate 
more clearly with defendants about law and their rights through ODR 
platform.99 That is, this solution would simply enable judges and court 
personnel to handle cases more quickly and accurately which will 
maintain the moral responsibility on judges.100 We will still need judges 
who are in charge and have the legal education in judging. As Bulinski 
97 Orr (n 79). 
98 Ibid. at 223–225.
99 Ibid. at 221.
100 Ibid. at 213. “Ultimately, an [ODR] system is not meant to replace the existing 
system, but rather to modernize it in at least two ways: (1) by expanding access options 
to include those made available by Internet technology and (2) by augmenting the 
abilities of judges and increasing the bandwidth of court personnel, thereby enabling 
them to handle cases more quickly and accurately.”
093and Prescott address in their article that one potential concern with 
using an intelligent ODR system to resolve cases is the possibility that 
a computer algorithm might be making the decisions and cases might 
become automated without a judge being in charge. Although, we would 
not need judges to announce routinized solution to a routine case, we 
will need judges when a case requires wise ruling. Correspondingly, AI 
can be a part of that decision-making process making it more efficient 
and maybe even more accurate meaning, however, that the control 
will remain in judge’s hands.101 This leads us back to one of the key 
points of using algorithms in courts – interpretability. Training judges 
to understand these algorithms and the possible bias that may occur 
has a high importance not to be ignored.
4.2 CASE ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Case management – i.e. managing all the information related to a 
case – is important part of the judge’s work. Due to the quality of ODR 
being fully online in the first place, AI could go through all the evidence 
and case information more quickly. As discussed above AI’s strengths 
are in recognizing patterns and going through vast amounts of data 
in no-time. Computers accomplish repeated tasks very well, so using 
ODR systems to address case types that occur frequently such as small 
civil claims and disputes would be practical.102 This brings essential 
advantages for managing cases and their information. Nowadays, 
more information is in electronic form which also makes it easier 
for individuals and lawyers to drown judges to case information and 
evidence. More data means more materials to go through and more 
101 Ibid. at 240–41. 
102 Ibid. at 217.
094 information management. Due to AI’s qualities, a case management 
platform build into the AI-driven ODR, would give a judge tools to 
search and organize information on this platform. 
To support judge’s decision-making process, a case assessment 
tool would use case prediction algorithm through NLP and machine 
learning. If parties do not settle for the BATNA, a judge still can use 
that as a basis of her reasoning.  By submitting the facts of the case 
to this case assessment tool that is functioning correspondent to case 
prediction through NLP discussed above, a judge would get an idea of 
the possible outcome of the case. This gives a judge more perspective 
to his own thinking and possibility to recognized whether his thinking 
is biased. Eventually, the final decision of the judgement will remain 
in judge’s hands. Case prediction would be one part of the process 
focusing on diagnosis of a problem and selection of an action – 
implementation of that action will remain to decide with judge’s legal 
experience in judging.103 
5 CONCLUSION
This Article has considered machine learning, AI-driven tools such as 
risk assessment algorithms, ADR and ODR through the lens of access 
to justice. I have considered the use of AI-driven ODR as a tool to 
reduce court congestion and facilitate judges’ workload in routine civil 
matters. AI-driven ODR also gives opportunities to judges to manage 
information and cases more efficiently, and ease the decision-making 
process in routine cases, leaving more time to focus on the hard ones. 
103 Lodder & Zelenikow (n 36) 86. “The process of decision support may generally 
be considered as divided into three steps: 1) diagnosis of a problem; 2) selection of 
an action; and 3) implementation of that action.” AI would be helpful in terms of 
diagnosis of a problem as well as selection of an action.
095There are some disadvantages of use of AI as a replacement of 
judging. For example, computers are not able to articulate the diverse 
emotional states of human beings, or conceptual creativity and 
flexibility which are beyond current scope of computers, and there is a 
danger or worry that existing skills of judges will shrivel while delegating 
tasks to machines.104 The danger is that judges – like all people – may 
find it easy to drop their own critical thinking skills when presented 
with what seems like an easy answer. Furthermore, there are many 
concerns of using bias algorithms in courts and avoiding these bias in 
algorithmic decision-making will take time and planning. Although, the 
idea of robojudges might be technically possible but still very unlikely 
– at least in near future. Judges will still bear the moral responsibility 
of their judgements and the education of judges plays also important 
role when adopting any new technology to court system.Technology, 
such as AI, can bring many benefits to the court system by making 
processes more efficient and faster.  However, finding the right balance 
of AI and human interaction in the court system will be a difficult task. 
Judges may be resistant to change, and we will need systems and 
institutions that ensure proper transparency, just, and speedy process. 
Judgements must be reasoned, transparent and fair equally to both 
parties. It is important to reduce false data to ensure the quality of AI 
results. When applying AI in courts, it must be able to explain how it 
reached it end result. We can agree that AI will not replace lawyers and 
certainly not judges. However, when using AI and machine learning in 
judges decision-making process, not only is access to justice likely to 
be increased, but economic impacts are anticipated to occur as well. If 
104 See generally,  Santosh Shah, ‘Will Lawyers and Judges be Replaces by Artificial 
Intelligence (AI)’ (2017) LiveLaw.in, http://www.livelaw.in/will-lawyers-judges-
replaced-artificial-intelligence-ai/ accessed at 30 September 2018.
096 judges would be able to solve cases faster with assistance of AI, courts 
would most likely to be less congested and backlogged. Also, ADR 
means utilizing AI, promote less court and lawyer-intensive solutions 
to solve cases meaning less congestion. According to this research, it 
seems clear that use of AI and ODR combined will provide more access 
to justice, reduce delays and congestion in courts. Furthermore, when 
risk assessment algorithms develop further diminishing their possible 
bias and towards better transparency, there is a major opportunity 
in making criminal justice more fair and just through use of these 
algorithms. I will wait eagerly, how and when AI will be adopted to the 
court system.
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Smart Legal Information Services
SARI KORHONEN & ALTTI MIEHO1
LEGAL INFORMATION SERVICES IN FLUX
Similarly to almost every other area of business, and as a self-evident 
starting point for the audience of this publication, the landscape for 
legal information services is undergoing a substantial change. Both 
technological advancement and expectations in demand are altering 
the playing field. Now is the time, and real need, for buzzwords like 
Legal Tech and Legal Design to come fully alive. 
Changes taking place in the field of legal information services fit to a 
larger image of digitalization and disruption. However, legal information 
services, and legal services in general, have their own peculiarities due 
to which adoption of new technologies and new ways of working have 
been somewhat different compared to some other fields of business.
Legal publishers have traditionally had a significant part in delivering 
the information about laws in force and about their interpretation. 
1 Sari Korhonen is Business & Development Director in Legal information sector 
of Edita Publishing Oy and Chairwoman of Finnish Legal Tech Forum. Altti Mieho is 
Development Manager in legal information sector of Edita Publishing Oy. Altti has 
over six years’ experience in editorial work, creation and training of legal information 
Services. 
106 Recently, their role has been in flux. Mere production of content has 
transformed into something else. In addition to focusing on content 
production, it is now also about tools and solutions, which enable 
lawyers and other professionals to perform tasks more efficiently.2 
Technology opens new opportunities, among other things, in 
relation to how legal content is produced, updated, combined 
with other relevant content, presented and, of course, consumed. 
Legal content becomes more relevant and more accessible through 
technology, which is great news for everyone. On one hand, solutions 
for lawyers can help them to be more productive and efficient. On the 
other hand, improved access to legal information facilitates access to 
justice, which in turn is important to everyone as a critical part of rule 
of law.
In order to understand the overall importance of legal information, 
we should focus on the value it creates and what kind of challenges 
are ahead to utilize legal information in a better way. This would also 
allow us to conceptualize something called “smart legal information”. 
Brief look below on how legal information is construed and delivered 
to public and professionals reveals some of the practical challenges 
and complexities that publishers and content producers aim to solve. 
CONTENT AS PART OF SOLUTIONS
Access to legal information is essential in a democratic society. We are 
bound by legislation - our politically found rules that we all need to 
follow and have knowledge of. Right to binding legal information is 
2 This is well described by David Curle. ‘Today HOW is the new WHAT’. Curle, David: 
Legal Publishers, Legal Technology, and the New Legal Landscape p. 189 – 197 in 
Hartung, Gues, Halbleib, ‘Legal Tech – how Technology is Changing the Legal World, A 
Practitioner’s Guide’ Verlag C.H. Bech oHG 2018. 
107rarely under debate. However, the manner in which legal information 
should be delivered to the public is a more complicated question. Legal 
texts tend to be very complicated themselves and especially due to 
the sheer amount of legal information typically it is very difficult even 
for a lawyer to be completely sure about particular legal question – let 
alone laymen.
The content of legal information has its impact on all aspects of 
life. In order to understand the practical implications, one has to go 
way beyond statutes, which provide merely a starting point.  However 
detailed and specific a law aims to be, at some point its wording 
requires interpretation. Legal information in its broad meaning may 
involve significant amount of different texts and verbal advice from 
varying sources. People need easy access to reliable legal information 
to be able to make informed decisions and in order to be able to 
achieve results they are after based on those decisions. 
For decades, we used to get most of this information in written form 
on a paper. Law books became essential source of legal information and 
tools for keeping professionalism up to date. For numerous reasons, 
books are still a valued and useful channel for distributing legal 
information but the way we use and distribute legal information has 
substantially changed. Content producers and new legal information 
service providers are key players in the utilization of modern digital 
solutions. 
The expectations for the use of legal information and for those 
who provide it have changed. In addition to delivering the information 
about legislation and interpretation, it is essential to consider how 
this should be done – and most importantly why. There is a real need 
for better tools at every stage of the “process”.  Legal publishers are 
in this respect well positioned to facilitate the interaction between 
108 the legislator, legal professionals and everyone influenced by legal 
information.    
Since we are living in an era of information overflow, legal 
information producers have more important role than ever.  The 
increasing amount of information makes it crucial to create reliable 
and time saving solutions. This is why legal information services have 
significant role to play in the development of the whole Legal Tech 
scene. Consequently, legal publishers and legal information service 
providers are transforming from content publishers to solution and 
platform providers. This is to say, smart legal information services. 
CHANGES AS A RESULT OF THE APPLICATION OF 
DIGITALIZATION
When people refer to digital content it is not always clear what they 
mean by it. In relation to legal information services, certain elements 
can be categorized based on the type of exploitation. 
While at first glance it would seem that digital legal content is static 
and easy to define, in practice this has changed over time. What we 
perceive as digital legal content or information has gradually become 
different based on the way the content is utilized by its users. There 
are three clear stages that have emerged in practice, and currently we 
are in transition from the second to third stage. This will have major 
implications in the way we use and understand legal content.
In the first stage, we started to convert legal information into digital 
format. For a long time, the digital format was only a parallel channel 
for conveying traditional legal information. The length of documents 
ceased to be a problem, search functions made life easier and linking 
109of different types of content created added value compared to books. 
However, digital format was, and in many respects still is, just a digital 
extension of manual content production. Legal information has 
been consumed by reading it and then mainly manually applying it 
somewhere else. 
As with most digitalization processes, at some point most of the 
legal information had been digitalized. This meant that there was 
a transition to the second stage, when there was a need for linking 
different pieces of legal information together. Presenting relevant legal 
information in context, in the way that regulatory change management 
can be conducted in same service platform where legal information 
is provided, brought wider opportunities for using metadata and 
structured data and for developing advanced user experience. The 
better quality of data in legal information services and structured data 
enable higher value to the end-users. The better and more structured 
the data on the background is, the better value the solutions build on 
that foundation can have.
In the third stage, where we are currently transitioning to, we have 
started to enable computers to use and enrich legal information. Many 
new ways of utilizing legal data has been developed, most of which 
seems to aim at providing new tools for people to use with the help of 
automatic or semi-automatic digital solutions. For example, automatic 
linking to other relevant content, recognizing similar cases or automatic 
anonymization of content with sensitive personal data means new 
opportunities for legal information services and their users.
110 MACHINE READABLE AND LINKED DATA IN LEGAL 
INFORMATION
When we look at legal information from the legal perspective, the 
most important element is the actual content. From this angle, a piece 
of legal information has its intrinsic value while format is of secondary 
importance. We are typically focusing on the literal text of legal 
content. However, when we look this from a different perspective, such 
as digital perspective, we notice that the content is heterogeneous and 
produced by using varying tools, data formats, and practices3. 
The exploitation and further development of digital format in legal 
information naturally requires, at the very least, that the information 
exists and is available in digital form. Moreover, it should be preferably 
in a format which is convenient to use – hence the ongoing discussions 
of legal design are extremely appreciated. When we talk about using 
the information it is important to differentiate between different 
purposes. For example, should the information be understood and 
used by humans, by computers or perhaps by both? 
Transformation to digital has not been an easy one.  To make some 
highlights of the relatively recent development we can use laws as an 
example. Statutes of Finland is the official publication of Finnish Law. 
Until the beginning of 2011, the authentic versions of laws were the 
ones published in the printed publication. The online versions were 
already available but did not have the authentic status. 
Today, online versions are published in Finlex, a database of up-to-
date legislative and other judicial information of Finland. The dataset 
3 Matias Frosterus, Jouni Tuominen, Mika Wahlroos and Eero Hyvönen: The Finnish 
Law as a Linked Data Service. The Semantic Web: ESWC 2013 Satellite Events, pp. 289-
290, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, Montpellier, France, May 26-30, 2013.
111of original legislation consists of approximately 47 000 acts and decrees 
as they originally appeared in the Statutes of Finland publication. This 
includes new acts and decrees as well as amendments and repeals 
targeted on previously enacted statutes.4 This amount of data is not 
particularly usable as it is. However, this is the law that everyone is 
expected to follow. The problem is that in order to find the current 
piece of legislation, in theory the user should manually combine all the 
amendments of a particular act or decree.
There have been different means to tackle this problem. Earlier 
solutions for this challenge have included especially consolidated 
legislation, which includes consolidated texts of acts and decrees that 
incorporate their successive amendments. This is to say that original 
statutes and subsequent legislative amendments are merged into one 
consolidated version for convenience reasons, and it is the approach 
for example the European Union follows in its regulations and 
especially in principal treaties with multiple amendments over time. 
This Consolidating legal information requires a significant amount of 
editorial work. However, while in theory the consolidated statutes in 
Finland do not have official status, this is the only presentation most 
people find usable and therefore is utilized in Finland. 
Finlex has been created for human use. This means that the 
information has not been available as data for algorithmic analysis 
and applications to use. Legislation is published as HTML documents, 
which is not very practical for most software to use. To improve the 
situation and make regulations machine readable, Semantic Finlex was 
built. Semantic Finlex is a national in-use data resource and system 
4 Oksanen Arttu, Tuominen Jouni, Mäkelä Eetu, Tamper Minna, Hietanen Aki and 
Hyvönen Eero: ’Semantic Finlex: Finnish Legislation and Case Law as a Linked Open 
Data Service’. Proceedings of Law via the Internet 2018 (LVI 2018), Knowledge of the 
Law in the Big Data Age, abstracts, pp. 271, Florence, Italy, October, 2018.
112 for publishing Finnish legislation and related case law as a Linked 
Open Data service with applications. Data from the Finlex database is 
transformed and interlinked on a regular basis into Linked Open Data.5 
Semantic Finlex was launched at 10th of March 2016.
Semantic Finlex has a possibility to be beneficial in many new 
use cases, such as building more intelligent digital legal services and 
conducting research into legislation and legal practice. Presenting 
legislative documents in a form that enables interpretation by 
a computer can help with the development of new intelligent 
applications. For example, legal texts can be automatically linked to 
other related texts, case law and vocabularies of legal terminology.6 
This is something that is currently mostly done by manual work.
LEGAL INFORMATION FROM PEOPLE TO PEOPLE
Publishing of legal information is about to enter new era as the 
third stage of digitalization of legal information is happening. Digital 
solutions provide us with options that were not available earlier. 
Not only are we now asking ‘Can we do it?’ but we have started to 
follow this with another question, ‘Should we do it?’. This question is 
continuously raised especially in connection with Artificial Intelligence. 
Legal information cannot, and should not, be excluded from these 
discussions.  
5 Oksanen Arttu, Tuominen Jouni, Mäkelä Eetu, Tamper Minna, Hietanen Aki and 
Hyvönen Eero: ’Semantic Finlex: Finnish Legislation and Case Law as a Linked Open 
Data Service’. Proceedings of Law via the Internet 2018 (LVI 2018), Knowledge of the 
Law in the Big Data Age, abstracts, pp. 271, Florence, Italy, October, 2018.
6 Oksanen Arttu, Tuominen Jouni, Mäkelä Eetu, Tamper Minna, Hietanen Aki and 
Hyvönen Eero: ’Semantic Finlex: Finnish Legislation and Case Law as a Linked Open 
Data Service’. Proceedings of Law via the Internet 2018 (LVI 2018), Knowledge of the 
Law in the Big Data Age, abstracts, pp. 271, Florence, Italy, October, 2018.
113New questions are actively solved in sphere of legal information 
as well, and we can illustrate this with the utilization of court cases to 
understand more holistically the use of law in Finland. For example, 
prior to the General Data Protection Regulation7 thousands of selected 
court cases had been made available to the public via Finlex. These court 
cases needed to be anonymized for further publishing. Anonymization 
means a process where explicitly or implicitly identifying details of 
persons and companies are removed from the text.
Edita Publishing Ltd estimated that - even if the time varied notably - 
it takes approximately 38 minutes to manually anonymize one decision 
on average. There were different parts in the anonymization process 
of a single case and included for example familiarization to the case, 
which took roughly 20 minutes per document. It is thus a relatively 
time-consuming process. While this was possible to do for selected 
cases, it would be very burdensome task to complete on a larger scale. 
One key challenge with automatic anonymization tools is for 
example the difficulty of evaluating the sufficiency of the anonymization 
for different kinds of data and needs. Also, a service or tool for this 
anonymization purpose has to handle both Finnish and Swedish 
language texts properly. For solving these problems, Ministry of Justice 
with its partners8 started a process of creating a semi-automatic tool for 
Finnish and Swedish, which could eventually be utilized in anonymizing 
court cases on a larger scale.
7 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 
1–88.
8 Aalto University, HELDIG – Helsinki Centre For Digital Humanities and Edita Publishing 
Oy.
114 This anonymization application is designed to consist of two 
separate software components: a web service and a user interface. The 
web service will comprise a functionality that takes text as input and 
produces as output the same text annotated with special tags marking 
the occurrences of named entities in the text. The user interface, a 
web-based WYSIWYG (What You See Is What You Get) editor, enables 
the user to edit made suggestions and add or delete new ones. The 
occurrences of selected named entities are then substituted with 
pseudonyms (such as ‘person A’). After finished editing, an anonymized 
version of the document can be exported.9 This process is expected to 
be helpful in anonymization of the court decisions. The tool should 
perform faster than a person doing manual anonymization. However, it 
will do mistakes and is only useful helping professionals in the process. 
Sufficient and reliable data is essential especially for the development 
of artificial intelligence and machine learning. Anonymized data means 
better availability of information. This is great news for both business 
and academia, but also for the common people and the society. 
Digitalization and new legal information services do not only mean 
new efficient tools and solutions for professionals, but they also 
have an impact of empowering individuals. This is what smart legal 
information services is all about. Easy access to reliable relevant legal 
information and a chance to interact and take action on the basis of 
that information. Despite all the technical capabilities we may have or 
gain, it is still people in communities and organizations we are doing 
this for.
9 Oksanen Arttu, Tuominen Jouni, Mäkelä Eetu, Tamper Minna, Hietanen Aki and 
Hyvönen Eero: ’Semantic Finlex: Finnish Legislation and Case Law as a Linked Open 
Data Service’. Proceedings of Law via the Internet 2018 (LVI 2018), Knowledge of the 
Law in the Big Data Age, abstracts, pp. 271, Florence, Italy, October, 2018.
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Exploring News Automation – Notes 
on Transparency and Copyright
ANETTE ALÉN-SAVIKKO1
I started my Science Pitch by referring to history and continuity, by 
acknowledging how the media has always been closely intertwined 
with technological development whether we talk about the print media 
or broadcasting. The media has also resorted to computers for decades 
ranging from computer-assisted reporting and data journalism in late 
20th century to computational journalism in the new millennium.2 
For their part, automation and artificial intelligence (AI) may be 
employed in various ways in the media sector: alongside predicting 
demand they may be used in content production on semi-automated 
to more autonomous basis, essentially referring to draft material 
being created for modification by human journalists or content being 
produced straight to publication.3 Indeed, news related to elections, 
sports, and finance, among others are already created in an automated 
1 LL.D, post-doctoral researcher at University of Helsinki
2 Coddington, M. (2015) Clarifying journalism’s quantitative turn: A typology for 
evaluating data journalism, computational journalism, and computer-assisted 
reporting. Digital Journalism 3 (3), 331-348.
3 Napoli, P. (2014) On Automation in Media Industries: Integrating Algorithmic Media 
Production into Media Industries Scholarship. Media Industries 1(1), DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.3998/mij.15031809.0001.107; see also Koponen, J. (2018) A new hope: 
AI for news media. techcrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/12/a-new-hope-ai-
for-news-media/ (accessed 15 March 2018).
116 fashion both in Finland and abroad.4 However, there are several 
challenges related to news automation.
In terms of principles, transparency and accountability have been 
recognized as important guidelines in the media sector, while news 
automation further increases their importance.5 Indeed, automation 
and AI tend to be accompanied rather by opacity – taking into account 
what we know about black boxes and biases in the context of AI.6 
Moreover, automation implies both qualitative and quantitative 
changes in content production, leading to agency and authorship being 
further fragmented as news automation involves AI, machine learning, 
programmers, journalists, and others.7 However, I assume that human 
journalists will not be replaced by newsbots, but rather coexist and 
complement each other in the future.
My research adopts a communications law perspective to news 
automation, with a specific focus on copyright law. Transparency must 
4 See eg Jackson, J. (2016) Press Association to look at automating sport and news 
stories, theguardian (18 Oct. 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/
oct/18/press-association-to-look-at-automating-sport-and-news-stories (accessed 
15 March 2018); Lever, R. (2019) Robo-journalism gains traction in shifting media 
landscape. phys.org (10 March, 2019), https://phys.org/news/2019-03-robo-
journalism-gains-traction-shifting-media.html (accessed 15 March 2018); Hallamaa, 
T. (2016) Voitto-robotti takoi NHL-uutisia – seuraavaksi kuntavaalien tulokset? yle.fi 
(28.12.2016), https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9375528 (accessed 15 March 2018).
5 Picard, R. & Pickard, V. (2017) Essential Principles for Contemporary Media and 
Communications Policymaking. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 10, 28-
31, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-11/Essential%20
Principles%20for%20Contemporary%20Media%20and%20Communications%20
Policymaking.pdf (accessed 15 March 2019); Diakopoulos, N. & Koliska, M. (2016) 
Algorithmic Transparency in the News Media. Digital Journalism 5:7, 809-828, DOI: 
10.1080/21670811.2016.1208053.
6 Coddington 2015, 337.
7 Grimmelmann, J. (2016) Copyright for Literate Robots. Iowa Law Review 101, 657-
681.
117be addressed when AI and algorithms are employed in the media 
sector. Research questions tackle issues, such as:
- Would the public like to know that a piece of news or part of it was 
machine-made? Why (not)? Does it make a difference? 
- Would the public like to know about the background data and 
the logic or function of the automated news production? Does it 
make a difference if it is a question of sports news, financial news 
or politics? Why (not)?
In legal terms, these issues may be addressed in terms of guaranteeing 
access to information and explanation about the algorithms.
FIGURE 1: Copyright dimensions of news automation from a communications law 
perspective.
Since my Science Pitch I (together with my colleagues) have already 
examined the challenges posed by automation to the basic premise of 
118 copyright, notably (individual) human beings as authors. Indeed, in the 
future, we might be facing a situation where human input is insufficient 
in order to meet the originality requirement as a prerequisite for 
copyright protection.8 
Automation in content production brings also the question of 
incentives to the fore: is it even necessary to promote creativity in 
automated news production by means of copyright or should other 
forms of protection be employed to safeguard investments therein?9 
Furthermore, with regard to fragmented agency, copyright must be 
studied in an employment context, taking into account the peculiarities 
of the media sector, as well as in other type of contractual relations. 
8 Alén-Savikko, A.; Ballardini, R. & Pihlajarinne, T. (2018) Tekoälyn tuotokset ja 
omaperäisyysvaatimus – kohti koneorientoitunutta tekijänoikeutta? Lakimies 
7-8/2018, 975-995.
9 Alén-Savikko, Ballardini & Pihlajarinne 2018; see also Pitkänen, O. (2017) Mitä 
lähioikeus suojaa? Lakimies 5, 580-602, 601.
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Black Box AI – The Problem with 
Sufficient Disclosure
ATTE KUISMIN1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AI AND PATENTING IT
AI and related terms like machine learning and artificial neural networks 
have become new buzzwords2, even in the legal world3. One reason 
for this is that while AI has been around for a long time4 the recent 
developments in computing power, AI research and the emergence 
of Big Data have led to more practical applications for AI.5 A second 
reason is the publicity that these applications have gained, from IBM’s 
Deep Blue beating world champion Garry Kasparov in chess in 19976 
1 LL.M. student at the University of Helsinki Atte Kuismin, who also took part in the 
student panel during the Legal Tech Con 2018.
2 E.g. Mona Lebied,’10 IT & Technology Buzzwords You Won’t Be Able To Avoid In 
2018’ (The Datapine Blog, 27.11.2017) <https://www.datapine.com/blog/technology-
buzzwords/> accessed 4.3.2018.
3 E.g. Rob Saccone, ‘The legal industry’s AI landscape’ (Medium, 8.4.2017) https://
medium.com/@robsaccone/the-legal-industrys-ai-landscape-e04b307c84f8 accessed 
4.3.2018.
4 The “modern” phase of AI is said to have begun in 1956, see Solomonoff p. 149.
5 MGI, pp. 8-9.
6 (Wikipedia) <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_versus_Garry_Kasparov> 
accessed 4.3.2018.
120 and Watson beating humans in Jeopardy in 20117 to Google’s AlphaGo 
beating the best Go players in the world in 2016 and 20178.
This development has led to an increasing importance of AI to 
the extent that it is said to be a key part of the “Fourth Industrial 
Revolution”9, although the adoption of AI technologies in companies 
outside the tech sector is still in its early stages10. The importance of 
AI can also be seen from the investments made by companies into 
researching AI; McKinsey Global Institute estimates that the tech giants, 
such as Google, have invested 20 – 30 billion dollars globally on AI in 
2016, of which 90 % was spent on R&D and 10 % on AI acquisitions.11 
This leads to companies wanting to protect their investments applying 
for patents for their AI inventions more frequently as their investments 
rise, as can be seen from the growth rate of AI patents: 6% per year 
on average worldwide between 2010 – 201512 and 34 % compound 
annual growth rate for machine learning (including artificial neural 
networks) U.S patents between 2013 – 201713.
There are a few problems regarding AI patents. The problems differ 
depending on from whose perspective are we looking: the patentee’s 
7 Jo Best, ‘IBM Watson: The inside story of how the Jeopardy-winning supercomputer 
was born, and what it wants to do next’(TechRepublic) <https://www.techrepublic.com/
article/ibm-watson-the-inside-story-of-how-the-jeopardy-winning-supercomputer-
was-born-and-what-it-wants-to-do-next/> accessed 4.3.2018.
8 Jon Russell, ’Google’s AlphaGo AI wins three-match series against the world’s best Go 
player’ (Techcrunch, 25.5.2017) <https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/24/alphago-beats-
planets-best-human-go-player-ke-jie/> accessed 4.3.2018.
9 Klaus Schwab, ’The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’ 
(World Economic Forum, 14.1.2016) <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/
the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/> accessed 
4.3.2018.
10 MGI, p. 6.
11 Ibid.
12 OECD, p. 22
13 ‘8 Fast Growing Technologies’ (IFI CLAIMS Patent Services) <https://www.ificlaims.
com/rankings-8-fast-growing.htm> accessed 4.3.2018.
121or the society’s. On the patentee’s side the problems relate to whether 
the patentee can get the patent granted. As such the problems arising 
are whether the AI is even a patentable subject matter, does it pass the 
other general requirements for a patent and if it does, can it pass the 
procedural requirements. On the society’s side the problems are linked 
to whether AI patents adhere to the basic principles of why patents 
exist i.e. does patenting AI inventions benefit the society by inciting 
competition and innovation14. 
The opposing problems of the different perspectives intersect on 
at least one occasion: sufficient disclosure i.e. the publicity function of 
a patent for which, in the context of the European Patent Convention, 
a person skilled in the art needs to be able to replicate the invention 
based on the application. From the patentee’s viewpoint the problem 
stems from the fact that the patent application may be rejected if 
the invention isn’t sufficiently disclosed. On the other hand, from the 
society’s viewpoint, the problem is when a patent has been granted 
to an invention that doesn’t satisfy the publicity function of a patent. 
When thinking about the “black box” nature of AI, i.e. the opaqueness 
of the AI makes it so that even the programmers themselves may not 
be able to explain why and how the AI reaches its conclusions, it raises 
the question of how can an opaque AI be sufficiently disclosed or how 
the claims can be clear, when its inventors don’t exactly know how it 
works?15 
14 E.g.’ Frequently Asked Questions: Patents’ (WIPO) <http://www.wipo.int/patents/
en/faq_patents.html> ”Why are patents useful?” accessed 4.3.2018.
15 On the “black box” nature of AI, see Will Knight, ‘The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI’.
122 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND THE STRUCTURE OF THIS 
PAPER
In this article my research question is to explore what is meant by 
sufficient disclosure in the context of AI. As the jurisdiction will be EU, 
I will be approaching this question mainly from the viewpoint of the 
relevant EPO Board of Appeals cases regarding the Articles 83, which 
is about sufficient disclosure, and 84, which is about clarity of claims, 
of the European Patent Convention (EPC). The case-based research 
is warranted as the subject at hand has not seemed to create much 
interest in the legal literature. I am excluding the issues regarding the 
general requirements of patenting AI and the issues with too broad or 
too narrow claims as there is already some legal literature on the first 
matter and the second matter would make this paper too broad.
I will be starting this paper with a section where I will be defining 
some key terms regarding AI as there are many types of AI today and 
not all of them are as opaque by nature as others. After that I will 
first be discussing what are the relevant parts of the application for 
assessing sufficiency of disclosure, then what is meant by “a person 
skilled in the art” in this context, then the clarity and completeness of 
disclosure and finally the requirement of reproducibility and how all of 
these are assessed in the context of AI.16 In the conclusion I will bring 
together all the arguments I’ve presented. 
16 This structure follows the section of sufficient disclosure in EPO’s Case Law of the 
Boards of Appeal, 8th edition.
1232 WHAT IS AI? 
2.1 DEFINITION OF AI
Artificial intelligence is the ability of a computer or a robot to perform 
tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings according to 
Encyclopedia Britannica.17 It can be further divided by functionality 
into weak AI, which means that the AI can only simulate human 
cognitive function and can only perform on specific narrow tasks and 
can seem to be very intelligent at them, and strong AI, which means 
that the AI is capable of all human cognitive functions and is able to 
perform on multitude of tasks just like humans.18 AI research on the 
other hand can be divided into huge amount of subfields ranging from 
general (like learning) to specific (like playing chess).19 The two most 
important fields for this paper are machine learning and its subclass 
deep learning and artificial neural networks(ANN), as these two are 
the main reason for the opaqueness of today’s AI.20 
17 B.J. Copeland, ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (Encyclopedia Britannica, 23.2.2018) <https://
www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence> accessed 5.3.2018.
18 Weak AI, (Techopedia) <https://www.techopedia.com/definition/31621/weak-
artificial-intelligence-weak-ai> accessed 5.3.2018 and Strong AI, (Techopedia) <https://
www.techopedia.com/definition/31622/strong-artificial-intelligence-strong-ai> 
accessed 5.3.2018 .
19 Norvig & Russell, p. 1.
20 Will Knight, ‘The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI’, where the issue is handled in depth. 
124 2.2 MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning simply means training computer software to teach 
itself by sifting through huge amount of data21, i.e. giving the AI 
software the ability to increase performance on a specific task without 
being explicitly programmed to do so. There are three main categories: 
supervised learning, semi-supervised learning and unsupervised 
learning.22 
Supervised learning is what majority of practical applications 
of machine learning use and means that the algorithm makes its 
prediction on the labeled data that is fed to it and it is corrected if it 
doesn’t predict correctly or in mathematical terms supervised learning 
means that there is an input variable (x) and an output variable (Y) and 
you use an algorithm to learn the mapping function from the input to 
the output so Y = f(x). The goal is to optimize the mapping function so 
well that when you have new input data you can predict the output 
variables of Y for that data.23
Unsupervised learning on the other hand means that there are 
input variables (x) only and no corresponding output variables, i.e. the 
algorithm is fed data and then left to its own device to learn about the 
data, so the algorithm won’t be corrected by anyone. The goal is to 
21 E.g. Sumit Gupta, ’What’s Machine Learning? Thanks to GPU Accelerators, 
You’re Already Soaking in It’ (NVIDIA blog, 25.3.2014) <https://blogs.nvidia.com/
blog/2014/03/25/machine-learning/> accessed 5.3.2018.
22 Jason Brownlee, ‘Supervised and Unsupervised Machine Learning Algorithms’ 
(Machine learning mastery blog, March 16, 2016) <https://machinelearningmastery.
com/supervised-and-unsupervised-machine-learning-algorithms/> accessed 
5.3.2018.
23 Ibid.
125model the underlying structure or distribution in the data to find more 
about that set of data.24
Semi-supervised learning is when only a part of the input data is 
labeled, so only a part of the input variables (x) have a corresponding 
output variable (Y) with them. The goal is to either find structure 
on the input data or make best guess predictions on the unlabeled 
data and feed that data back in to a supervised learning algorithm as 
training data.25
2.3 ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS
Artificial neural networks are algorithms, either regression (predicting 
values) or classification (predicting categories), that are used in 
machine learning.26 They are designed to grossly simulate the networks 
of neurons of the biological nervous system.27 The basic topology of a 
neural network is that it has at least one input layer and one output 
layer, but modern networks aren’t that simple: in addition to input 
and output layers they have one or more “hidden” layers between the 
input and output layers.28 Each layer contains one or more “neurons”. 
Each neuron has a value between 0 and 1 which it calculates using 
the input values and the set of weights and biases assigned to that 
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Gary Ericson & William Anton Rohm, ‘Machine learning algorithm cheat sheet for 
Microsoft Azure Machine Learning Studio’ (Microsoft Azure Machine Learning Studio 
Documentation, 18.12.2017) <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/machine-
learning/studio/algorithm-cheat-sheet> accessed 6.3.2018.
27 Graupe 2007, p. 1.
28 Christopher Olah,’Neural Networks, Manifolds, and Topology’ (Colah’s blog at 
github, 6.4.2014) <http://colah.github.io/posts/2014-03-NN-Manifolds-Topology/> 
accessed 6.3.2018. 
126 neuron. The output of each neuron affects the input of the next layer 
and whether a particular neuron in that next layer activates. The way 
that an ANN learns is by feeding it more input data and tweaking the 
weights and biases of each connection between layers, which modern 
ANNs have been programmed to do by themselves by using different 
methods such as backpropagation.29 
2.4 DEEP LEARNING
Deep learning has many definitions, but common thing about these 
high-level definitions is that deep learning models consist of multiple 
layers of nonlinear information processing that use supervised or 
unsupervised learning30, i.e. using a deep ANN, which has many hidden 
layers, to do machine learning. The most important attribute about 
deep learning for the purposes of this paper is that the deeper the 
system, i.e. the more layers and neurons it has, the more complicated 
the system becomes as there are more and more weights and biases 
to adjust. Therefore, it becomes more and more harder to know what 
happens between the input and output layers.31
29 This is a gross simplification of the basic functions of an ANN using youtuber 
3Blue1Brown’s excellent video series ‘Neural Networks’ <https://www.youtube.com/
playlist?list=PLZHQObOWTQDNU6R1_67000Dx_ZCJB-3pi> (accessed 6.3.2018) as a 
source. There are also different types of neural networks in which the basic structure 
is different, for example the neurons aren’t connected to all neurons in the next layer, 
but rather only to a particular set of neurons.
30 Dong & Yu 2013, p. 201. Foundations and Trends in Signal Processing Vol. 7, Nos. 
3–4 (2013) 197–387 
31 Will Knight, ‘The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI’.
1273 THE STARTING POINT IN ASSESSING SUFFICIENT 
DISCLOSURE 
3.1 THE GOAL OF THIS CHAPTER
In this chapter I go through the Articles 83 (sufficient disclosure) and 84 
(clarity of claims) of the EPC and the relevant parts of the application 
in assessing them. I argue that for the purpose of this paper “sufficient 
disclosure” can refer to both of these Articles. After that I present the 
hypothetical person from whose viewpoint the sufficiency of disclosure 
is assessed, i.e. the person skilled in the art, and how this skilled person 
is defined in AI cases. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the 
starting point from which the assessment of sufficient disclosure is 
done in all contexts, including the topic of this article: Black box AI.
3.2 EPC ARTICLES 83 AND 84
Article 83 of EPC is titled “Disclosure of the invention” and according 
to it the European patent application shall disclose the invention in 
a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out 
by a person skilled in the art.  Article 84 on the other hand is titled 
“Claims” and according to it the claims shall define the matter for 
which protection is sought (and) they shall be clear and concise and be 
supported by the description. What is the relationship between these 
articles?
The first distinction is that compliance with Article 84 can only be 
examined in cases where there has been an amendment but Article 
83 can be examined in any opposition proceeding, as it is one of the 
128 grounds for opposition according to Article 100 (b). A second distinction 
can be found in the case T 0593/09 (Polyethylene terephthalate resin-
coated metal plate of high processability) where the Board concludes 
that there is a distinction in the meaning of “clear” between Article 
83, which concerns the disclosure or “technical teachings” of the 
application or patent and Article 84 where that term relates to claims, 
which “shall define the matter for which protection is sought”. In short 
there is a difference between clarity of what is disclosed and what is 
claimed. 32
In case T 0608/07 (Polymerization process) the Board found that 
in cases in which insufficiency arose through ambiguity, i.e. where it 
is possible to use both Article 83 and 84, it is not enough to show that 
ambiguity existed, but rather the ambiguity must be so severe that it 
deprives the person skilled in the art of the promise of the invention. 
The board concludes that the delicate balance between the Articles 83 
and 84 must be assessed on the merits of each individual case. This is 
because it should be carefully examined that the insufficiency claim 
based on ambiguity isn’t just a way to secretly using clarity of claims as 
a ground for opposition.33
3.3 RELEVANT PARTS OF THE APPLICATION
In assessing what parts of the application are relevant to both Article 
83 and 84 there are a few leading decisions: T 0014/83 (Vinylchlorid 
resins) and T 0169/83 (Wall element) which concern Article 83 and T 
0818/93 (Expandable intraluminal graft) which concerns both Articles. 
In “Vinylchlorid resins” the Board concludes that the application in 
32 T 0593/09, point 4.1.3 of the Reasons.
33 T 0608/07, point 2.5.2 of the Reasons.
129question was sufficiently disclosed even though the experimentation 
contained in the description was needed.34 In “Wall element” the 
Board argues that due to fairness to applicants and public interest, it is 
possible to extract features from the description and drawings in the 
light of Article 83, although it must be kept in reasonable bounds as 
it increases legal uncertainty.35 In “Expandable intraluminal graft” the 
Board argues that “the drawings must be considered as ranking equally 
with the other elements of the application to satisfy the requirements 
of Articles 83 and 84”.36 It follows that the whole application must be 
considered when assessing whether the application complies with 
both Article 83 and 84.
Also in T 0032/84 (Redefining an invention) the Board concludes 
that the invention in question was sufficiently disclosed, even though 
a circuit in one drawing fails to function, as it is possible for the person 
skilled in the art to see the needed capacitators and deduce that they 
can be used from another drawing.37 This means that even though 
certain elements of the invention aren’t explicitly disclosed, this 
doesn’t mean that it is automatically insufficient if they can be found 
to be disclosed implicitly.
On the other hand, this means that substantially any embodiment 
of the invention, as defined in the broadest claim, must be able to be 
carried out by the person skilled in the art based on the disclosure.38 
This means that the disclosure is insufficient even if an irrelevant part 
of the claim cannot be realized based on the disclosure. What can be 
considered as a limitation to this rule, the Board in T 0206/13 (Surface-
34 T 0014/83, point 9 of the Reasons.
35 T 0169/83, point 4.1 of the Reasons.
36 T 0818/93, point 3 of the Reasons.
37 T 0032/84, point 6 of the Reasons.
38 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal 8th edition, II.C.2, third paragraph.
130 enhanced spectroscopy-active composite nanoparticles) concludes 
that technical aspects that are referred to in the claims, but are not 
defined, are not to be considered in the assessment under Article 83, 
but such technical aspects might be considered under Article 84.39 
This statement by the Board also sheds some light on the difference 
between Articles 83 and 84 as in only defined claims can be considered 
under Article 83, but undefined claims may still be considered under 
Article 84.
Because of there is only a small difference between the Articles 
in the light of this paper, as demonstrated in this and the previous 
subchapter, I am using sufficient disclosure as a term that encompasses 
both Articles in this paper.
3.4 A PERSON SKILLED IN THE ART
3.4.1 GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE SKILLED PERSON
The person skilled in the art when assessing Article 83 or Article 84 
is the same as when assessing whether there is an inventive step40, 
but the assessment of the skilled person differs between the Articles. 
In assessing Article 83, the invention must be disclosed in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by the skilled 
person. On the other hand, in assessing Article 84 “clarity demands 
not only that a skilled person be able to understand the teaching of 
the claim but also that he be able to implement it. In other words, the 
feature must provide instructions which are sufficiently clear for the 
39 T 0206/13, point 3.4 of the Reasons.
40 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal 8th edition, II.C.3.1, second paragraph, where 
Article 84 isn’t mentioned, but it can be deduced that it is the same e.g. from case 
T 0818/93 point 3 of the reasons, where the Board discusses both articles without 
making a distinction between the skilled persons.
131expert to reduce them to practice without undue burden, if necessary 
with reasonable experiments”41 
According to the case law of the Boards of Appeals, “the person 
skilled in the art should be presumed to be an experienced practitioner 
who has average knowledge and abilities and is aware of what was 
common general knowledge in the relevant art concerned at a particular 
time (average skilled person). He should also be presumed to have had 
access to everything in the state of the art, in particular the documents 
cited in the search report, and to have had at his disposal the normal 
means and capacity for routine work and experimentation”.42 The 
skilled person is an expert in a technical field.43 Even though the skilled 
person is skilled in particular technical field, they will seek suggestions 
from neighboring fields and also from a general technical field if they 
are aware of such fields.44 The “person” skilled in the art can also be a 
team of professionals, especially in advanced technical fields.45
A skilled person may use his common general knowledge to 
supplement the application to the point that the skilled person may 
even recognize and correct errors in the description. What counts as 
being common general knowledge? The common general knowledge 
is partly comprised of textbooks and general technical literature on 
the subject. On the other hand, scientific articles, patent literature 
and information that can be obtained only after extensive searching 
is not part of the common general knowledge. As an exception to this, 
when a technical field is so new that there has been no textbooks or 
other sources of general knowledge on the subject, even scientific 
41 T 0068/85 point 8.4.3 of the reasons.
42 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal 8th edition, I.D.8.1.1, paragraph 1.
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., paragraph 2
45 Ibid. 
132 publications or patent specifications can be considered as common 
general knowledge.46
Even though the skilled person may use their common general 
knowledge to fill in the gaps in the application, it must still provide 
guidance for the skilled person to enable them to identify all the 
essential processes of the patent application. The skilled person should 
not have to work these out by himself.47
The biggest step in “making” the hypothetical skilled person seems 
to be the deduction of what the technical field of the skilled person is, 
as this is the field from which the assessment of sufficient disclosure 
is made. All the skills that the skilled person has is tied to the technical 
field, as is their common general knowledge, what can be counted as 
being in their common general knowledge and influences what the 
neighboring technical fields can be. Therefore, the next subchapter is 
dedicated to looking at how the technical field has been defined in AI 
cases.
3.4.2 WHAT IS THE TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE SKILLED PERSON IN AI 
PATENTS?
Determining the technical field of the skilled person is crucial when 
assessing sufficient disclosure, as the sufficiency is determined from 
the viewpoint of the skilled person. How do the general rules regarding 
the skilled person work in the context of AI?
First it must be noted that there are at least two basic types of AI 
patents: patenting the AI itself or patenting the use of AI in a different 
46 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal 8th edition, II.C.3.1, paragraphs 3 and 6.
47 Ibid., paragraph 5.
133field.48 How does the technical field of the skilled person differ between 
these two types? It must be kept in mind that as AI is software, the 
general rules regarding software patents applies.49 This is important 
as the field must be technical and software as such is not technical 
in the light of EPC Article 52(2)(a), so the field is the one in which the 
software solves a technical problem.
I have chosen the next six cases on the basis that they create an 
overview on how the technical field in AI cases is deduced and how 
different they can be. They also showcase the difference between 
patenting AI itself and patenting the use of AI in a different field, 
although only the first case is about the former. I handle the cases in 
some detail first, as these details are important for the conclusions I 
present based on these cases. 
Case T 0521/95 (Pattern recognition/RDC JAPAN) is about a pattern 
recognition software, that is based on an Artificial neural network 
(ANN). The case is about sufficient disclosure. The Board handles the 
technical properties of an ANN in relation to sufficient disclosure in 
some depth, but relevant for this section is what is the technical field in 
this case. The field can be found in the appellant’s arguments50 and in 
the reasons section 4.11: the field of pattern recognition. Because the 
field is a subfield or in some cases almost synonymous with machine 
learning, and the case is about patenting AI itself, the “choice” of the 
technical field here seems natural.
48 Patenting the AI itself could be divided into two subcategories: patenting AI “as is” 
i.e. patenting the code and mathematics behind the AI and patenting AI while showing 
it solves a technical problem. As patenting AI “as is” makes it unpatentable, it does not 
have much relevance for the purpose of this article.
49 See EPO 2018, p. 2 for example.
50 Summary of Facts and Submissions, section V, paragraph 5.
134 Case T 1153/02 (Diagnostic system/FIRST OPINION) on the other 
hand is about “computerized medical diagnostic system utilizing 
list-based processing” and the case is about the inventive step. The 
invention’s inputs consist of answers to basic questions posed to the 
patient, which it then uses to allocate weights to different diseases and 
after reaching a specified weight on a disease, outputs that disease as 
the diagnosis. As the invention is heavily tied to the medical field, it is 
no surprise that the field of the skilled person in this case is medical 
informatics.51
Case T 0598/07 (Cardionetics Limited) is about a “heart monitoring 
apparatus and method”, which uses a type of ANN using unsupervised 
learning called a “Kohonen network”. The Kohonen network is used 
to monitor whether there is an irregularity in the heartbeat of the 
user of the invention. The case is about novelty, inventive step and 
clarity of claims. Even though the Kohonen network is an essential 
part of the case, the field of the skilled person in this case is simply 
electrocardiograph monitoring.52
Case T 0466/09 (Nokia) is about “a method for monitoring the 
health of a patient by measuring and predicting the glucose level of the 
patient’s blood sample” and it concerns the sufficiency of disclosure and 
the inventive step. The invention uses an adaptive mathematical model 
called Widrow-Hoffs (only Widrow in the case) Least Mean Squares 
(LMS). This model makes predictions of the user’s glucose levels and 
after getting the correct reading, corrects the prediction coefficients. 
In other words, the invention uses a self-learning algorithm that can 
be called AI. The field of the skilled person in this case is not specified 
in any way by the Board, but it can be deduced from the literature 
51 Reasons 3.2, paragraph 2.
52 Reasons 4.3.1, paragraph 4.
135forming the common general knowledge of the skilled person. The 
field is something relating to using AI in insulin monitoring, so the field 
could be for example, using case Diagnostic system/FIRST OPINION 
above as an example, medical informatics, but the emphasis being on 
the programming side of things and especially programming related to 
AI, as the case revolves around the AI part of the invention.
Case T 1662/09 (Eye control of computer apparatus/TOBII) is 
about “eye control of computer apparatus” and the legal question 
is technically about remittal to the department of first instance, but 
substantially about the inventive step. The invention in question uses 
an “event engine”, i.e. uses event-based programming to achieve the 
goal of the invention, while the closest prior art uses an ANN. The field 
of the skilled person in this case can be found from the Summary, part 
V, document 6(D6), which is a textbook that comprises of the common 
general knowledge of the skilled person in the field of object-oriented 
graphical user interfaces. So, in this case the field is not actually related 
to the AI component of the invention, i.e. the eye tracking.
Finally, case T 1285/10 (Genetic analysis computing system/IRIS 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES), is about an artificial intelligence system for 
genetic analysis and Articles 56, 83 and 84. The skilled person in this 
case isn’t explicitly mentioned, but there is a list of texts that exemplify 
the common general knowledge of the skilled person. As all the texts 
are about gene expression patterns and functional genomics, it seems 
that the skilled person is an expert on the biological side of things 
rather than programming.
From these cases it can be seen that there is no “one size fits all” type 
of skilled person in regard to AI, but the skilled person is deduced case 
by case, as it should be. However, in all the cases regarding the use of AI 
in another technical field, the skilled person is always an expert in the 
136 area that the AI is applied in, but not always in the programming side 
of things as based on the cases it seems that this side of the invention 
is often downplayed. This might be because the Board has not found 
or the appellant has not raised a problem regarding the AI part of the 
invention, so the cases have focused on the field of application of the 
invention.
I find the downplaying of the AI part of the invention regarding the 
technical field of the skilled person problematic. From the patentee’s 
side the problem might be that if the technical field of the skilled 
person is not heavily tied to the AI part of the invention, the patentees 
might find themselves in a situation where they have disclosed the 
application in such a way that they have omitted some parts of the 
invention that would be obvious to the expert in the field of the 
particular AI programming, but not so much to the skilled person in the 
field where the AI is applied. This could lead to claims of insufficient 
disclosure and therefore could get the patent application denied. 
However, in the cases above, this problem doesn’t seem prevalent. But 
as the cases are quite old, as the new wave of patent applications for 
AI started a few years back, the Board hasn’t handled cases of the new 
wave yet, so this might be a problem in the future.
The problem in these cases is more tied to not handling the AI part of 
things in depth, because they have focused on the field of application, 
as the skilled person technical field has been defined there most often. 
In cases Cardionetics Limited, Eye control of computer apparatus/TOBII 
and Genetic analysis computing system/IRIS BIOTECHNOLOGIES it can 
be seen that the field of the skilled person leads to a situation where 
the AI part of things isn’t actually handled in depth. This might lead to 
a problem from the society’s point of view, as this way the patent may 
be granted, even though the AI part of the invention might actually be 
137insufficiently disclosed, because it hasn’t been handled in depth due 
to the skilled person’s technical field. This problem is mitigated by the 
fact that in these cases the patent grants protection only in the field 
of application, so the patent doesn’t include the specific programming 
techniques used in AI programming. On the other hand, this might 
also lead to a patent that actually includes a very broad claim of using 
any AI in that particular field, which would be very problematic as this 
would prohibit competitors from using different types of AI that could 
compete with the granted patent.
As the analyzing of sufficient disclosure is done from the viewpoint 
of the skilled person, it is essential that the defining of the skilled 
person is done carefully as the technical field of the skilled person 
defines what is actually considered to be sufficient. This should be 
kept in mind when looking at the requirements of sufficient disclosure, 
which I will be looking at the next chapters. 
4 SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE 
4.1 THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUFFICIENT DISCLOSURE
Sufficient disclosure is made of two requirements: clarity and 
completeness and reproducibility. In this chapter I go through these 
requirements by first presenting what they mean in general and then 
look at how they apply in AI cases. 
138 4.2 CLARITY AND COMPLETENESS OF DISCLOSURE
4.2.1 WHAT DOES CLARITY AND COMPLETENESS INCLUDE?
The requirement of clarity and completeness in Article 83 means that 
the disclosure of the invention must be such as to enable the skilled 
person to reproduce the claimed step without any inventive step on 
the skilled person’s part.53 The skilled person must be able to do this 
based on the application and their common general knowledge. 
In case T 1164/11 (Medical apparatus for cutaneous administration 
of mendicaments) the effect of the claimed invention was known, 
but there was a lack of scientific explanation. This raised the question 
whether the invention can be sufficiently disclosed if only the effect of 
the invention is known, but the reason for the effect is unknown. The 
claimed effect in question was using a laser light to push molecules of a 
medicament into the skin. The board accepted that an invention might 
be sufficiently disclosed even though the exact scientific explanation 
isn’t known, if the unexpected effect is convincingly demonstrated, 
although the Board found that the application in question was 
insufficiently disclosed.54
According to established case law of the Board, the invention is 
in principle sufficiently disclosed if there is at least one way clearly 
indicated that enables the skilled person to carry out the invention. 
If the one way is clearly indicated, it is immaterial whether some 
variants of functionally defined component features of the invention 
are unavailable, if it is possible to find these variants from different 
53 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal 8th edition, II.C.4.1., first paragraph.
54 Ibid., second paragraph. 
139parts of the disclosure or from the common general knowledge of the 
skilled person.55
In contrast to the “one way” which is mandatory, the use of 
examples generally is not. The possible examples in the disclosure 
must be considered in the same light as other parts of the disclosure. 
This means that examples might be mandatory only when they are 
essential for the disclosure to be sufficient.56
The “one way” must be such that it allows the invention to be 
performed in the whole range claimed, i.e. if there is only a one way 
disclosed, it must be enough to let the skilled person to perform 
all claimed parts of the invention. This also means that all claimed 
embodiments of the invention must be sufficiently disclosed. This 
principle applies regardless of the way the invention has been claimed, 
be it by function or by process.57
If the invention in question is characterized by a distinct set of 
unfamiliar parameters, the patentee is under a particular obligation to 
disclose all the information needed to define these parameters in such 
a way that the skilled person can find these parameters without undue 
burden. The method for finding these parameters must produce such 
consistent results which are relevant for solving the technical problem 
underlying the patent application.58 
4.2.2 CLARITY AND COMPLETENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF AI PATENTS
55 Ibid., II.C.4.2., first paragraph.
56 Ibid., II.C.4.3.
57 Ibid., II.C.4.4.
58 Ibid., II.C.4.5.
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How to apply the conditions above to AI patents? First, I’ll look at 
specific cases regarding AI and sufficient disclosure and after that I’ll 
be looking at problem more generally, from the technical perspective 
of AI.
In the case T 0521/95 (Pattern recognition/RDC JAPAN) the 
disclosure begins with an explanation of how the human brain works, 
as the invention is said to be based on that and after that it discloses 
the structure of the ANN and the processes behind it. The Board finds 
many problems with clarity and completeness in this case: the problem 
of defining the “one way”, the problem with weighting coefficients as 
parameters and the lack of adequate instructions and vague functional 
nature of description, which do not enable the skilled person to 
perform the invention.
First the Board finds it difficult to find out what the invention 
actually is and particularly a one way of performing it. According to the 
Board it is not clear based on the application what pattern recognition 
problem any of the different variants of the ANN presented solve. The 
Board concludes that the variant shown on Figure 26 is the most likely 
candidate to be sufficiently disclosed, so that variant is the one to be 
analyzed. 59
Secondly the Board concludes that it is possible for the skilled 
person to perform the actual ANN based on the description, but 
the pattern recognition that this system should be able to do is the 
problem. There is also a disagreement between the Board and the 
applicant whether the structure of the ANN constitutes the “software” 
59 T 0521/95, points 4.1-4.2 of the Reasons.
141part or the “hardware” part of the invention, as the Board sees this as 
the “hardware” part of the invention contrary to the applicant.60
This disagreement leads to the problem of the weighting 
coefficients used in the ANN to recognize certain patterns, as the 
disclosure doesn’t actually tell these. It must be determined whether 
the weighting coefficients can be determined by the common general 
knowledge of the skilled person. According to the Board the common 
general knowledge only gives some general rules for this and doesn’t 
help the skilled person to train the system in this case.61
Next the Board says that the description doesn’t give a single 
“worked” example of the invention and rather the appellant has stated 
that the invention hasn’t been carried out and the project has been 
discontinued.62
The Board concludes that the invention hasn’t been sufficiently 
disclosed, as it is not possible for the skilled person to carry out 
the invention based on the application and their common general 
knowledge.
As the case T 0598/07 (Cardionetics Limited) is mostly about the 
inventive step, the clarity part of the case is quite brief and the problem 
in this case was whether the diagnosis step was an essential part of 
the invention, rather than the ambiguity of the claims. From reading 
the amended claims and description of the application, it is quite clear 
why there were no such problems, as in the previous case, with the 
disclosure of the Kohonen ANN. In the amended description the use of 
Kohonen ANN is handled in some depth and more importantly the data 
needed to train the network is given.63 Together with the amended 
60 Ibid., points 4.3-4.4 of the Reasons.
61 Ibid., points 4.6-4.8 of the Reasons.
62 Ibid., points 4.5 and 4.10 of the Reasons.
63 T 0598/07, pages 2-7 of the amended description of the application.
142 claim 28, the disclosure is quite detailed compared to the previous 
case, although the cases are not entirely comparable as the Kohonen 
network is an example of a deep learning network, which means that 
the parameters used are even more essential than in a “regular” ANN, 
using supervised learning, for sufficient disclosure.
In case T 1285/10 (Genetic analysis computing system/IRIS 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES) the examining division objected to the use of the 
term (among others) “Artificial intelligence routines” as lacking clarity. 
The Board however argues that this is not the case, as the term has a 
“well known meaning per se” and the description gives two examples 
of such systems: a rule-based system and a neural network.64 The 
examples can be found on the pages 10-12 of the description. There 
the applicant gives an example of a general rule-based system and 
mentions that a neural network can be used instead.65 The applicant 
does not disclose how to apply these systems to the invention, as the 
rest of the disclosure refers only to “artificial intelligence systems” 
without specifying which one is used and how. In the pattern recognition 
case above, the disclosure was deemed insufficient because it was too 
abstract and didn’t include working examples of the ANN. This case 
seems quite similar to that one in that regard, but the Board seems to 
have reached a contrary decision.
What can be concluded from these cases is that the “parameters” 
such as the weighting coefficients and input data to be used matters 
quite a lot in the case of AI as these are a key part of disclosing the “one 
way” of the invention, although in Genetic analysis computing system/
IRIS BIOTECHNOLOGIES not giving out the parameters didn’t seem to 
be a problem.
64 T 1285/10, point 3 paragraph 6 of the Reasons.
65 Ibid., point 0071 of the description of the application.
143From the technical point of view, the technical properties of an ANN 
make it so that the “one way” cannot be disclosed without disclosing 
the data used as input data for the training of the network as different 
input data leads to different weighting coefficients and thus leads to 
different results. It is also important to disclose the structure of the 
ANN as it leads to different results, especially the type of ANN or even 
AI in general used. From the technical point of view, it seems bizarre 
that it could be sufficient to refer to neural networks in general, as was 
in “Genetic analysis computing system/IRIS BIOTECHNOLOGIES”, as it is 
impossible to deduce what to code from that.
Regarding the “black box” nature of AI, the problem under clarity 
and completeness seems to boil down to the question of how to 
disclose the “one way”. If the programmers disclose the input data, the 
structure and the different algorithms or code behind the ANN would 
it constitute a “one way”, even though they don’t know what happens 
to the weighting coefficients and how it reaches its conclusion? It 
could be argued based on the case where there was a lack of scientific 
explanation that it would be enough in the case of AI, if the claimed 
effect is convincingly demonstrated in the application, even though the 
inner workings of the ANN aren’t completely known.
Another problem is linked with the data used, as today in the world 
of big data the amount of data used to train the ANN is so huge that it 
can be hard to know what the essential part of the data is. The problem 
in this regard boils down to whether the “parameter” of data can 
be disclosed in such a way that the skilled person can use it without 
undue burden and on the other hand can the data be consistent, as the 
data sets used evolve as the data subjects change. Also, is it enough to 
disclose a huge amount of data without knowing the parts of the data 
that was essential for the training of the algorithm? Does the same 
144 data set consistently produce the same results? These questions are 
better left for the future case law. 
4.3 REPRODUCIBILITY 
4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR REPRODUCIBILITY
The requirement for reproducibility differs from the “one way” 
approach described above in that the “one way” is about the process 
of reproducing the invention while reproducibility is about the effect 
of the invention.66
The first significant requirement for reproducibility is repeatability. 
According to established case law repeatability does not mean that a 
specifically described example of a process must be exactly repeatable, 
as long as the process reliably leads to the desired outcome.67
The second requirement is that the disclosure must be reproducible 
without undue burden. First, this means that even though a reasonable 
amount of trial and error is permissible, the skilled person must have 
enough information to lead them towards successfully reproducing 
the disclosure after possible initial failures. Second, this means in 
the context of parameters, that if the skilled person can only find the 
correct parameters from numerous alternatives by trial and error, this 
is regarded as being an undue burden.68 If the selection of parameters 
is a matter of routine for the skilled person and/or there is more 
information on the parameters in examples provided in the description, 
the disclosure is deemed reproducible.69 In contrast to trial and error, 
66 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal 8th edition, II.C.5.1, second paragraph.
67 Ibid., first paragraph.
68 Ibid., II.C.5.6.1.
69 Ibid., II.C.5.6.3.
145if the disclosure requires experimentation this constitutes as an undue 
burden, unless they must be carried out only to find the numerical 
limits of a defined range.70
If the claimed process occasionally leads to failure, this does not 
mean that it is not reproducible, if it only takes a few tries to successfully 
perform the invention, as long as these tries do not mean an inventive 
step for the skilled person.71 On the other hand if the disclosure 
requires some non-disclosed steps these must be so apparent to the 
skilled person, that it would unnecessary to disclose them in the light 
of the common general knowledge of the skilled person.72
4.3.2 REPRODUCIBILITY OF A “BLACK BOX” DISCLOSURE
What are the problems with reproducing an AI with a “black box” 
design? How do the general rules laid out above apply? Here I go 
through the requirements of reproducibility laid out above in the 
context of a “black box” AI by looking at how AI case law has handled 
them and how the technical properties of “black box” AI affect the 
assessment.
First the requirement of repeatability does not require that the 
process must be exactly repeatable, as long as the desired outcome 
is reached. In the context of a “black box” AI this would mean that it 
does not matter if the skilled reader does not know the exact inner 
workings of the AI, if they can reach the desired outcome based on the 
disclosure and their common general knowledge.
70 Ibid., II.C.5.6.7.
71 Ibid., II.C.5.6.2.
72 Ibid., II.C.5.6.6.
146 The requirement that the disclosure must be reproducible without 
undue burden seems more problematic.73 With a “black box” AI, for 
example a deep learning networks, the weighting coefficients, the data 
used to train the algorithm and the data used as the input are essential 
for the AI to work correctly.74 But the problem is that the programmers 
don’t actually know the exact weighting coefficients in these types of 
AI and it is difficult to disclose all the massive amounts of data used. 
Therefore, how can the skilled person know the parameters without 
unreasonable amount of trial and error or even experimentation? It 
could be argued in some cases that the selection of parameters is a 
matter of routine for the skilled person, especially in the case of the 
data used.75 It could also be argued that in some cases the data to be 
used could be so obvious that it would be unnecessary to disclose it. 
This doesn’t remove the problem with the weighting coefficients as 
they are a key part in the inner workings of a deep learning network, 
but as in the case T 0598/07 (Cardionetics Limited) there is not always a 
need to disclose these for the invention to be sufficiently disclosed, as 
in that case the applicant sufficiently disclosed the Kohonen network 
without going deep into the inner workings of it, but rather by focusing 
on how it principally works and the data used.
As most of the AI today is not 100% accurate it raises the question of 
applying the occasional failure doctrine. As there are a lot of different 
types of AI between which their accuracy differs widely the occasional 
failure doctrine could apply in some cases. As there is no case law on 
this matter, the question of how big of an error rate can AI have before 
the occasional failure doctrine applies, remains for the future case law.
73 This was one of the problems in T 0521/95 (Pattern recognition/RDC JAPAN), see 
point 4.9 of the Reasons.
74 See Ibid., points 4.4 – 4.8 of the Reasons for example.
75 As the appellant argued in Ibid., point V of the Summary of Facts and Submissions.
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Throughout this article I have been presenting how the general 
rules regarding sufficient disclosure are applied in the context of AI, 
especially the “black box” type of AI, as the research question was to 
explore what is meant by sufficient disclosure in the context of AI. I 
approached this by going through EPO Board of Appeals case law 
regarding sufficient disclosure in general and AI and on the other hand 
by applying the general rules found in the case law to the technical 
properties of AI, especially ANNs. Based on this research there seems 
to be a few problems with sufficient disclosure and AI. First the problem 
of defining the technical field of the skilled person, where the defining 
of the technical field seems to lead to downplaying the AI parts of 
the inventions. Second the problem with disclosing at least one way 
of performing the invention which seems problematic with “black 
box” AI, where the inner working of the AI might be unknown. Third 
the problem with trying to make the disclosure reproducible without 
undue burden, especially when it comes to trial and error in finding the 
parameters in an “black box” AI.
All of the cases that I have presented here are from before the new 
wave of patenting AI, as the cases arising from the new wave have 
not found themselves in the hands of the Board of Appeals yet. The 
problems I found will be even more prevalent in future cases as the 
AI software will be much more complex and opaque than those that 
were present in the cases presented in this paper. Therefore, in my 
opinion the problems that I have presented should be considered 
extra carefully when handling the new wave of applications and the 
inevitable appeals of the applications. There should be an emphasis 
on balancing the needs of the applicant and the needs of the society 
148 when dealing with AI patents, as AI will have a huge impact for the 
society in the future. The problem is that on the other hand the 
process should be fair for the applicants. The problem with defining 
the technical field of the skilled person might make the process unfair 
for them. On the other hand, if the applications are not scrutinized 
closely enough, patents might be granted for inventions that have not 
disclosed the essential parameters needed for the skilled person to 
perform the invention in question. It is essential therefore that the AI 
part of inventions are not downplayed and are handled in depth.
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Modelling Justice by Emergence? 
Rights and Values in AI Development
RIIKKA KOULU & TIMO HONKELA1
1 THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE TIME OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE
1.1 “AN AI SCHOLAR AND A LEGAL SCHOLAR WALK INTO A 
BAR...” 
Borrowing the popular Internet catchphrase, interdisciplinary research 
is like teenage sex: everyone is talking about it, no one knows how 
to do it, everyone thinks everyone else is doing it and so claim to be 
doing it. The same has been said about big data, AI, and machine 
learning, to name but a few. Although this comic relief is often used to 
expose buzz words, perhaps there is a seed of truth here and the key to 
success actually does start with talking, hopefully followed by mutual 
understanding? These were some early musings on the necessity and 
the difficulties of interdisciplinary research we shared over a pint of 
beer in the aftermath of the inaugural professor meetup of Helsinki 
1 Riikka Koulu, assistant professor on Law and Digitalisation, Faculty of Law, University 
of Helsinki; Timo Honkela, research director on Digital Humanities, Faculty of Arts, 
University of Helsinki. We would like to thank University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab’s 
research assistant LLB Kalle Markkanen for his assistance in finalising this paper. 
156 Centre for Digital Humanities (HELDIG) in late 2017, which later on led 
to this dialogue taking place at the Legal Tech Lab’s 2018 conference 
on AI.
Our objective here is twofold. On one hand, we want to draw 
attention to the need for interdisciplinary research on AI ethics, as 
we consider this to be vital for sustainable AI development. On the 
other hand, we want to exemplify how such interdisciplinary work 
could be initiated, first, by mapping out similarities and differences in 
how our respective fields (according to our subjective interpretations) 
conceptualise algorithmic fairness and, second, by reflecting how 
knowledge exchange can contribute to a more comprehensive 
approach to the societal consequences of algorithmic models. 
From which backgrounds do we approach this issue, which 
disciplines and perspectives are we bringing to this topic? One of 
us, Research Director Timo Honkela from the University of Helsinki 
has played a seminal role in Finnish AI research on social-cognitive 
systems. He started his research on natural language processing with 
rule-based systems in the 1980s and changed his methodological point 
of view into statistical machine learning and neural networks in early 
1990s. In particular, Honkela was expanding professor emeritus Teuvo 
Kohonen’s work on self-organising maps into humanities and social 
sciences.2 Timo has also written a book on the potential of using AI 
as a “peace machine”, with the objective to advance the welfare of 
humanity as a whole. In his book he describes how artificial intelligence 
methods could, for example, facilitate mutual understanding 
regardless of cultural differences, improve our ability to recognise 
emotional states in ourselves and in others, and event support societal 
2 Teuvo Kohonen, Self-Organizing Maps. Springer Series in Information Sciences 1995.
157processes related to democracy and economics.3 In turn, Riikka Koulu 
is an assistant professor on Law and Digitalisation at the University 
of Helsinki and director of the University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab. 
Riikka did her doctoral dissertation in procedural law on privatisation 
of coercion in digital environments and her postdoctoral research 
projects deal with legal framework for algorithmic decision making in 
public administration, conflict management in digital environments 
and technological change of legal institutions and professions.  
How to reconcile such differing research backgrounds and research 
interests, which are often formulated from the perspective of one’s 
discipline? Do we start with methods and theoretical frameworks, 
concepts or themes, objectives or expected results, should we focus on 
the process of scientific debate or the production of research findings? 
Here, we decided to experiment rather than to explicate, following 
a loose methodological approach of free association and discussion, 
without any particular starting points or expectations, trusting that 
we would find connection points and common ground and that by 
doing so, we would stumble upon interesting ideas that could later 
on be elaborated into concrete research interests and knowledge 
constructing needs. This being said, we both also acknowledge the 
value of strategic naivety; the need to develop feasible utopias and 
not only convincing dystopias and the role that curiosity and ability for 
self-reflection play in this.
Like so many current debates about interactions between law, 
technology, and society, our conversation started gravitating towards 
the societal consequences of algorithmic models, a topical theme 
3 Timo Honkela, Rauhankone: tekoälytutkijan testamentti. Gaudeamus 2017. The 
French edition by Éditions Saint-Simon forthcoming in 2019, The Estonian edition 
“Rahumasin: Tehisintelleksi uurija testament” by Koolibri forthcoming in 2019.
158 currently associated most often with discrimination and bias the use 
of algorithms reinforces and reinterprets in the society. Such examples 
can be drawn from a variety of applications both within the public 
and the private sphere, ranging from credit scoring and recruitment 
processes to criminal justice and social security.4 However, it should 
be noted that societal consequences of AI development are not 
necessarily as straightforward as the dystopian examples would lead 
us to believe. Although automation bias is a reality, there are also 
intersecting, overlapping and diverging consequences involved in 
algorithmic modelling of reality. In the end, the negative consequences 
can - and at times, should - be juxtaposed with the overall promise 
of automation as they are discussed both in research as well as in 
public debate: automation in theory means that less human resources 
are needed, although as has been noted the resources freed by 
technological development have never been distributed fairly. Thus 
the question is, how do we provide for legitimacy, security and fairness 
when on a global level the benefits of digital technologies benefit only 
a small privileged minority? 
In both data science and legal scholarship, the concern for negative 
consequences of algorithms is often associated with the demand 
for algorithmic fairness, or fairness-aware AI. But what exactly is 
meant by fairness, or by algorithms for that matter? The aspiration 
to marry AI with fairness is by default an interdisciplinary exercise, as 
algorithmic fairness intersects with data science, ethics, governance 
and protection of fundamental rights. In the end, a legal scholar 
4 See e.g., Danielle Keats Citron – Frank Pasquale, The scored society: Due process 
for automated predictions. 89(1) Wash. L. Rev. 2014,  p. 1-33; Julia Angwin – Jeff 
Larson – Surya Mattu –Lauren Kirchner, Machine bias. Propublica 23.5.2016. Available 
at <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing> accessed 20.6.2019.
159would say, regulatory and normative frameworks provide the concrete 
means for implementing restrictions and safeguards necessary for 
sustainable use of algorithms. The AI scholar would concur by stating 
that it is an issue beyond the ability of computer and data science to 
create the boundary constraints for the development of algorithmic 
decision making models. Simultaneously, the fields can provide new 
perspectives for each other. For example, algorithmic decision making 
can provide us with new tools for making legal safeguards more 
effective, for example, by implementing them within the technological 
architecture, as is suggested by justice by design approaches.5 Also, AI 
methods could provide a window for examining justice in new ways, as 
an emergent phenomenon that arises from collective human action.
At the same time, there is an urgent need to develop normative 
frameworks for future AI development and to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights, which has led to both to the development of soft 
law instruments such as ethical charters as well as growing pressure 
towards European regulatory action.6 Simply put, the rules of the game 
need to be decided and legislation is one way to go about it. However, 
the legislative quality requirement of technological neutrality further 
complicates formulation of regulation. In any case, regulating artificial 
5 Burkhard Schafer, Opening the black box: Petri nets and privacy by design. 31(1) 
International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, p. 68–90.
6 For example, The European Commision set up an independent research project 
into AI ethics. See, European Commission, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, High-
Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence. 2019. Available at <https://ec.europa.
eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation> accessed 20.6.2019. See also the Montreal 
declaration for a responsible development of artificial intelligence, available at 
<https://www.montrealdeclaration-responsibleai.com/the-declaration> accessed 
20.6.2019; see also The Toronto Declaration: Protecting the right to equality and non-
discrimination in machine learning systems, available at <https://www.accessnow.org/
cms/assets/uploads/2018/08/The-Toronto-Declaration_ENG_08-2018.pdf> accessed 
20.6.2019. 
160 intelligence requires a holistic approach and dialogue between 
disciplines varying from social scientists to natural scientists regardless 
of the difficulties caused by different ontological and epistemological 
stances. The place to start, in our opinion, is the dialogue between 
individuals. 
This paper is divided into four parts in addition to this introduction, 
following the structure used in dialogue at the conference. In the 
next section, we provide an overview on the development of artificial 
intelligence and different paradigms of the research, as these 
differences also carry significance from philosophical as well as from 
a practical point of view. We also provide a brief description of legal 
debates and research themes AI has given rise to during the last years 
and demonstrate, how the legal system produces anthropocentric 
law. Following this in section 3, we discuss the ontological and 
epistemological differences between social and natural sciences in 
mapping out complex social reality. We examine how the shift from 
rule-based systems to machine learning techniques, at least partly, 
enables us to overcome these differences and pinpoint how one 
problem related to algorithmic fairness can be found in our tendency 
to ascribe objectivity to technology. In section 4, we discuss how 
fairness-aware AI could be construed as interaction between human 
and algorithmic actors. Finally, in section 5 we offer some concluding 
remarks on the lessons we learned from our discussion as well as on 
the first steps towards interdisciplinary research. 
1612 FIRST ROUND: UNDERSTANDING AI AND 
UNDERSTANDING LAW 
2.1 FROM RULE-BASED AI TO LAYERED NEURAL NETWORKS: 
NATURAL LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY
It should be noted that defining AI has traditionally been an issue of 
moving goal posts, where often functionalities not yet in existence 
were ascribed the definition only to be called something else once their 
technical implementation had become feasible. Thus, it is important 
to place AI development to relevant societal context and to elaborate 
what is currently meant by artificial intelligence. 
In the 1980s and before, active development of AI was based on 
rule-based systems. In various domains, experts were interviewed in 
order to elicit theory knowledge and code it in the form of rule sets to 
facilitate decision making and problem solving in computing. Despite 
large investments, development of medical or legal expert systems 
or natural language processing system did not reach breakthrough 
results. The reason for the relatively modest success can be coined 
to two reasons. The number of rules needed to model the expertise 
approved to be very large. Furthermore, concerns started to grow 
that human knowledge and expertise cannot be fully modeled using 
symbolic rules.
As said, there is ambiguity surrounding the concept of artificial 
intelligence, which still in the AI summer of 1980s was largely 
synonymous with rule-based models but nowadays refers mostly to 
the use of statistical machine learning and neural networks for tasks 
such as classification and pattern recognition. The difference between 
162 these techniques is also relevant for legal AI applications, as the 
unrealistic expectations towards AI and the shortcomings of rule-based 
systems lead to the field’s stagnation in 1980s. At the time, rule-based 
systems within law often took the form of Expert Systems, creation 
of which required professionals of a given legal field to formulate the 
rules that the system would then follow through in its operations. The 
formulation of rules, however, proved out to be a laboursome task of 
only limited practical applications, as the legal system’s complexity 
could not be simplified into rules without something getting lost. Early 
developments led to the old consensus still often repeated by both 
scholars and practitioners alike - that computational methods in law are 
mostly suitable for automating routine-like simple cases, which require 
no discretion and can hence be presented as rule-based systems with 
‘if/then’ commands.7 
Thus, an important distinction needs to be made between 
reasoning and representation of knowledge, which relates to the 
relationship between complex social reality and its representation as 
a computational model. It should be noted that any model is always 
simplification by definition; social reality is simply too complex to be 
modelled as such and if everything would be included in the model, 
it would cease to be a model. Legal knowledge, like any specialised 
human knowledge, is usually presented through natural language, 
either spoken or written. Natural language has thus been the casual 
7 From the Finnish perspective see e.g., Kaarle Makkonen, Zur Problematik 
der juridischen Entscheidung. Oikeudellisen ratkaisutoiminnan ongelmia: eine 
strukturanalytische Studie. Rakenneanalyyttinen tutkimus. Turun yliopisto 1965; 
Jorma Kuopus, Hallinnon lainalaisuus ja automatisoitu verohallinto : oikeustieteellinen 
tutkimus kansalaisen oikeusturvasta teknistyvässä valtionhallinnossa. Lakimiesliiton 
kustannus 1988; Tomi Voutilainen,  ICT-oikeus sähköisessä hallinnossa: ICT-oikeudelliset 
periaatteet ja sähköinen hallintomenettely. Edita 2009.
163observer’s entrance point to the expert’s internal reasoning that 
precedes explication through language.  
At the same time as it is causing problems for computational 
modelling of law, the ambiguity of natural language provides for much 
of the flexibility necessary for legal practices. Ambiguity is, so to speak, 
the safety valve of the legal system. Through interpretative flexibility 
embedded in abstract legal norms, the legal systems create space for 
discretion in legal decision making. For example, by emphasising the 
objectives of regulation instead of literal application, legal decision 
making can be context-dependant case-by-case assessment when 
necessary. Laws’ reflexivity, which is the product of thousands of 
years of legal practices across all human societies, can be seen as 
the means for handling uncertainties and unknowns within the legal 
system. This flexibility, complexity and ambiguity of language (e.g. we 
can both understand the word ‘justice’ completely differently but still 
have a conversation about it) impose challenges for AI development, 
a linguistic threshold that is seldom taken sufficiently into account. 
Nevertheless, understanding the complexity of any given domain 
constitutes a prerequisite for automation, be it through rule-based 
systems or neural networks. Thus the development of feasible AI 
applications requires collaboration between developers and domain 
experts such as legal professionals to ensure that too much complexity 
is not lost through computational modelling. 
Traditionally, knowledge representation through natural language 
has imposed almost insurmountable challenges for early AI 
development, as described above. In this sense, new AI techniques 
do, in fact, constitute a way forward. Neural networks are particularly 
suitable for recognising patterns in vast data flows and thus provide 
means for observing emergent action, to analyse with statistical 
164 methods the correlations and interdependencies embedded within 
the data.8 Whereas the early rule-based Expert Systems in the 1980s 
required a human intermediary to take charge of formulating the rules 
for the system’s operations, trained neural networks have no such need 
for human intervention. Simply put, they are much more autonomous 
in this regard. As it is, you win some, you lose some. Although neural 
networks are able to overcome some of the insurmountable obstacles 
natural language posed for rule-based systems, a different set of 
problems emerge with these new techniques.  
During recent years so-called deep learning, i.e. multilayer neural 
networks have been applied even to give rise to emergence to implicit 
knowledge and problem solving in a manner that can be called 
intuitive, at least in a metaphorical sense of the word. These methods 
are often referred to as data-driven technologies, as the internal view 
the models create over a given e.g. the legal domain depends on the 
data given to them. Although these autonomous and data-intensive AI 
methods are able to address problems related to quantity, over which 
rule-based systems were not, they falter when it comes to quality of 
modelling social reality. The expression “garbage in, garbage out” has 
become ubiquitous, reminding that the selection of data is an essential 
task.9 Moreover, human understanding and decision making is based 
8 Self-evidently, data is not objective although we often insinuate this: data is created, 
produced, categorised and managed within information processes and architectures 
that also define what types of data can be utilised. One of the focal problems related to 
the subjectivity of data follows from our assumption of its objectivity, that by accessing 
data we can access the truth. We return to subjectivity later on in section 3. See also 
Christiane Floyd – Heinz Züllighoven –Reinhard Budde – Reinhard Keil-Slawik, Software 
Development and Reality Construction. Springer-Verlag 1992; Natascha Just –, Michael 
Latzer, Governance by algorithms: reality construction by algorithmic selection on the 
Internet. 39(2) Media, Culture & Society 2017, 238–258.
9 For example, see Bininda-Emonds et al, Garbage in, garbage out, p. 267–280 in Olaf 
R. P. Bininda-Emonds (ed.), Phylogenetic supertrees. Springer 2004.
165on multiple levels that are formed both socially and over long periods 
of time. This cultural capacity is not available for AI systems that 
view the world in a rather flat way even in the case of deep learning 
architectures.
The nature of these algorithms leads into a situation in which their 
behaviour is difficult or impossible to predict and explain in detail. 
This has been always true to even larger extent also with humans, but 
we have come to terms with this property of human cognition to the 
extent that we no longer question it. As machines increasingly portray 
similar capacities, the situation needs to re-evaluated: how should the 
society, through its steering instrument of law, react to the potential 
and challenges of these new AI applications? Within legal research, the 
question is often formulated in terms of regulation and governance 
of technologies: how do we ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights when AI applications are used across society? Are current 
legal instruments sufficient for addressing the evident shortcomings 
of algorithmic models discussed under the AI ethics and algorithmic 
fairness debates? If new instruments are developed, should they be 
addressed towards states, organisations or markets, private individuals 
such as programmers or consumers, or corporate actors like technology 
companies? And ultimately, are legal conceptualisations of agency still 
valid, when decision making is no longer directly linked with human 
decision makers? In the next section, we describe briefly some of the 
reactions and answers legal scholarship has discussed in relation to AI 
applications in law.
166 2.2 LEGAL SYSTEM REACTING TO AI: FROM STATISTICAL 
METHODS TO ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS
Current AI methods present a complex set of issues for legal scholars 
and practitioners alike and many aspects still remain largely under-
theorised in socio-legal scholarship, although not for the lack of 
trying. There has been a multitude of research on the impact statistics, 
computers, automation and AI have on law since the early history of 
electronic computing in the 1940s. Early scholarship was influential in 
establishing law and technology as an acceptable topic in legal research 
and provided some of the early conceptualisations of the relevant 
research questions and methods. Also, the need for interdisciplinarity 
was usually acknowledged as a prerequisite for research on the 
intersection of law and technology. 
For example, the use of statistical methods, which also most current 
AI applications lean on, has been discussed in relation to law already 
in late 1940s and early 1950s under the auspices of ‘jurimetrics’, which 
became particularly influential in the US and Brazil. Its beginnings are 
often associated with American lawyer Lee Lovinger’s article from 
1949, in which the author strives for an economic analysis of law.10 
Early jurimetrics “mainly concentrated in three areas: electronic data 
storage and retrieval; behavioural analysis of decisions; and the use of 
symbolic logic”, as the late Professor Hans Baade described in his 1963 
article.11 
Similarly, the use of computational methods to model legal decision 
making has been discussed in legal informatics, a tradition that emerged 
10 Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward. 33(5) Minn. L. Rev. 1949, pp. 
455–493.
11 Hans W. Baade, Jurimetrics: Foreword, 28(1) Law & Contemp. Probs. 1963. 
167in the 1950s and expanded decades until late 1990s.12 Early work on 
legal informatics was particularly interested in conceptualisations 
of information and access to legal information and in developing 
information retrieval systems and data-bases to these ends.13 In 
German-speaking legal culture legal informatics was in the beginning 
closely linked with administrative automation,14 an emphasis that was 
also embraced in the Nordic tradition.15 In the Nordic countries legal 
informatics has been particularly influential in formulating the growing 
importance of information architectures, establishing law as an 
information architecture and deciphering boundaries of legal decision 
making. Furthermore, the Finnish legal informatics discussion in the 
1990s gravitated towards doctrinal self-reflection of legal research, 
12 For example, see Josep Aguiló-Regla, Introduction: Legal Informatics and the 
Conceptions of the Law, p. 18–24 in Richard Benjamins –Pompeu Casanovas – 
Joost Breuker – Aldo Gangem (eds.), Law and the Semantic Web, Legal Ontologies, 
Methodologies, Legal Information Retrieval, and Applications. Springer-Verlag 2005. 
The subject has especially been researched in Europe, see Hondius Frits, Data law in 
Europe. 16 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1980, p.87–111. In Finland, Ahti Saarenpää has been one of 
the leading researchers in the area, see Ahti Saarenpää, Oikeusinformatiikka, p. 1–82, 
in Risto Haavisto (ed.), Oikeusjärjestys 2000 - I osa. Lapin yliopiston oikeustieteellisiä 
julkaisuja 2005.
13 On information retrieval systems, see Jon Bing, Let there be LITE: a brief history of 
legal information retrieval, 1(1) European Journal of Law and Technology 2010.
14 See e.g., Karl Zeidler, Über die Technisierung der Verwaltung. C. F. Müller 1959; 
Herbert Fiedler Rechenautomaten als Hilfsmittel der Gesetzesanwendung. Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung 1962; Niklas Luhmann, Recht und Automation in der öffentlichen 
Verwaltung. Duncker & Humblot; Auflage: 2., unveränd. 1997. 
15 For example, see Cecilia Magnusson Sjöberg, Rättsautomation: särskilt om 
statsförvaltningens datorisering. Norstedt 1992; Peter Wahlgren, Automation of legal 
reasoning: a study of artificial intelligence and law. Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 
1992; Kuopus 1988; Voutilainen 2009.
168 trying to define its identity and status within the hierarchy of legal 
disciplines.16 
Sometimes considered a subfield of legal informatics and at times a 
separate tradition, AI & law research combined computer science with 
the legal domain. In a special issue of Artificial Intelligence and Law in 
2012, Professor emeritus Trevor Bench-Capon of University of Liverpool 
et al. provide a comprehensive overview of the field’s development 
during 25 years of AI & Law conferences organised since 1987.17 The 
articles reprinted  and revisited in the special issue demonstrate how 
computational modelling of legal decision making has been, if not 
the Philosopher’s stone then at least a very popular and long-lasting 
research topic in the field.18 In the 1980s most models were rule-based 
systems that required human intermediary to program the commands 
that the system would then execute. During the years and decades, 
AI & Law contributed to increasingly nuanced understanding about 
computational modelling of law and the accompanying challenges. 
Much research approached modelling by developing legal expert 
systems, which would replicate the way in which a legal professional 
16 See e.g. Ahti Saarenpää: Does Legal Informatics Have a Method in the New Network 
Society?, p. 51–75 in: Ahti Saarenpää – Aleksander Wiatrowski (eds.), Society Trapped 
in the Network: Does It Have a Future? University of Lapland 2016. On research 
topics within Nordic legal informatics, see e.g., Cecilia Magnusson, Juristen och 
datasäkerheten. Norstedts 1985; Ari Koivumaa, Nätets juridik. Jure 2000; Peter Seipel, 
Rätten och säkerheten i IT-samhället. Jure 2006. On the development of information 
law and the identity of legal informatics see e.g., Kuopus 1988, s. 16–25. 
17 Trevor Bench-Capon et al., A history of AI and Law in 50 papers: 25 years of the 
international conference on AI and Law. 20(3) Artificial Intelligence and Law 2012, p. 
215–319.
18 For example, the first conference regarding AI and Law was held in 1987, see Brench-
Capon 2012, p. 219. It’s also worth mentioning that the first Finnish dissertations of 
the topic were conducted in 1965 and 1988 by Makkonen and Kuopus, respectively. 
169would apply the law based on her experience and intuition.19 Another 
line of research aimed to represent law through the formalisation 
of legislation. However, several features of law hindered progress; 
complexity, factual and legal uncertainties as well as the dynamics 
of legal change have been identified in recent literature as some of 
the focal challenges legal expert systems faced.20Although some 
authors advocated for general theory development as a prerequisite 
for the field’s further development, such systematisation and 
conceptualisation efforts have not yet been able to produce a lasting 
influence on mainstream legal scholarship.21
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly as it is so often the case with 
new research traditions, many of the early findings remained within 
the boundaries of the newly established specialised fields and mostly 
did not find their path into mainstream legal scholarship. It is likely 
that this relative isolation from other legal fields, the methodological 
detachment from legal dogmatics often necessary for interdisciplinarity, 
and generational changes affecting knowledge transfer all contributed 
to the fact that many of these early successes have been forgotten 
by later researcher generations.22 The decline of interest in legal 
informatics has been described in an introductory article to a special 
issue on the history of legal informatics from 2010, in which Professor 
19 See eg. Richard Susskind, Expert systems in law: A jurisprudential approach to 
artificial intelligence and legal reasoning. 49(2) The modern law review 1986, p. 168-
194.
20 Charles Stevens – Vishal Barot – Jenny Carter, The Next Generation of Legal Expert 
Systems – a New Dawn or a False Dawn? International Conference on Innovative 
Techniques and Applications of Artificial Intelligence, p. 439–452.
21 Peter Wahlgren, A General Theory of Artificial Intelligence and Law, p.79–92 in A. 
Soeteman (eds.), Legal knowledge based systems JURIX 94: The Foundation for Legal 
Knowledge Systems. Koninklijke Vermande 1994.
22 See e.g., Riikka Koulu, Digitalisaatio ja algoritmit - oikeustiede hukassa? 7–8 
Lakimies 2018, p. 840–867.
170 emeritus Paliwala of University of Warwick describes how legal 
informatics has evolved over the decades but simultaneously reflects 
on the field’s shortcomings:  “many of the contributors to this volume 
sense a crisis; that the many achievements chronicled in this volume 
are paralleled by stories of promise not fulfilled, of pathways not 
followed, of wrong pathways followed.”23
In any case, from the late 1990s and early 2000s research started 
to shift away from legal informatics, as the mainstream popularisation 
of Internet in the form of World Wide Web created the demand for 
research on new digital environments and actors “on the Information 
Superhighway” and in “cyberspace”, to use the 1990s terminology. At 
the time law and technology research gave rise to new emergent fields 
such as information and communication law as well as encouraged 
research within established legal subfields such as copyright law, 
criminal law, and constitutional law, among others.24 This intra-
subdisciplinary shift is also reflected in current legal research on the 
implications of AI applications, the examination of which often adopts 
a monodisciplinary perspective of individual legal subdiscipline instead 
of to the overarching umbrella disciplines such as legal informatics or 
AI & Law. For example, a copyright scholar might be drawn to a re-
examination of the concept of authorship when art is created with 
the help of AI application, whereas a scholar of administrative law 
might focus on interpretation of administrative law principles in AI-
based automation of public administration. Researcher interested in 
23 Abdul Paliwala, A History of Legal Informatics: An Introduction to the Special Issue. 
1(1) European Journal of Law and Technology. Available at <http://ejlt.org/article/
view/21/38> accessed 27.6.2019. 
24 See e.g., Taina Pihlajarinne, Tunnusmerkin suoja verkkotunnuskäytössä. Edita 
2009; Riku Neuvonen, Sananvapaus, joukkoviestintä ja sääntely. Talentum 2005; Päivi 
Korpisaari, Uusi tietosuojalainsäädäntö. Alma Talent 2018. 
171transport law might be interested in assessing the risks of autonomous 
AI-monitored cargo traffic, all while maintaining a distance to the others 
due to (sub)disciplinary boundaries. Simultaneously, many intersecting 
theoretical questions as agency of technical systems and responsibility 
for algorithmic decision making are often left undiscussed. 
Later on, even more nuanced approaches have been developed, 
such as law, technology, and society studies, which aim at placing 
the impact of digital technologies in their social and societal context, 
and applications of Science and Technology Studies (STS) framework, 
which finds its logical connection with law in credibility of facts and 
production of legitimacy in the modern world.25 These approaches 
have further elaborated the complexity and ambiguity related to the 
use of digital technologies within the legal system and acknowledged 
the need for comprehensive and interdisciplinary legal scholarship, 
although particularly STS tradition has questioned the feasibility 
of overarching general theories that would catch the entirety of 
technological development. One recent addition to the debate on law 
and technology can be found in the growing body of literature on legal 
tech, a more practice-oriented field focusing mostly on legal profession 
and the influence digital technologies have for law firms, legal service 
production, and legal work.26 
Still, despite these efforts and progressively expanding current 
scholarship, many issues related to algorithmic decision making remain 
unsolved both on practical and theoretical level. For example, the use 
25 Sheila Jasanoff, Dreamscapes of Modernity Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the 
Fabrication of Power. University of Chicago Press 2015.
26 Markus Hartung – Micha-Manuel Bues – Gernot Halbleib (eds.), Legal Tech A 
Practitioner’s Guide. Beck C. H. 2018; Markus Hartung – Micha-Manuel Bues – Gernot 
Halbleib (eds.), Legal Tech: Die Digitalisierung des Rechtsmarkts. Beck C. H. 2017. 
Stephan Breidenbach (ed.), Rechtshandbuch Legal Tech. Beck C. H. 2018.
172 of historical data that many algorithmic models rely on might prove 
out to be problematic from the perspective of legal decision making 
particularly if past performance of others is used to predict the future 
performance of an individual. One issue that would deserve further-
reaching examination is how this temporal quality of using historical 
data to predict the future is conceptualised in application of law, and 
to which extent such descriptive data can be used as the basis for 
prescriptive statements? 
Another challenge might signify a return to the eternal question 
already discussed both in legal informatics as well as AI & law: how do 
we conceptualise legal decision making for computational modelling? 
Do the advances in computational power, data storage and availability 
of big data provide new insights into old impasses? In this sense, 
current algorithmic models can be used as a mirror to reflect on human 
decision making and to dissect the underlying conceptualisations 
about what constitutes a decision. Perhaps it will be revealed that the 
legal system operates on the assumption of anthropocentric law and 
attributes only to human actors the role of decision maker, assigning to 
them liability for false decisions and responsibility for effective redress 
mechanisms and production of legitimacy?  
Despite doctrinal fragmentation and the increasing complexity 
of societal digitalisation, legal scholarship might be able to provide 
its two pennies worth in the ongoing debate on AI ethics. In recent 
literature, the AI ethics debate has been criticised - quite correctly 
one might state - for its vagueness and lack of concrete solutions, 
which often leads to reintroducing industry self-regulation as the 
gold standard for technological governance.27 True enough, at a quick 
27 E.g. Thilo Hagendorf, The Ethics of AI Ethics -- An Evaluation of Guidelines. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1903.03425. 
173glance many recent AI guidelines seem to interconnect with the legal 
regime. For example, many such framework documents emphasise 
that AI development needs to be in compliance with fundamental 
rights and legal frameworks - without further elaborating what this 
actually would entail, while also listing ethical principles from human 
autonomy to transparency and fairness. Interestingly enough, many 
principles of fairness-aware or trustworthy AI are well established legal 
principles that have been interpreted and elaborated both in research 
and case-law. 
The advantage of legal interpretation is that, unlike inherently 
unsolvable ethical dilemmas, the legal regime produces nuanced 
interpretations what exactly constitutes as fair or transparent within a 
given context. Hence, the legal system has a lot to offer to debates on 
algorithmic fairness; comprehension about the complexity and context-
dependency of fairness, criteria for its evaluation on case-by-case basis, 
and procedural mechanisms that structure such evaluation. In addition, 
the legal system has a unique focus on the production of justification, 
the legitimacy creation necessary for trust towards organisations and 
institutions. And finally, the legal system also provides a diverse set of 
tools for executing fairness standards, for example through national 
or regional regulation or multilateral conventions, through procedural 
safeguards and monitoring mechanisms. Hence, we argue that law is 
vital for ensuring fairness-aware AI. 
This being said, it is obvious that many of the suggested solutions 
for unfair algorithms, e.g. algorithmic transparency, justice by design, 
or human-in-the-loop, are not simply legal or technical solutions 
but instead hybrids, that can only be created through collaboration 
of different actors and fields. This again leads us to the same simple 
conclusion that we need interdisciplinarity. But if interdisciplinarity 
174 has for decades been advocated as the only viable way forward what 
actually keeps us from it?
3 SECOND ROUND: MAPPING OUT SOCIAL REALITY 
AND DEALING WITH COMPLEXITY
3.1 FROM SOCIAL REALITY TO MODELLING
The lack of common language often pops as the reason why 
interdisciplinary research is so challenging. In this section we delve a 
bit deeper into language and meaning and how the language we use 
reflects the different ontological and epistemological starting points 
of natural sciences and social sciences. Simply put, language provides 
access to our perception of reality and to our comprehension of 
knowledge: what is the world and what can we know about it. This 
means that the difficulties of interdisciplinary dialogue can at least 
partly be explained by the differences in the disciplines’ ability to 
reflect their relationship with social complexity and uncertainty. Each 
computational model is a representation of a complex and uncertain 
reality and thus by definition an oversimplification of it: there exists 
an inevitable distinction between the world and its representation. 
Here lies also the danger of ontological reductionism if the model is 
perceived as a fair description of the world.
However, natural sciences in general and statistics in particular 
are often seen to encompass a rather narrow understanding of social 
complexity, whereas in social sciences there is a long-standing track 
record of reflection on subjectivity of knowledge production. For 
example, sociology of knowledge pioneered by French sociologist Emile 
175Durkheim among others in early 20th century mapped out how social 
reality influences production and formulation of knowledge, which 
ideas the American-Austrian sociologists Berger and Luckmann made 
accessible for mainstream application in their 1966 book The Social 
Construction of Reality.28 Furthermore, the turn to technology in social 
sciences in the 1970s signified a growing interest in making sense of 
ongoing technological transformation of the society,29 although since 
then the tradition has faced its fair share of criticism for not being 
sufficiently informed about technology and thus providing only very 
limited understanding of relevant issues.30
This is to say that the distinction between natural sciences and 
social sciences based on the fields’ ability to manage social complexity 
is also a simplification. Despite several discussions in social informatics 
and related fields that have sought to elaborate the social dimension 
of technology,31 much of this research has remained in the margins. 
Hence, we argue that historically this simplification has been a fair 
description, as natural sciences have not had as pressing a need to 
grasp this social complexity during the previous AI booms, partly 
because of the limitations of rule-based systems in representing the 
28 Peter Berger – Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge. The Penguin Press 1966.
29 Steve Woolgaar, The Turn to Technology in Social Studies of Science, 16(1) Science, 
Technology & Human Values 1991, p. 20–50.
30 Langdon Winner, Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social 
Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology. 18(3) Science, Technology & Human 
Values 1993, p. 362–378. 
31 On social informatics see e.g., Enid Mumworth, Effective Systems Design and 
Requirements Analysis: the ETHICS Method. Macmillan 1995; Rob Kling – Howard 
Rosenbaum – Steve Sawyer, Understanding and Communicating Social Informatics: 
A Framework for Studying and Teaching the Human Contexts of Information and 
Communications Technologies. Information Today, Inc. 2005. Similar themes have also 
been at the core of the IFIP working groups and conference, https://networking.ifip.
org/ (accessed 23.8.2019).
176 world and the lack of mainstream applications. Still, there exists a 
danger of reductionism when social complexity is modelled according 
to binary logic. There are, though, interesting and potentially applicable 
developments within logic that may approve useful with regard to the 
conceptuality and subjectivity.32  
In section 2.1 we described the shift from rule-based systems to 
machine learning techniques that provide new insights into modelling 
through quantification. Increases in computational power, decreases 
in data storage costs, and advances in AI techniques contribute to a 
broader automation and datafication of the society. It is likely that 
machine learning and neural networks provide a new entrance point 
to the sporous human speech and the eternal ambiguity of language 
and reintroduce the social complexity to world presentation. This 
renewed focus on language also entails the necessity to detach from 
the limitations inherent in traditional natural sciences approaches, 
where the world presentation is based on assumptions about logical, 
rational and unambiguous reality with clear-cut causality. And here’s 
why this is important: the computational methods used to create 
presentations of the world in the form of an algorithm directly dictate 
what are the limits and boundaries of the model, the quality of the 
representation so to say. 
In other words, the computational modelling and resulting 
presentation are dependent on the choice of techniques. For example, 
is social complexity reduced into a computational model based 
on Bayesian statistics, which produce probabilities with statistical 
methods, or is the modelling built on fuzzy set theory, which sheds light 
on the relationship between language and reality? These approaches 
should not be understood as conflicting but more as complementing 
32 Patrik Eklund et al., Semigroups in Complete Lattices. Springer 2018.
177perspectives. Fuzzy set theory enables more nuanced and multi-
valued approach to modelling. It is an answer, for instance, to the 
Sorites paradox.33 With the use of fuzzy sets, drawing a strict line is not 
necessary. The word ‘fuzzy’ is somewhat unfortunate as it refers to a 
more accurate representation of the relation between language and 
world than what two-valued logic can provide. 
It is noteworthy that fuzzy sets and probability theory serve in 
different tasks. In statistical analysis and reasoning, frequentist and 
Bayesian approaches may be considered to be the two main alternatives. 
They both have been used as basis for constructing statistical machine 
learning algorithms. In addition, information theory has been used 
as a firm theoretical basis for the development of algorithms. When 
these methods are applied, the data is typically numerical from the 
beginning. The focus of fuzzy set theory, on the other hand, is in the 
relation between linguistic and mathematical representations: to put 
it simply, between words and numbers. A qualitative description of 
the world with language is a considerably more complex phenomenon 
than analysis of numerical measurements that are readily available for 
mathematical and statistical analysis. 
Mathematically and statistically oriented analysis of text corpora has 
long roots in AI development. It follows that there are many approaches 
to how texts can be transformed into mathematical representations. 
For instance, one may count how many times different words appears 
in a text and conduct analysis based on these word distributions. The 
word distributions are, however, of quite limited use by themselves. 
Much more useful analysis becomes possible when words and texts 
33 Sorites paradox is a language related paradox that is related to vagueness. For 
example, the question of at what point can individual grains of sand form a heap can 
be described as a sorites paradox. See eg. Dominic Hyde, The Sorites Paradox, p. 1-17 
in Giuseppina Ronzitti, Vagueness: A Guide. Springer 2011. 
178 are considered in the context of other words and texts, in relation to 
each other. Much related to word meaning and their relationships can 
be deducted based on the word co-occurrence statistics. In a large 
collection of texts such as pieces of news, it is more probable to find the 
word “judge” more often in the same document with the word “court” 
than with words such as “leisure” or “beach” which may, on the other 
hand, appear together relatively more frequently. When large or vast 
collections of documents are analysed, fine grained representations of 
semantic relations between words can be gained. 
The methods for analysing text corpora are often such as mentioned 
above, i.e. statistical machine learning. The fuzzy sets do not belong 
to that set of methodologies, but they give a framework to represent 
accurately the relationship between words and the world the words 
refer to. The reasoning based on fuzzy logic has been abandoned or 
has never been used by many researchers in machine learning because 
of the associated theoretical problems. In addition to the algorithms 
build on statistical or information theory basis, inspiration gained from 
natural systems has been the starting point for development of many 
methods. In particular, our gained understanding of the functioning of 
human brain has given ideas and inspiration for the development for 
artificial neural networks, often called simply neural networks. These 
methods are accused by some researchers to lack proper theoretical 
bases that might, for example, lead into problems related to how 
trustworthy and explainable the results are gained using the neural 
networks.
Currently, the most popular approach is deep learning, which 
refers to the use of multilayer neural networks. These are able to learn 
both representation and reasoning models from the data given to 
it. Perhaps to the best known example of deep learning is related to 
179playing games such as chess and game of go. These games are simple 
in the sense that they are fully rule-governed. There is no uncertainty 
in the environment except for the moves by the opponent, the context 
is not changing, there is no ambiguity or emergence involved, and the 
reality is very clear-cut. The success of the AlphaGo in the game go 
and AlphaZero in chess are still noteworthy. In 1990s, the Deep Blue 
system won the world champion Garry Kasparov. The approach can be 
called brute force calculation. The system went through a vast number 
of chess position and found better moves that the human best player. 
As there are many more positions in chess that can be analysed by 
any current and most likely computer, the forward looking was ended 
when some expert programmed limits were reached. In 2018, the 
Alpha Zero system won overwhelmingly the best follower of Deep 
Blue. This system, Stockfish lost so dramatically that some people 
gave statements that there must be some kind of scam involved. This 
was not the case and it is noteworthy that the AlphaZero system was 
praised for its intuitive and creative style of play. 
If nothing else, this may be considered to be a relevant example 
of dealing with rule governed systems and phenomena. Alpha Zero 
did not build any rules to give it principles of behavior. The behavior 
is based on the complex “neural” network structure that it uses for 
decision making in each position separately. The structure of the 
neural network is result of playing 9 hours against itself, just by the 
given rules of chess. In other words, the system was not instructed 
by humans by any content-related manner. This is also the reason the 
example is interesting from the perspective of modelling emergence. 
Because the conceptual input from human developers was limited to 
the bare framework of chess rules, the functional intelligence resulted 
from emergent behaviour of the model. Although emergent action in 
180 chess play is very narrow compared to the social complexity in broad 
societal areas such as the legal system, the example sheds light to how 
social processes could emerge if artificial actors are equipped with 
virtual experience of relevant social context. In the sense of emergent 
behaviour, the Alpha Zero system may be considered to be closest to 
so-called artificial general intelligence we have seen up to now.34 In 
this sense, emergence portrayed by artificial actors could offer new 
insights also to modelling legal decision making.  
An obvious conclusion is that these systems would do much better in 
the legal domain than the rule-based systems programmed manually, 
if suitable data is available. The complexity of reality cannot, however, 
be modelled this easily. A potentially useful application in the legal 
domain could be in building simulations of multiagent systems and 
testing what kind of emergent results can be observed when different 
versions of the rules are experimented with. In this set-up, data could be 
collected actively from people that could provide their replies in specific 
contexts, although data protection does impose certain limitations to 
overall collection of data. Of course, it must be stressed that we do 
not consider chess or other games for that matter to be a sufficient 
analogy for legal complexity or a roadmap to future AI development 
in the legal domain, as is obvious from the societal importance of 
legal decision making. These methods can, however, be applied, 
at least in principle, in a non-reductionist manner, and thus could 
facilitate new ways forward also for modelling legal decision making. 
 
34 See eg. Ben Goertzel – Cassio Pennachin (eds)., Artificial General Intelligence. 
Springer 2007.
1813.2 ALGORITHMIC MODELS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING
The problems that may raise from the use of machine learning in 
complex real world contexts can be exemplified by the infamous 
COMPAS case that has spawned a multitude of research into algorithmic 
discrimination both in data science and law. The algorithmic model 
was used in criminal cases in lower courts in many US states, to assess 
the recidivism score of defendants. The newly emerged interest in 
algorithmic discrimination was fueled by two related events. In May 
2015 the independent news media ProPublica published an exposé 
on machine bias in recidivism score software that demonstrated the 
algorithms produced systematically higher scores for black defendants 
when compared with scores of white defendants.35 
The discussion’s legal dimension was articulated through legal 
proceedings, when a defendant in a criminal case called Eric Loomis 
contested the court’s judgment from 2013 in which the court held 
him to be a danger to his community based on an algorithmic risk 
assessment.36 The defendant argued that the use of the proprietary 
software was an infringement of his due process rights, as the 
methodology behind the score was not disclosed to the court nor 
the defendant based on the software company’s trade secrets. In its 
decision in 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated there had been 
no due process violation, as the algorithmic score did not form the 
sole basis for the court’s decision. The court then proceeded to advise 
judges on the use of risk assessment software, stating judges must give 
35 See Angwin et al. 2016.
36 State v. Loomis, Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before Use of 
Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing. Harvard Law Review 10.3.2017. Available 
at https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/03/state-v-loomis/ accessed 27.6.2019. 
182 additional grounds for sentencing beside the risk score and elaborated 
that such assessment procedures should incorporate some warnings 
for judges about their limitations. After the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
decision, the defendant appealed to the US Supreme Court, which 
denied the petition after an amicus brief from the United States in June 
2017.
When algorithmic models are used to produce a recidivism score, this 
entails prediction of the future but as future cannot be known before it 
happens, the models operate on probabilities based on factors derived 
from different sources of data (in the Loomis case, statistical public data 
in addition to data provided by the defendant). It should be noted that 
dangerousness cannot be quantified but when the algorithmic model 
is built, decisions are made on which factors are used in its place. This 
ambiguity of language, what it means to be dangerous in the legal 
sense of the word, is something that could perhaps be approached 
with fuzzy set theory.  An additional problem raised from the fact 
that different people may understand the meaning of some world in 
a different way that others. If the difference in interpretation among 
two or more people is considerable, serious problems may arise. Here, 
we do not refer only to ambiguity of natural language but also to more 
fine-grained differences in interpresentation of words and expressions. 
We will discuss these challenges and potential solutions in detail in the 
following section.
It should be noted that the legal system has developed its own 
procedural and material mechanisms for handling uncertainties 
and social complexity. One central mechanism for uncertainty 
management is the distinction between routine cases and cases that 
require discretion. There is an inherent danger of reductionism when 
automation is implemented in discretionary cases, the old wisdom 
183carries, because by automating such decision making, we might 
simultaneously render existing mechanisms of complexity reduction 
dysfunctional. At the same time, however, we should acknowledge 
that human decision makers are not necessarily qualified to assess 
hidden societal correlations and causalities. Are we imposing different 
standards for human and non-human decision making? 
When we accept that both human and non-human decision making 
is always subjective in the end, perhaps we can then perceive that 
the actual problem is not the subjectivity of algorithms but instead 
our lack of acknowledgment of it? We are well aware that our judges 
are humans and thus are by no means infallible, but do we still 
unconsciously expect our technological tools to be less subjective than 
we are? It seems that we often still assign objectivity to technology and 
by doing so end up renewing and reinforcing the dichotomy between 
human/machine, where the first is considered subjective and the latter 
objective. This leads us back to pondering what is the world and what 
can we know about it? What is the difference between the world and 
its presentation through computational modelling? 
At the same time, we are able to perceive that the human/
machine distinction is reintroduced in AI ethics debates, but this time 
with different roles cast to human and non-human actors: many AI 
guidelines advocate for human agency as a necessary safeguard against 
unforeseeable implications of AI systems. The ideas behind human-
in-the-loop, human oversight and human-centric design approaches 
reflect a need to engage humans in algorithmic decision making in 
order to ensure fairness and thus ultimately justify decision making. 
This connection between human agency and legitimacy of legal 
decision making should be investigated further. Hence, the feasibility 
of these approaches should be critically assessed before they are 
184 implemented into governance models, as they may not provide the 
intended solutions to the problems that are considered a priority but 
instead might lead astray due to the encompassed theoretical baggage. 
What, then, would follow if we would construe the use of algorithms 
not as an either/or choice between human-faced or algorithmic 
decision making but instead we would perceive automation in terms 
of interaction between humans and machines?
4 THIRD ROUND: THE PROMISE OF FAIRNESS-AWARE 
AI AS INTERACTION BETWEEN HUMAN AND 
MACHINE ACTORS 
Traditional computational modelling of social complexity requires 
simplification, which results from the subjective choices of those 
involved in the process. In the previous section, we discussed different 
AI methods used for dealing with complexity and argued that neural 
networks might provide new possibilities for modelling legal decision 
making and thus perhaps overcome some of the shortcomings of early 
rule-based systems. We also discussed how the distinction between 
human-faced and algorithmic decision making reinforces the dichotomy 
of human/machine and the belief in objectivity of computational 
methods and argued that the adoption of AI development would better 
be framed as collaboration instead of substitution. In this section, we 
return to the risks and possibilities of machine learning applications in 
law and the need for algorithmic fairness.
The negative societal consequences of algorithms as well as 
the public and academic debate on AI ethics demonstrate that 
we need to acknowledge the limitations of statistical methods in 
185describing our social reality. The advantage of this recently acquired 
and unpleasant comprehension is that it steers practical as well as 
theoretical AI development as well as scientific research on algorithmic 
fairness increasingly towards interdisciplinarity, particularly towards 
collaboration between social sciences and computer science. Successful 
representation of the world as a computational model is dependent on 
translation between the social complexity and computation. Thus, the 
advances in AI techniques during the last decades do not suffice for 
modelling by themselves need to be complemented by understanding 
of the underlying ambiguity and complexity of natural language.
What are the limitations of machine learning algorithms in 
modelling social complexity? One way to study the qualities and effects 
of machine learning is to divide them to supervised, unsupervised and 
reinforcement learning systems. 
Supervised learning refers to the practice according to which the 
algorithm is trained by providing collection of pairs of inputs and correct 
outputs. The training aims at finding a model that gives best possible 
output for unforeseen inputs. As an example, one could mention a 
system that classifies incoming messages into categories like decisions, 
employee requests, administrative hearing materials and others. In 
the training phase, the system would be given examples of texts that 
belong to one of these categories. Each document is first pre-processed 
to numeral representations (vectors) and then given as training data to 
the machine learning system. After training the system classifies new 
incoming documents into one of the categories. The results of such 
supervised machine learning algorithms depend on multiple factors. 
How large and representative is the training data collection? Does the 
data cover all the relevant aspects of the phenomenon at hand? How 
well chosen is the algorithm for the task? How are the parameters 
186 of the algorithm chosen? Are there enough computing resources 
available? The answers given to these questions reflect the subjective 
decisions made by those involved in the design and development of 
the model, which are then embedded into the algorithms. Hence, the 
modeling of the world based on machine learning is not objective in 
any true sense of the word.
Potentially the most serious problem related to the supervised 
learning is the categorization itself. Namely, many phenomena are 
continuous in their nature. The borderline is drawn in a manner that 
forces the items to be put into one of the classes. Let’s take a simple 
example. People are characterized by three values. We can call these 
three A, B and C. In the real world these variables could be age, income 
and debts. We can take A as those people for whom loan is given 
automatically, B those who are checked manually and C those whose 
application fails based on the decision by the classifier. When classifiers 
are used, there are always borders that have been drawn as well as 
cases that are very close to each other in the real world but are divided 
into A and B or B and C. The algorithmic decision making may fail even 
in a miserable way if the number of categories is unreasonably low or 
if the data do not contain all relevant variables.
In unsupervised learning, the algorithm is given only the input and 
its task is to find patterns, structures or relationships in the data. In 
other words, no categories are defined as a conceptual basis for the 
learning process. Statistical clustering is one form of unsupervised 
learning. Among the neural network models on unsupervised learning, 
the self-organizing map (SOM) has become the most popular model. 
The SOM is widely used for data analysis and visualization in many 
187application areas.37 The unsupervised learning approach applied on 
text data is comparable with qualitative research.38 The representation 
of words as numerical vectors provides interesting opportunities also 
for qualitative research. When unsupervised learning is applied the 
conceptual representation of the phenomenon is not predefined as is 
done when supervised learning is applied.
Acknowledgment of the inherent subjectivity of machine learning 
techniques may help us overcome the deeply rooted belief in the 
objectivity of computational information processing. This, in turn, 
may facilitate better identification of the societal issues involved in 
increased use of algorithms. Also, it might produce reflection on the 
similarities and differences of human and algorithmic decision making 
and, while doing so, advance our understanding of human reasoning 
and communication in the hopes of translating such insights into fairer 
decision making in general. In the end, algorithmic decision making 
models can be understood as different techniques for automation 
of certain parts of human-driven processes. Thus we can inquire 
what is the promise of AI techniques in improving the quality of 
human decision making: for example, supervised machine learning 
applications could reveal unconscious discriminatory patterns and 
provide a more elaborated understanding of social issues involved. 
To this end, intricate power relations might play a role in social 
37 SOM has served as a sketchboard for considerations of social and cognitive 
phenomena. For example, the model can be employed to simulate how communal 
language systems emerge as a result of interaction between different actors, who 
all operate based on their unique expectations of meaning and social context. 
See  Timo Honkela –  Ville Könönen – Tiina Lindh-Knuutila – Mari-Sanna Paukkeri, 
Simulating processes of concept formation and communication. Journal of Economic 
Methodology, 15(3) 2008, 245–259.
38 Nina Janasik – Timo Honkela – Henrik Bruun, Text Mining in Qualitative Research: 
Application of an unsupervised learning methods. 12(3) Organizational Research 
Methods 2009, p. 436–460.
188 interaction without human participants ever become fully aware 
of them. In addition, AI applications might provide new monitoring 
mechanisms to govern automated processes as well as to produce 
more organisational transparency. The human point of view may also 
help in developing methods and algorithms that help in dealing with 
tasks and solving problems that stem from real-world situations rather 
than from the formal abstractions that are often the starting point for 
development of mathematical algorithms. It is not enough to develop 
and apply formally proven methods, but they also need to serve 
their purpose in the real world. This match may not always be strong 
enough if the algorithm has been developed having some limited 
model of reasoning and representation in mind. Such a problem may 
raise, for instance, from a limited view on causality. Thus it may even 
be necessary to develop new (kinds of) machine learning algorithms 
for the legal domain and for humanities and social sciences in general. 
One potential example to this direction is the Peace Machine 
concept, developed by one of the authors. The Peace Machine 
provides a framework for the development of AI applications for 
social good. The framework consists of three main areas. The focus 
of the first area is on human and social communication including 
challenges related to intercultural exchange and problems on how 
people use language within their personal context. Naturally, different 
individuals and communities have their own unique systems of 
language, meaning and concepts due to differences in cultural context 
and personal experiences. The starting point for the Peace Machine 
concept is that this cultural and social diversity should be preserved. 
Unlike earlier attempts on intercultural exchange that aim at common 
formalizations through formal logic or universal linguistic systems such 
as Esperanto, the Peace Machine proposes the concept of machines 
189engaged in meaning negotiations. The ultimate objective is that such 
AI applications within language translation would enable interpersonal 
communication despite subjective differences in meaning, by giving 
support to an individual’s ability to read the other’s intention, which 
is often embedded in social context. In this sense, emergence could 
be used to comprehensive top-level analysis of how language and 
meaning come to be. Within the legal domain such comprehensive 
linguistic approach could be employed to analyse the differences 
between language used by legal experts and laypeople.
The second, parallel area of application is the consideration of 
using analytical technologies to help people understand their own 
and others’ emotions better. Hypothetically, increased awareness of 
one’s emotional states and ability to reflect one’s life in a constructive 
manner enables empathy and thus helps people manage their daily 
encounters better both in private life and on a societal level. The third 
area of the Peace Machine goes beyond the level of interpersonal 
relations and considers AI applications that would improve access to 
justice and fairer resource allocation in the society. The third area looks 
into different application areas ranging from economy and politics to 
law and public administration, repeating and testing the hypothesis 
that current and emerging AI applications can, in fact, be used to 
improve societal processes through introduction of new forms of 
democracy and participation. Ultimately, the Peace Machine concepts 
aims to demonstrate the positive potential of current and emerging AI 
technologies to improve the overall well-being of humans. 
Such AI applications could provide new tools for managing 
uncertainties. However, a word of caution is needed particularly 
due to the current hype around AI that often contribute to inflated 
expectations on the technology’s abilities. The dystopian images of 
190 technological dictatorship present in some AI ethics debates should not 
be replaced with unwavering belief in data-intensive AI applications, 
nor should we overlook the strategic and ideological strains and power 
dynamics of technological governance and AI development. 
As predictions about the future have the tendency to frame 
what is possible and what is not, there exists a need for realistic but 
positive interpretations of such possibilities. In the end, as decades of 
research into computational modelling of law has demonstrated, legal 
decision making is not simply about application of rules to established 
facts, structured fact-finding processes, and negotiations between 
different interpretations. But perhaps emergence-based simulations 
of human interaction could shed new light into this often overlooked 
underbelly of legal decision making?
5 CONCLUSION
Interdisciplinary dialogue is not easy: it requires curiosity, respect, and 
patience, the ability to reflect and to explain one’s own perspectives and 
assumptions even when there is no guarantee of instant gratification, 
in the hopes that understanding comes with time. Although it may 
sound conflicting, interdisciplinarity can at the same time save time, as 
borrowing the expertise and insights from other researchers and their 
respective disciplines furthers the ability to reflect one’s own thinking. 
However, there lies another danger of reductionism, as dialogue across 
disciplinary boundaries requires its own complexity reduction. 
Here, we have sought to adopt a comprehensive and abstract 
approach to these questions of legal rules, values and ethics in AI 
development and the boundaries of computational modelling of law. 
191Our starting point was the acknowledgment of societal problems 
associated with the use of algorithmic models and the demand for 
algorithmic fairness. Algorithmic models are about modelling the 
world, which comes at a price of simplification through representation. 
We discussed how information about the world is accessible through 
natural language that is defined by its ambiguity and flexibility, which 
also the legal system utilises in order to create simultaneously flexibility 
and coherence. How, then, do we capture this social complexity into a 
model without losing too much of this flexibility? 
We described the subjectivity of modelling and how the distinction 
between human and algorithmic decision making derails attention 
from the potential embedded in current machine learning techniques. 
Instead of juxtaposing humans and machines,39 we should delve deeper 
into collaborative potential of AI techniques; in addition to algorithmic 
bias we should develop algorithms that enable us to recognise human 
bias; alongside automation we should develop monitoring schemes. 
The advances in natural language processing might translate into 
improved models that take social complexity, ambiguity of meaning, 
and context-dependency into consideration, and hence are able to 
avoid the shortcomings of earlier rule-based systems. At the same 
time, we should not exaggerate the abilities of AI applications nor 
should we attribute objectivity to the inherently subjective exercise of 
modelling social complexity. 
The positive potential lies in artificial machines interacting with 
humans, enabling explicit meaning negotiations without losing any of 
the diversity of human interaction. To this end, the logical next step 
would be to test the feasibility of the Peace Machine concept for the 
39 Market-driven development has contributed to the fact that automation often 
involves seeking cost savings. See eg. Kuopus 1988, pp. 15, 505.
192 purposes of the legal domain. Potentially this could be achieved by 
simulations of the complex interaction that constitute legal decision-
making processes, without forgetting the ritualistic and authoritative 
elements that are vital for their legitimacy. In the end, modelling legal 
decision making by emergence provides us with a mirror, that enables 
reflections on what makes decision making fair and reasonable, what 
meanings do we associate with the elusive concept of justice, and how, 
despite these differences of meaning, we can contribute to sustainable 
digitalisation of law.
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Towards AI-Driven Society. A Legal 
Perspective
1 INTRODUCTION 
Last June Legal Tech Lab organized a workshop on artificial intelligence. 
It had been prepared in connection with the Legal Tech Con 2018 
Conference, which explored the use of artificial intelligence in the legal 
practice, focusing on legal, ethical and practical implications towards 
the field. The point of this workshop was to create a separate forum for 
a legal debate that would have two main aims. Firstly, it would allow 
an overview of the topic of the conference and secondly, it would also 
start methodological discussions on  artificial intelligence.
The workshop aimed to identify the biggest challenges that AI 
has imposed on law and other fields of research. Since some of the 
participants did not have a  legal background and the invited speakers 
consisted of both academics and other professionals, the workshop 
enjoyed an  interdisciplinary atmosphere. The workshop gathered 
together different ways of approaching AI from the legal perspective 
and exploring what issues are currently being considered by researchers 
of contract law, competition law, procedural law, administrative law, 
legal theory, etc.
BEATA MÄIHÄNIEMI, HANNE HIRVONEN, TUOMAS PÖYSTI, 
BURKHARD SCHAFER, DORY REILING, LEO LEPPÄNEN, 
ANURADHA NAYAK & LAURA LASSILA
196 The workshop hosted several academics, all of whom handled the 
different practical challenges to the legal application of AI. Dr. Tuomas 
Pöysti is the Chancellor of Justice in Finland and has been presenting 
on ‘The Realm of Law Extended – Living Together with the Artificially 
Intelligent Machine’. He is a Docent of Administrative Law at the 
University of Helsinki and has a strong background in information law 
and legal informatics with approximately 50 scientific publications.1 
Dr. Dory Reiling is an Independent IT and judicial reform expert as 
well as a Retired Senior Judge at the Amsterdam District Court. She 
has published several publications on IT and courts as well as judicial 
1 See e.g. Ruxandra Balboa-Alcoreza – Tuomas Pöysti – Ahti Saarenpää – Mikko Sarja 
– Viveca Still, Tietoturvallisuus ja laki : näkökohtia tietoturvallisuuden oikeudellisesta 
sääntelystä : tutkimusraportti (Information Security and Law), Valtiovarainministeriö 
1997; Tuomas Pöysti. Tehokkuus, informaatio ja eurooppalainen oikeusalue (Efficiency, 
Information and European Legal Space), University of Helsinki Faculty of Law 1999. 
See also the following wider articles: Tuomas Pöysti, Trust on Digital Administration 
and Platforms. Scandinavian Studies in Law 65 2018, p. 321–366; Tuomas Pöysti, 
Information Policy and Citizens’ Communicational Rights as Conditions for Sustainable 
Fiscal Policy in the European Union, p. 8–53 in Erich Schweighofer – Ahti Saarenpää 
– Janos Böszörmenyi (eds.), KnowRi§ht 2012. Knowledge Rights – Legal, Societal and 
Related Technological Aspects. Österreichische Computer Gesellschaft – Austrian 
Computer Society 2014; Tuomas Pöysti, Information Government in Practice: Functional 
Gains and Legal Perils. Scandinavian Studies in Law 56 2010, p. 91–124. Tuomas Pöysti, 
Hallintoeettiset toimintasäännöstöt hyvän hallinnon toteuttamisessa (Ethical Codes 
of Conduct in the realization of Good Administration), p. 143–157 in Ida Koivisto – 
Tuomas Ojanen – Outi Suviranta – Maija Sakslin (eds.), Avoin, tehokas ja riippumaton: 
Olli Mäenpää 60 vuotta juhlakirja. Edita 2010; Tuomas Pöysti, Scandinavian Idea of 
Informational Fairness in Law - Encounters of Scandinavian and European Freedom 
of Information and Copyright Law. Scandinavian Studies in Law 50 2007, p. 221–248; 
Tuomas Pöysti, Communicational Quality of Law, in Cecilia Magnusson Sjöberg – Peter 
Wahlgren (eds.), Festkrift till Peter Seipel. Norstedts Juridik 2006.
197reforms.2 During the workshop she evaluated on ‘AI and courts, hype 
and reality’. Professor Burkhard Schafer from the The University of 
Edinburgh spoke about ‘Trial reporting, data ownership and legal AI’. 
He has a strong background in AI and law, theories of legal reasoning 
as well as regulation of technology. He is also a co-founder and co-
director  of the Joseph Bell Centre for Legal Reasoning and Forensic 
Statistics.3 Other speakers of the conference were professors Mika 
2 See, e.g., Dory Reiling, Technology for justice: how information technology can 
support judicial reform. Amsterdam University Press 2009; Dory Reiling, Technology 
for Justice - T4J blog in English https://doryreiling.blogspot.com/. Accessed 7.6.2019.; 
Dory Reiling, Beyond Court digitalization with online dispute resolution. International 
Journal for Court Administration 8(3) 2017; Dory Reiling, Information Technology in 
the courts in Europe, in Gottwald (ed.), e-Justice in Österreich, Erfahrungsberichte und 
europäischer Kontext, Festschrift für Martin Schneider. Editions Weblaw 2014.
3 See Burkhard Schafer, Legal Knowledge and Information Systems, JURIX 2012: 
The Twenty-Fifts Annual Conference, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 
17-19 December 2012. IOS Press 2012; Joanna Wardlaw – Janet De Wilder – Peter 
Sandercock –Jane Haley – Burkhard Schafer – Robert Rae – Donald Jarvie, What are 
you thinking? Who has the right to know? Brain imagining and its impact on society. 
Scottish Universities Insight Institute 2010; Abbe Brown – Burkhard Schafer – Andres 
Guadamuz – Eliza Walker, E-Consumer Protection: A Publich Consultation on Proposals. 
AHRC Reseach Centre for Studies in Intellectual Property and Technology Law 2010; 
Luciano Floridi – Josh Cowls – Monica Beltrametti – Raja Chatila – Patrice Chazerand – 
Virginia Dignum – Christoph Luetge – Robert Madlein – Ugo Pagallo – Francesca Rossi 
– Burkhard Schafer – Peggy Valcke – Effy Vayena, AI4People—An ethical framework 
for a good AI society: Opportunities, risks, principles, and recommendations. Minds 
and machines 28 2018, p 689–70; Luciano Floridi – Christoph Luetge – Ugo Pagallo – 
Burkhard Schafer – Peggy Valcke – Effy Vayena – Janet Addison – Nigel Hughes – Nathan 
Lea – Caroline Sage – Bart Vannieuwenhuyse – Dipak Kalra, Key ethical challenges in 
the European Medical Information Framework. Minds and machines 2018, p. 1–17; 
Burkhard Schafer, Formal models of statutory interpretation in multilingual legal 
systems. Statute Law Review 38 2017, p. 310–328; Burkhard Schafer – Lilian Edwards, 
“I spy, with my little sensor”: Fair data handling practices for robots between privacy, 
copyright and security. Connection science 29 2017, p. 200–2009; Laurence Diver – 
Burkhard Schafer, Opening the black box: Petri nets and privacy by design. International 
Review of law, Computers and Technology 31 2017, p. 68–90.
198 Viljanen (University of Turku) on ‘Insuring AI’4 and Petri Kuoppamäki 
(Aalto University)5 on ‘Artificial intelligence, internet of things and 
competition law’. 
Thereafter, other contributors to the  workshop were doctoral 
students: ms. Aduradha Nayak from the University of Lapland presenting 
on ‘In a techno-political horizon: Autonomous AI and electronic 
personality’. Ms. Nayak has a background in law and philosophy, and 
is interested in concepts such as posthumanism, transhumanism, 
artificial intelligence and human genome. Ms. Laura Lassila, a 
doctoral student from the University of Helsinki, gave a presentation 
about ‘Smart Contract – how to make it legally enforceable’, Mr. Leo 
Leppänen is also a doctoral student from the University of Helsinki and 
during the workshop he evolved on ‘Automated Journalism’. Moreover, 
other doctoral students from the University of Helsinki presented 
at the workshop. Among them were Anna Ronkainen (co-founder 
of TrademarkNow®) on ‘Understanding human legal reasoning as a 
prerequisite for legal artificial intelligence’, Vesa Kyyrönen on ‘Robotics 
and machine autonomy from the perspective  of international law’ as 
well as Samuel Wrigley on ‘Data protection and transparency when 
computers imitate humans: The problems faced by Google Duplex’. 
The chairs of the workshop were Dr. Beata Mäihäniemi – post doctoral 
researcher in law and digitalisation – and Ms. Hanne Hirvonen, 
4  See eg. Mika Viljanen, Robotteja vakuuttamassa: autonomiset alukset esimerkkinä. 
Lakimies 7–8/2018, p. 954–974; Mika Viljanen, Algoritmien haaste – uuteen 
aineelliseen oikeuteen? Lakimies 7–8/2017, p. 1070–1087; Mika Viljanen, A Cyborg 
Turn in Law? German Journal of Law 18(5) 2017, p. 1277–1308.
5 See eg. Petri Kuppamäki, Määräävän markkina-aseman väärinkäyttö digitaalisilla 
markkinoilla - mikä muuttuu? Lakimies 7–8/2018, p. 996–1023; Petri Kuoppamäki, 
Tying and two-sided digital platforms, p. 307–340 in Paul Nihoul – Pieter Van 
Cleynenbreugel, The Roles of Innovation in Competition Law Analysis. Edward Elgar 
Publishing limited, 2018.
199doctoral student, both of whom are from the Legal Tech Lab, University 
of Helsinki.6
This article presents the findings of the workshop based on the 
happened discussion and the abstracts provided by the participants. 
Since it is based on these sources, it aims primarily at introducing 
the ideas of speakers but also attempts to find alternative ways of 
approaching problems, as well as common areas of interest among the 
researchers. It is divided into two parts. The first part poses questions 
at the abstract level, such as how the instruments of the legal system 
can and should react to new ways of using artificial intelligence. In this 
discussion, it becomes self-evident that regulation is always related 
to a particular context. The second part of the article illustrates the 
diversity of these contexts as these are concretized through three 
particular examples; AI in Courts, automated journalism and smart 
contracts. 
Before addressing the above-mentioned parts of the article, it is 
useful to take a look at the definitions some workshop participants 
gave for artificial intelligence (hereinafter AI). This helps to understand 
their views and also reveals that there are different definitions for 
AI already in a small workshop. Artificial intelligence, as defined by 
Tuomas Pöysti, is ‘a series of different kinds of general purpose digital 
technologies modelling functioning and reasoning of human brains.’ 
According to Anuradha Nayak, AI can be defined as ‘a human artefact. 
Artificial yet so real. It replicates and represents an augmented version 
of intelligence and sentience, attributes that signify a human being. 
Simultaneously amalgamating itself with humans through digital 
6 Contributors to this text were Beata Mäihäniemi, Hanne Hirvonen, Tuomas Pöysti, 
Dory Reiling, Burkhard Schafer, Anuradha Nayak, Laura Lassila and Leo Leppänen. 
Thanks for the comments to Riikka Koulu, Jenni Hakkarainen, Kalle Markkanen. 
200 identities and the futuristic human-machine interface.’7  Pöysti notes 
that although the capabilities of most AI programs are limited in terms 
of problem-solving abilities, intelligent machines and automated data 
processing will rapidly appear as collaborators for humans. Nayak 
points out the future holds promises for a General AI (GAI) that would 
represent a holistic intelligence that could in fact compete with human 
intelligence. 
New AI applications are used in many different ways to ease 
operations. Concrete examples of everyday AI applications are e.g. 
big online platforms that predict very accurately what consumers are 
interested in purchasing or entertainment services which are able to 
give personal music or film recommendations for every user. From this 
point of view, it is good to remember that the need to find better tools is 
not new at all. As Pöysti pointed out in his presentation, human history 
is a history of developing and using tools. However, AI as a tool is quite 
a unique if compared to older tools. Pöysti stated that the partnership 
and collaboration with intelligent machines will be a powerful one. In 
the future, we will be assisted by intelligent virtual assistants and AI 
colleagues in our daily actions and professional life.
Behind the surface, different AI applications include several 
approaches and techniques. However, one common feature for most of 
them is the central role of data. As AI systems are trained on historical 
data, it is important to point out that software is also only as good 
as the data it is trained on. In real life this means different practical 
problems – for example Reiling reminds that predicting outcomes on 
the basis of past case law assumes this case law is correct (see closer 
7 Anuradha Nayak, ‘In a techno-political horizon: Autonomous AI and electronic 
personality’, abstract for the Workshop ‘TOWARDS AI-DRIVEN SOCIETY. A LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE’, 7th of June 2018, University of Helsinki, Finland. 
201part 3, example 1). As the AI  definitions and the problems that are 
drawn through them reveal, the fact that AI is based on data is a key 
part of AI’s social impact. However, it results in a number of problems 
such as different kinds of bias,8 which requires the legal system to 
address this bias by ensuring the quality of data and the proper ways to 
use it. However, due to the space concerns, this article is not focusing 
on questions concerning e.g. biases or other kinds of challenges that 
come along with gathering and handling datasets. Instead, this article 
is focusing on matters such as how can we benefit from data to create 
and improve (legal) and other societal services as well as how to ensure 
that data is correct and properly protected.
The discussions from the workshop provide a basis for this article 
similarly as the above-mentioned definitions of AI. One of the major 
issues that AI raises in the legal sphere and that was repeatedly brought 
up at the workshop is the question of how AI could be regulated to 
best serve the society. This is because the attempts of technology 
companies to self regulate do not necessarily serve the society at 
large, as it will be pointed out below. The following part 2 is focusing 
on attempts to provide guidelines on improving the regulation of AI.
2 REGULATION AND POLICY OF AI 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we will focus on some of the challenges that AI brings 
to regulation and policy. In particular, as to the regulation of AI, we will 
8 See, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: how high-tech tools profile, 
police and punish the poor. St. Martin’s Press 2018; Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math 
Destruction. Crown 2016. 
202 tackle the question ‘How existing laws should be tweaked to respond 
to the current challenges?’ as well as ‘Should new laws be created to 
regulate AI?’. As to the policy changes inspired by AI, we point out that 
the increased use of AI, e.g. autonomous cars (which of course are 
only one example concerning the relationship of AI and regulation), 
can also affect the interactions between citizens and law enforcement. 
In particular, policing traffic in smart environments will be given as an 
example. 
2.2 REGULATION OF AI 
The question on the regulation of AI comes into motion where a 
number of  technology companies use a strategy where they claim that 
the law in force is not suitable for the new technology. Therefore, they 
postulate resorting to self-regulation or start lengthy debates on new 
legislation. Therefore, these tech companies wish to strategically avoid 
more restrictive regulation. Nevertheless, as the laws in force are just 
as valid as before, the important question is how to interpret the laws 
to accommodate the already existing law.9 One of the issues with this 
accommodation is that, as pointed out by Pöysti and evaluated later on 
this article, natural and legal persons are regulated directly or indirectly 
through the market, however, the regulation should always be based 
on a human actor (the so-called idea of anthropocentric law10). 
9 See Riikka Koulu – Beata Mäihäniemi – Vesa Kyyrönen – Jenni Hakkarainen – Kalle 
Markkanen, Algoritmi päätöksentekijänä? Tekoälyn hyödyntämisen mahdollisuudet 
ja haasteet kansallisessa sääntely-ympäristössä (Algorithm as a decision maker? 
Possibilities and challenges in using AI in national legislative environment). 
Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2019.
10 On definition and history of anthropocentric law, see e.g. Jan G. Laitos - Lauren 
Joseph Wolongevicz, Why environmental laws fail. William and Mary Environmental 
Law and Policy Review, 39(1) 2014, pp. 1-52, p. 6-11.
2032.2.1 HOW EXISTING LAWS SHOULD BE TWEAKED TO RESPOND TO THE 
CURRENT CHALLENGES?
As a first answer to the question of ‘How existing laws should be 
tweaked to respond to the current challenges?’, according to Pöysti, 
law should regulate the relationship between the human and AI. This is 
so as traditionally the law has regulated human to human relations or 
legal artefacts created by humans (like foundations and trusts). Today 
and in the near future law might also have to regulate the relationships 
between humans, intelligent machines and networks. This is very 
visible in the European Union data protection law where the General 
Data Protection Regulation (EU) 679/2016 (hereinafter the GDPR)11 
Article 22 contains a general principle of the right of humans being 
ultimately evaluated by humans. In addition, the preamble of the GDPR 
paragraph 4 states the general principle underlying data protection 
laws, according to which processing of personal data, like other actions 
based on AI,  should be designed to serve mankind. However, the 
discussion during the workshop offered also an alternative way of the 
interpretation of the relationship regulated by GDPR, which could be 
defined more narrowly as the systems’ users competence to make use 
of the predicting skills of the system. 
According to Pöysti, the fundamental role of law in digitalised 
society is to maintain human dignity and integrity. The GDPR and 
data protection regulation in general have an important mission 
in governing the relationship between humans and AI-powered 
11 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/
EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
204 machines.12 Data protection regulation is important because it goes 
to the source of many AI-based applications: the users’ data that 
contributes to the improvement and development of the applications 
and improves automated decision-making. Moreover, Pöysti pointed 
out that the importance of the relationship between humans and AI-
powered machines makes both paragraph 4 and article 22 of the GDPR 
eventually one of the most important pieces of regulation regarding 
information processing and automated decision-making.
Pöysti also stated that data protection regulation helps to answer 
some of the fundamental questions of our time: the systemic risks 
related to automated decision-making and living together with (semi)
intelligent applications and devices. Also, data protection regulation 
requires quality of information processing, sufficient security and 
structural protections of legal rights to be built into the platforms and 
software systems. The idea of data protection by design and default is 
a general principle and core requirement in the GDPR Article 25 as well 
as information security in Article 32 of the GDPR.
It is yet important to remember that as the GDPR is quite new 
regulation there is lots of conversation regarding it and many times it 
is the first aspect that comes to mind when discussing about AI related 
legal questions. This strong GDPR approach is partly problematic as 
it may marginalize other essential legal instruments.13 During the 
workshop, the participants also pointed out that there are many other 
governance mechanisms such as the International Human Rights 
Framework or competition law.
12 Lawrence Lessig, Code: and other laws of cyberspace. Basic Books cop. 1999; 
Lawrence Lessig, The future of ideas : the fate of the commons in a connected world. 
Vintage Books cop. 2002; See also Tuomas Pöysti, Kohti digitaalisen ajan hallinto-
oikeutta. Lakimies 7-8/2018, p. 868–903.
13 See eg. Pöysti 2018, p. 879.
205However, the existing laws may still be insufficient to accommodate 
the changes brought along by AI. For example, according to Pöysti, data 
protection regulation alone will not be sufficient on the AI governance 
task. Therefore, a more general way to establish principles of human 
centric digital technologies and legal humanism are needed. As pointed 
out earlier, in his workshop presentation, Pöysti stressed the problem 
of regulation of AI developing away from human-centered regulation, 
and that would be considered a wrong way of development. Therefore, 
he postulates the need for human-centric principles that would be 
based on the rule of law and securing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of fundamental and human rights in digital environment. The task is 
to write the fundamental principles of fundamental rights into the 
infrastructure, digital architectures and to the code and algorithms of the 
AI powered systems. Workshop organisers found this recommendation 
extremely important, however, they were not sure who would in fact 
be precisely responsible for formulating these principles. For example, 
would they be the programmers and companies themselves? What is 
more, there is a question of how would the task of writing principles 
into vertical infrastructures work out in practice, at which stage would 
it be done and finally, who (perhaps a separate governmental body?) 
would ensure that (1) the rules are indeed written in or (2) there is 
compliance with these principles?
According to Pöysti, there should be general legal requirements for 
preserving the principle of human rights by design, such as default and 
proper system testing and maintenance, access to a sufficient quality of 
data, realisation of citizens’ rights of access to data, analytical tools and 
access to good digital administration and justice. The ensuring rights 
by design and default should not be limited to just data protection 
206 regulation.14 Instead, the question is to code in a reasonable general 
balance of all of the fundamental rights and freedoms.
Therefore, as pointed out by Pöysti, we need to establish principles 
of human-centric digital technologies. Moreover, in dealing with AI, 
we should focus on legal humanism that is based on rule of law as 
well as on securing the efficiency and effectiveness of fundamental 
rights in digital environment. Here, data protection law alone will not 
be sufficient on this governance task. 
However, he points out that this could succeed only where  two 
methodical remarks are fully taken into consideration. Firstly, law 
should be proactive, and law is a mechanism of societal and corporate 
planning. Secondly, law can be effective while dealing with AI only if it 
is context-sensitive by taking seriously the specific empirical realities 
of each working environment, which requires a multidisciplinary 
approach for lawyers to work together with computer scientists 
and other professionals. Legal work and legal method in the digital 
environment require systemic and systematic risk management, 
which increasingly concurs with a general theory and practice of risk 
management developed in various aspects of computing, management 
and administrative sciences.
Moreover, as the second answer to the question ‘How existing laws 
should be tweaked to respond to the current challenges?’, it is important 
to point out that the introduction of AI-based technology may also 
lead to significant revolution in policy. For example, as Schafer pointed 
out, introduction of cars has been a major industrial breakthrough 
that also caused a revolution in policing. While car ownership would 
soon become commonplace, the traffic environment remains for many 
citizens the only time where they interact with frontline police officers. 
14 See eg. Pöysti 2018, p. 879.
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new forms of cross-border cooperation between police forces, both 
nationally and internationally. Finally, the emergence of a new legal 
regime, “road traffic law”, also gave the police in many countries 
significant new surveillance powers: it remains almost impossible to 
drive without violating some regulation and “pretextual searches” for 
minor traffic law violations became in many jurisdictions a strategy for 
gathering (legal) intelligence.
As pointed out by Schafer, the advent of autonomous and semi-
autonomous vehicles on our roads could result in changes to policing 
and the interaction of citizens and law enforcement, which could 
denote us to the same regulatory environment that existed before 
cars. Some traffic offences might become irrelevant – if the car drives, 
its human cargo may well be drunk. Other traffic offences might 
become impossible to commit – the car’s AI will have a status report of 
all its constituent parts and can remotely ascertain and proof that the 
insurance has been paid, the tires are inflated, the lights are working, 
and  the license plate is not obstructed etc. With this in mind, an 
important form of citizen-police interaction could disappear, and with 
that also a source of intelligence for policing. 
Similarly, Schafer pointed out that due to the interconnected nature 
of fleets of autonomous cars and their constant interaction with their 
smart environment, massive amounts of information are created. 
This can be information not only about cars’ physical space, but also 
about their legal status such as whether they are stolen, deemed not 
roadworthy etc. The information could also include knowledge of the 
number of passengers, possibly their age and other details. Finally, 
as autonomous and semi-autonomous cars have to be aware of their 
environment, they will also record (what remains of) the interactions 
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“sousveillance”, the surveillance of state actors by citizens. Similarly, 
the police could routinely create data about its own operations when 
policing smart cities, allowing much faster, and more accurate detection 
of problematic patterns (e.g. disproportionate use of surveillance and 
other investigatory powers, such as unlawful data access requests 
against drivers of ethnic minorities). During the workshop discussion 
it was pointed out that such predictive policing is actually already used 
to some extent globally. 
According to Schafer, this kind of predictive policing could result in 
less confrontational (as carried out remotely) and less biased policing. 
It could however also mean an increase of “defensive policing”, where 
everything is demonstrably done by the book (which is only good if the 
book is good) and a loss of discretionary judgement, in the knowledge 
that every police-citizen interaction is recorded via multiple channels. 
Taken together, all this points to the need for a considerable 
readjustment of the legal environment within which traffic policing 
takes place. As the UK and also the Nordic countries identify smart 
cities as a major component for a sustainable urban environment, 
with initiatives such as Smart City Sweden, the Nordic Smart Cities 
Conferences, or Future Cities Glasgow, hard questions have to be 
asked about the future of traffic policing and traffic law in intelligent 
environments.  This means not just a re-evaluation of surveillance 
powers, but also issues such as police oversight and complaints 
procedures, which at the moment are not ready to deal with massive 
amounts of digital evidence that could in the future be supplied by 
citizens (or rather, the AIs in their cars) as a matter of course. 
To sum up, the issue of tweaking existing laws to respond to 
the current challenges, has, during the workshop pointed out two 
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centric law, still, even in the rising age of AI and the need for preserving 
human dignity and integrity. What is more, as pointed out by Schafer on 
the example of autonomous cars, introduction of AI-based technology 
may lead to significant revolution in policy and some legal adjustments 
in that sphere would be required. However, other researchers also 
focus on the challenges created by developing new laws that would go 
beyond the limit of anthropocentric law. This is analysed in the further 
part of this article.
2.2.2 SHOULD NEW LAWS BE CREATED TO REGULATE AI?
The question of whether new laws should be created to regulate 
AI, has been mostly pondered upon during the workshop by Nayak. 
She denotes that ‘’bringing AI robots under the legal identification of 
personality, (...) should be developed as opposed to the traditional 
legal regulation of solely human relationships.’  Granting ‘electronic 
personality’ to autonomous and adaptive robots has been in fact, in 
2017, agreed  by the EU Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) 
as a guideline for the future.  Therefore, the legal framework for ‘AI 
(Artificial Intelligence) and Robotics’ focuses on their development, 
use, ethics and electronic personality. In particular, it evaluates 
on: (a) creation of ethical guidelines to robots; (b) liability rules 
applicable to robots; © ‘Electronic personality’ to autonomous and 
adaptive robots; (d) Independent interaction with third parties.15 
Nevertheless, although this is only a draft of the legal framework, 
15 European Parliament Report (2015/2103(INL)) of 21 Jan 2017 with recommendation 
to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_EN.html> accessed on 18 Mar 2019. 
210 the EU Parliament insisted the European Commission to follow suit. 
Futuristic experts, legal manufacturers and lawmakers approved this 
stance. Conservationists were reluctant and wrote an open letter 
urging the EU Parliament to restrain itself from bringing AI robots 
under the legal identification of personality. They stressed that JURI 
had over-evaluated AI and robotics. The report, although focused on 
technological impacts of AI and robotics, has unforeseen psychological, 
ethical and societal repercussions.16 Moreover, in 2018, the European 
Commission published its future strategy on AI, but refrained itself 
from the ‘electronic personality’ issue.17 The above-mentioned political 
developments show that legal personality has become a sensitive 
issue.  
AI simultaneously amalgamates itself with humans through digital 
identities and the futuristic human-machine interface. With these 
dynamics in play, AI locates itself in a techno-political horizon, a 
fusion of technological, legal and political boundaries that warrants 
the reinterpretation of the notion of personality. This will constitute 
an evolution to the present situation where the application of AI is 
‘specific’ or ‘narrow’ focusing on performance of specific tasks. The 
future holds promise for a General AI (GAI) that represents a holistic 
intelligence competing with human intelligence, with prospectus of 
such intelligence merging with human intelligence.
This raises the following questions. How do technological advances 
affect the position of AI in the juridico-political sphere? What does 
16 Open letter to the European Commission Artificial Intelligence and Robotics 
(Robotics-openletter.eu 2018) <http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/> accessed 18 Mar 
2019.
17 Thomas Burri, The EU is right to refuse legal personality for Artificial Intelligence 
(EURACTIV 31 May 2018). <https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/the-eu-
is-right-to-refuse-legal-personality-for-artificial-intelligence/ >, accessed 18 Mar 2019.
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personality not inclusive? In that reference, what measures could be 
taken to formulate a customized notion of personality for AI?
To sum up, as noted during the workshop discussions, the 
development of an AI-based society requires changes to the law but 
also changes to policy. This is because the definition of AI, its form and 
tasks are constantly evolving. We are slowly moving away from the 
narrow AI towards a notion of electronic personality. What is more, 
changes to regulation bring along the need to update the policy. In 
the following chapter, we will introduce some examples of AI-based 
applications and show how they challenge the application of law. 
3 LEGAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE APPLICATION OF 
TOOLS THAT ALLOW MORE EFFICIENT WORK
In this part, three examples on legal questions related to the 
application of tools that allow lawyers to work more efficiently are 
introduced. All three examples were given during the workshop and 
were complementary as every one of them describes some legal 
questions related to the application of AI tools that allow more 
efficient work. According to these examples, researchers in different 
fields of law meet legal challenges when AI tools come to the picture. 
It is interesting that even though the presentations in the workshop 
were very compact and the given examples were from different fields 
of law, it is still possible to identify the same kind of themes from every 
example. These examples may help to define some shared research 
questions and focus points for the legal perspective of the AI-driven 
society. 
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First of the examples is about the use of AI in courts and it was given 
during the workshop by Dr Dory Reiling. This theme has been discussed 
in many conversations but often in a bit exaggerated format. Questions 
like “will there be robot judges” are of course interesting, but not 
necessarily very close to the real life current situation where courts 
actually are or what courts even seek. However, the digitalization of 
courts is a very concrete example of the progress where AI changes 
legal precedent.18 
In her presentation, Reiling stated that in order to understand what 
AI can do for courts, it is useful to distinguish the different processes in 
judging. Many cases are mainly routine. If the information that comes 
in is sufficient to determine the outcome, no information exchange 
between the parties is needed.19 Since in these cases all the court does 
is provide a title for execution, AI may be useful to triage incoming 
cases into this group. A lot of family and labor law related cases are 
also largely routine, since they are brought to court in cooperation 
between the parties. The court’s role in these situations is largely 
notarial. Here, predicting outcomes in order to provide advice to the 
parties could help speeding the cases through court.
Reiling also stated that when the information brought to the court 
is not enough to predict the outcome, things change. In more complex 
cases unpredictable outcomes always impose risks for parties. Here, 
according to Reiling, court procedures are a conversation about what 
18 Riikka Koulu, Digitalisaatio ja algoritmit – oikeustiede hukassa? Lakimies 7–8/2018, 
p. 840–867, p.846.
19 On different roles on the basis of which court cases can be categorized according 
to the use of information in each group see Reiling 2009, in particular pages 116–117. 
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conversation is also a way to reduce the complexity of the dispute. 
Parties may agree on some points, but not on others. Sometimes, 
parties still settle their dispute with an agreement. In this case, a 
prediction as advisory can also be helpful for the parties to decide 
how they need to settle their differences and reduce the risk of 
unpredictability. If not, a judicial decision is needed to end the case. 
In this case, by no means the largest proportion of court cases, judges 
may be helped with algorithms structuring the information in the case 
file, predicting outcomes as advisory and testing the fairness of the 
judge’s conclusions.
Reiling also reminded us not to be over optimistic or overestimate 
the help and usefulness of these AI tools. She pointed out that predicting 
outcomes on the basis of past case law assumes this case law is correct. 
It is not easy to check the correctness of earlier case law if compared 
to different types of data, for example more statistical information. 
This is one reason why predicting from earlier court decisions differs 
from more simple situations where the right answer can be easily 
deduced straight from the facts. Generally, law is a complicated system 
and it seems that ideas concerning “robot judges” are based on over-
simplified impression of courts’ work and also overrated assessment of 
AI applications’ usefulness and objectivity.
Another important thing Reiling pointed out is that AI does not 
use legal reasoning in its methodology. Legal reasoning deals with 
what happened, procedural fairness, legal framework and moral 
considerations. Its structure largely looks like this: facts, circumstances, 
rules, analysis, and outcome. Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights requires that courts provide a fair procedure. This 
includes accountability, an explanation of the outcome of cases. This 
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crucial to keep in mind that AI works with existing inputs. This assumes 
that input is correct, and can be processed by the AI. 
‘What does it take to make AI useful for courts?’,  Reiling then 
asked. According to her, the legal source input needs to be improved. 
It then requires, among others, the implementation of European 
Case Law Identifier that would be available not only for court cases, 
but also for other legal sources like legislation and parliamentary 
documents. Reiling saw that AI can do for courts things that do not 
get a lot of attention in the hype around predicting outcomes, but can 
still be useful: structuring large amounts of information, for instance 
in big case files, analyzing processes to detect bottlenecks in case 
management and increase efficiency and testing case outcomes for 
equality. Hopefully these new working methods will soon be in use and 
we will get to a point where judges can focus on the most important 
parts of their job.
Finally, as pointed out by Reiling, we need to trigger a warning that 
digital support of judicial decisions might not help the most vulnerable 
(in courts). Financial efficiency should not be the only goal of changes 
and there should also be some ethical considerations included. 
Therefore, some guidelines for the use of AI by courts should be 
provided. In fact, the Council of Europe’s Commission for the Efficiency 
of Justice has, in December 2018, produced guidelines for the ethical 
use of AI in courts. These are, firstly, respecting fundamental rights 
which denotes ensuring that the design and implementation of artificial 
intelligence tools and services are compatible with fundamental rights. 
Secondly, non-discrimination that is preventing the development or 
intensification of any discrimination between individuals or groups of 
individuals. Thirdly, ensuring quality and security: with regard to the 
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intangible data with models conceived in a multi-disciplinary manner 
and in a secure technological environment. Fourthly, ensuring the 
transparency, impartiality and fairness in making data processing 
methods accessible and understandable as well as authorizing external 
audits. Finally, ensuring that processes are “under user control” that 
is precluding a prescriptive approach and ensuring that users are 
informed actors and in control of their choices.20
The workshop aimed to understand AI related issues that are 
currently being considered by researchers of different fields of law. 
This example describes well both practical and theoretical sides of 
the question in court – for example better case management is a 
practical benefit AI tools may offer and the possibility to use AI in legal 
reasoning is an example of matters that demand more theoretical 
thinking.  When AI tools’ use in court raises questions concerning due 
process and fundamental rights, the following example on automated 
journalism represents completely different research orientation. 
Following example moved the conversation from procedural law to 
private law and more closely to copyright law.
3.2  EXAMPLE 2: AUTOMATED JOURNALISM 
Second example is about automated journalism and this example was 
given by Mr. Leo Leppänen. According to Leppänen, recent years have 
seen an increase in the use of automation in the news organizations 
20 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), European ethical 
Charter  on the use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment. 
Strasbourg 3-4 December 2018. Available at https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-
publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c.
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to the audiences and the general public in the shape of automated 
generation of news articles. 
Leppänen explained that financial efficiency is one of the most 
important drives of the change. The reasons for the employment 
of such automation technology are myriad, but largely boil down to 
a need to achieve more with less resources. For example, in cases 
where automation can reduce the cost of producing an individual 
piece of news content towards zero, it becomes feasible to target the 
so called “long” tail, where consumer preferences are divided among 
a great number of different categories. Normally, the marginal costs 
for investing resources into creating niche content would be too high. 
However, in the case of automation, hundreds or thousands of articles 
could be produced cheaply, each targeting a highly specific audience 
of a handful of readers. At the same time, automation could allow the 
redirection of the human journalists’ effort to where it most counts: 
from producing the bulk news reports to analytical and introspective 
journalism. 
Every time something is automated – the same problem occurs 
– how to define the rights and responsibilities of the party that is 
“in charge”. According to Leppänen, in this context the question 
concerns both the rights and responsibilities of the author. Due to the 
limited time Leppänen wasn’t able to describe in detail what kind of 
responsibilities are the most relevant ones in this context. However, 
according to Leppänen, legal questions become increasingly pressing 
as the systems move from relatively trivial and “safe” domains, such as 
weather reports, to others with increasing complexity and societal and 
financial importance such as finance and elections.
217Leppänen pointed out that the systems used to generate news 
articles are complex and the production of even the simplest system 
can directly or indirectly involve dozens of people. This probably is 
obvious to people who are familiar with computer science, however, 
not necessarily to all others. As this example shows, in order to 
understand the AI-driven society an interdisciplinary collaboration in 
needed.
It is therefore unclear, whose name should be on the byline of the 
produced news articles, as pointed out by Leppänen. Attributing it to 
the software itself hides the humans not only from the glory, but also 
from the responsibility over the system’s possible failures. This suggests 
that we should hold those who had a part in the creation of the system 
as authors. But there again lies problems: to what degree can we hold 
the author of a 3rd party software library, who has probably never even 
heard of the specific system, an author of the system’s output? Does 
the answer depend on the significance of the library for the system as 
a whole? If the system uses machine learning and ingests hundreds of 
thousands of news articles written by humans in order to learn how to 
mimic them, what is the contribution of those original authors? Or that 
of the journalists who tell the engineers what to do? 
Leppänen’s example describes well some of the legal questions 
which the technological development has caused. Leppänen was 
focusing on the work of journalists, but in the same way in a judicial 
context automation and new technologies may help lawyers or judges 
to focus on the more difficult tasks. Situations similar to this example 
can be found among others while applying automated decision-making 
to the public sector. In these cases, there is also a need to define 
the person who takes the responsibility of a certain decision. More 
generally, this example shows in a simple way what kind of problems 
218 current anthropocentric law causes in these new circumstances where 
the human actorship is not self-evident basis anymore. 
As the example shows, typical working methods have changed in 
two ways: 1) people do less by themselves while the role of  machines 
is growing and 2) roles in certain production and collaboration have 
become more complex.  Many times, the legislation is based on the 
idea of rights and responsibilities of one actor, which is one of the 
reasons for the new interpretation problems. This presentation also of 
course raises new questions. As AI can produce news “independently”, 
but it can also have more of an assisting role, it would be interesting to 
discuss i.e. how this affects the question of different responsibilities. 
It is also important to notice that it seems that working methods in 
the future are not “either human or machine” type but “both human 
and machine” type. Even though AI applications are developing and 
becoming more and more autonomous, the workshop’s examples show 
that most relevant focus point is the relationship and co-operation 
between humans and AI-powered machines. This remark strengthens 
points that were made already in the second chapter of this article. 
The last example of this article is about smart contracts and it offers 
third point of view to the legal issues AI related tools bring up. As the 
example comes from contract law, where the freedom of contract is a 
strong principle, it offers very different angle to the matter compared 
to the examples presented so far.
3.3 EXAMPLE 3: SMART CONTRACTS
The third example, which was presented by Ms. Laura Lassila in the 
workshop, is about interpreting smart contracts. Smart contracts 
generally refer to a digital programme based on blockchain technology 
219which performs its inner logic. As the code cannot be changed, 
smart contracts are both self-executing and self-enforcing. This is a 
significant difference compared to conventional contracts established 
through speech, written words, or actions. Smart contracts can be 
applied in a multitude of different ways, with highly varying goals 
and circumstances.21 Smart contracts are claimed to save contracting 
parties money, as they should be faster, cheaper and more secure than 
tradiional systems.22 However, this new contracting method is not fully 
trouble-free from a legal point of view.   
Legally interesting smart contract models can be divided into two 
different groups, as Lassila had done in her presentation. The first smart 
contract model here is called a “simple smart contract” and it refers 
to a contract where parties have agreed terms beforehand, either 
with different contract or within the code. Such terms constitute the 
smart contract, which then can execute itself as programmed. From 
these kinds of contract terms, one can in many cases find  the key legal 
elements of a legally valid contract: offer, acceptance and intention to 
be bound by the terms. However, parties may be unidentified persons 
or machines, and this brings up the question of a legal subject.23
21 See eg. Juri Mattila and Timo Seppälä, Älykäs sopimus - Miten blockchain muuttaa 
sopimuskäytäntöjä? ETLA reports 2016, available at <https://www.etla.fi/julkaisut/
alykas-sopimus-miten-blockchain-muuttaa-sopimuskaytantoja/> accessed 19 March 
2019.
22 The sources that praise smart contracts are not academic but they give good picture 
from the hype around the theme: Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain 
Technology That Will Replace Lawyers. Blockgeeks 2016. Available at:   https://
blockgeeks.com/guides/smart-contracts/ and What Are Smart Contracts? Guide For 
Beginners. Cointelegraph, available at: https://cointelegraph.com/ethereum-for-
beginners/what-are-smart-contracts-guide-for-beginners#what-are-smart-contracts-
for. Accessed 20.4.2019. 
23 Riikka Koulu, Blockchains and Online Dispute Resolution: Smart Contracts as an 
Alternative to Enforcement. SCRIPTed – A journal of Law, Technology & Society,   13(1) 
2016, p.40-69.
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which in turn refers to a contract where AI is used for solving issues 
of reliability and usability of contracts. According to Lassila, AI can 
for example verify the code so that there are no bugs. AI can also be 
used to check the contract terms and that those terms are in line with 
agreed framework rules or legislation.24 Smart contracts with AI have 
been called intelligent contracts in order to highlight  the difference 
between not so smart smart contracts and contracts with actual 
intelligence. 
One of the interesting questions concerning interpretation of 
contract law and smart contracts is, according to Lassila, whether a 
contract is valid if the parties agree without knowing the terms of 
the contract. Lassila has studied this question via Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which provides 
interpretation rules for sales contracts. CISG article 8 sets the parties’ 
intention to be the starting point of interpretation. In article 9 there 
are rules concerning binding contract terms. The article states that 
‘parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by 
any practices which they have established between themselves.’ From 
this starting point Lassila set following questions: could AI be seen as 
the next practice in international trade? Should it then be seen as the 
usage parties have agreed part to their contract? 
In the workshop, Lassila based her own introductory answer on the 
contract freedom. According to Lassila, contract law traditionally leaves 
a significant amount of freedom to parties, especially in commercial 
24 Bill Li, Intelligent Contracts - the AI Solution for the issues of Security and Smart 
Contracts. Matrix AI Network, 5 May 2018, available at: <https://medium.com/@
matrixainetwork/intelligent-contracts-the-ai-solution-for-the-issue-of-security-and-
smart-contracts-a992d1368fd1> accessed 19 March 2019
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Therefore, parties should have the freedom to choose AI to negotiate 
terms on behalf of them.25 In real life, there are multiple different 
terms of use that  consumers agree on without reading or knowing 
the content precisely. Lassila asks, how does this then differ from 
the situation where parties agree to use algorithm to create specific 
terms? She also continued with another question; if the parties cannot 
read and understand the terms presented in a code, is there a serious 
problem in the light of contract law? 
According to Lassila, existing rules can give us tools to interpret 
contract clauses in new environment. General principles can function 
as a framework when finding ways to adopt existing norms to solve 
new legal issues. For example, the principle of freedom of contract 
gives contracting parties a possibility to choose ways and methods to 
make agreements. What is more, these principles could be used as 
a framework in AI driven contracts when parties agree to be bound 
by the principles. Here, AI, or better say, code, could solve questions 
of specific terms, answering the problem of how to reach the parties’ 
intention.
In the beginning of this article we mentioned that many of the 
issues regarding AI-driven society are so new that the current laws 
can’t often be bent for to be applied to new situations. Our human-
centric law, which mostly regulates human to human relations, seemed 
problematic also according to the previous example. However, Lassila’s 
presentation allows us to rethink this matter and it seems that this 
is not always the case. With innovative interpretation one might find 
possibilities to interpret law in a way which is coherent, logical and 
25 Of course there are several contract types where parties don’t have full contract 
freedom and they have to take different kind of regulations into account.
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also important to notice that where the legal text itself is not applicable 
to the case, the general principles of the field may also be of help. This 
shows us that one should not make too fast conclusions when facing 
new kind of relationships between humans, intelligent machines and 
networks and just rush to demand new legislation. It is often very easy 
to state that existing laws cannot solve certain new problem, but this is 
not necessary always the case.
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The workshop organised by the Legal Tech Lab ended up with fruitful 
discussions on a range of topics related to AI. In particular, we seemed 
to provide an overview of the crucial questions that legal research can 
ask on artificial intelligence, such as the need to tweak the existing laws 
and the possibility of creating new ones. However, the discussions also 
provided some particular examples of the areas where legal problems 
connected with the regulation of AI can arise, such as the use of AI 
in courts, automated journalism and smart contracts. We have noted 
that most of the speakers agree on strengthening the role of a human 
actor wherever the question of the regulation of an AI occurs. 
Below we sum up some of the  observations from the discussions.
As to the regulation of AI, several recommendations were offered such 
as the need to write the fundamental principles of fundamental rights 
into the infrastructure and digital architectures and, to the code and 
algorithms of AI powered systems. What is more, a more general way 
to establish principles of human centric digital technologies and legal 
humanism would be welcomed. These principles should be based 
on the rule of law and securing of the efficiency and effectiveness 
223of fundamental and human rights in digital environment. Moreover, 
according to Nayak, in order to embrace electronic personality and 
develop this legal concept, some kind of consensus has to be met in 
techno-political horizon, which for now is a fusion of technological, 
legal and political boundaries that warrants the reinterpretation of the 
notion of personality. 
As to the policing of AI in the era of the rise of autonomous cars, 
Schafer calls for a considerable readjustment of the legal environment 
within which traffic policing takes place. This is because the advent 
of autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles on our roads could 
result in changes to policing and the interaction of citizens and law 
enforcement that is every bit as profound as that of the early 20th 
century, and, somewhat counterintuitively, puts us back to the word 
before cars.
The workshop also evaluated on AI related tools that allow 
more efficient work are very different from the tools people have 
used earlier. They allow replacing many tasks via automation and 
transforming working methods, however these changes can raise legal 
questions that current legislation cannot necessarily address. This has 
been illustrated in this article on the examples concerning automated 
journalism and smart contracts.
Another important point deriving from the examples related to AI 
tools that were introduced in this paper, is that efficiency should not 
be the only driver of the change. In order to benefit from these new 
AI tools, it is also important to recognize the possible problems. One 
of them was pointed out by Dory Reiling, when she pointed out that 
where AI works with existing inputs, an assumption that an input is 
correct, and can be processed by the AI, does not always hold. For this 
224 reason, for example predicting outcomes on the basis of past case law 
is a complex matter as the past case law is not always correct. 
To sum up, the workshop provided and stressed some specific 
guidelines for the regulation of AI, both at the general level as well as 
in specific areas. Based on the discussion, it became self-evident that 
regulation is always related to a particular context it is applied in. 
